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THE CONNECTIVITY BETWEEN DAMAGE TO PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND 
SOCIAL SCIENCE: A NEW FIELD STUDY PROTOCOL CONCEPT 
 
The primary objective of this thesis is to introduce a field study methodology that will be 
calibrated over the next several years to enable researchers to collect data in the field that can be 
used to better understand and quantify community resilience. Specifically, a key objective is to 
provide a mechanism to link damage to the physical infrastructure to social and economic 
dimensions of a community in a measurable way. Although there have been several past attempts 
at creating a common post-disaster field study protocol, none of them have attempted to quantify 
community resilience in a quantitative manner that can be used for risk and resilienc  analysis. 
The methodology explained in this thesis is unique because it discusses potential metrics that can 
be used to quantify community resilience and describes methods of quantifying these metrics 
using field data. These metrics come from a combinatio  of disciplines including engineering, 
sociology, and economics. This work combines a literature review of past field study protocols 
with perceived data requirements in order to outline a field study methodology that can be used 
for disasters (primarily natural; not anthropogenic) of any type including tornados, hurricanes, 
flood, tsunamis, wildland-urban interface (WUI) fires, and earthquakes. Algorithms were derived 
that include the ability to process raw field study data in order to create probabilistic models of 
resilience metrics (i.e., fragility functions). These algorithms were then demonstrated using 
existing field data related to population dislocation caused by Hurricane Andrew. Finally, a 
community resilience field study was conducted five years into the recovery process in order to 
investigate and model the long term effects of the May 22, 2011 tornado that occurred in Joplin, 
iii  
MO. The planning and execution of this study is described and the data that was gathered is used 
to provide an illustrative example of the interconnectivity between the physical damage and 
socio-economic consequences.   
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This thesis describes a field study methodology that has the objective of linking the 
socio-economic dimensions of a community with the physical effects on a community’s 
infrastructure that are caused by a natural hazard. The NIST Center for Risk-Based Community 
Resilience Planning is a NIST Center of Excellence (CoE), which is headquartered at Colorado 
State University (CSU) with nine partnering universities across the U.S. This five-year project is 
focused on developing a computational environment called Interdependent Networked 
Community Resilience Modeling Environment (IN-CORE). IN-CORE is a research tool that will 
allow researchers a mechanism to study and quantify resilience and provide informative 
decision-making support for communities. The methodology outlined in this thesis explains the 
process of generating fragility functions for resilience metrics, which are typically driven by 
socio-economic consequences, which an be added to the IN-CORE databases once a series of 
field studies are conducted.  
One of the tasks within the NIST CoE involves conducting several resilience field studies 
in communities that have been affected by disasters. The methodology presented in this thesis 
has been created in order to provide a mechanism to develop fragility functions that link hazard 
intensity and potential resilience metrics. This, in turn, will provide insight into what data should 
be collected in the field to allow researchers to build the necessary databases for IN-CORE. This 
methodology focuses primarily on the socio-economic consequences resulting from damage to 
physical systems. Social and economic changes can lso impact physical systems, but those 
effects are not considered in this body of work. This thesis primarily focuses on the social 
consequences of physical damage nd only briefly discusses economic impact studies, which are 
typically performed using secondary data. However, it will be important for future work to create 
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new data collection procedures that allow economists to use primary field data to quantify fiscal 
impacts. That work, however, is outside of the scope of this thesis.  
Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21 2013) defines resilience as “the ability to 
prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and to withstand and recover rapidly from 
disruptions.” NIST defines a community as “a place designated by geographical boundaries that 
functions under the jurisdiction of a governance structure, such as a town, city, or county.” 
However, it is also important to understand that communities are composed of smaller sub 
communities that are formed by people who share views, values, perspectives, and life 
circumstances (Kwasinski et al. 2016). By combining these two definitions the term community 
resilience can be better understood. We have defined two major goals for community resilience 
field studies:  
1. To quantify the connectivity between physical damage and socio-economic 
consequences. This includes immediate effects such as damage, but should focus on long-
term recovery. 
2. To collect the data needed to develop probabilistic models of community-level resilience 
metrics for eventual addition to IN-CORE databases. 
The methodology presented in this thesis demonstrates the procedure to achieve these 
goals during a field study. Chapter 2 describes a review of past protocols for conducting field 
studies after natural disasters and identifies gaps in the current process typically used to conduct 
post-disaster field reconnaissance. Chapter 3 discusses a conceptual framework for assessing 
resilience at the community scale that was created by NIST and identifies seven crucial resilience 
metrics that form the basis of this protocol concept. In Chapter 4 a diagram is presented that 
provides field questions that focus on the interconnectivities between the physical, soci l, and 
3 
economic domains within a community, and a sample field study questionnaire is also provided. 
Throughout this thesis, the term “connectivity” is used to represent the linkage across physical, 
social, and economic community domains, and the term “dependency” is used when referring to 
linkages between physical systems only. Chapter 5 includes some practical suggestions for 
planning and executing resilience-focused field studies. Chapter 6 describes algorithms that were 
created to process field data in order to generate fragility functions for evaluating resilience 
metrics. These algorithms were tested using household population dislocation data from 
Hurricane Andrew and the results are shown in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 provides an illustrative 
example of a field study that focused on connecting physical damage to socio-ec nomic 
consequences in support of a hindcast for Joplin, MO about five years after it was devastated by 
an EF-5 tornado. Finally, Chapter 9 provides final conclusions, describes the significance of this 
thesis, identifies data concerns, and outlines future work that should be done in this area.  
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2. Literature Review 
Since the origin of modern disaster research, field studies have been conducted in the 
aftermath of disaster events o investigate and improve the built and social environments. 
Traditional field studies typically focus on either infrastructure performance or human behavior. 
Further, the majority of past field studies have focused on a single sector of the infrastructure 
within a community or city with the intent to, for example, improve building codes or establish 
public policy of some sort. Very few field researchers have attempted to investigate the 
interconnectivities of physical systems, economic structure, and social vulnerability within a 
community. As the field of disaster research shifts to the new paradigm of improving a 
community’s resilience to natural (or other) hazards, field researchers must begin studying 
system interconnectivities within communities. This thesis begins by reviewing thirty-five 
relatively recent field studies from different disc plines and across different natural hazards with 
a focus placed on their stated or implied protocol. The first goal of this review is to identify 
common features from each field study protocol in order to lay the ground work for the 
development of a community resilience study protocol and provide a brief overview of the 
current methods, tools, and strategies that are being used for field studies. The second goal is to 
identify gaps in past field study protocols related to collecting data for the study of community 
resilience. Each study that was reviewed was carefully selected with the guidance of leading 
experts in disaster field studies in order to provide the reader with a broad understanding of field 
study protocols for various disciplines and natural disaster types. 
Following this review of past field study protocols, a brief overview of the dependencies 
and interdependencies of critical infrastructure systems is provided in order to highlight the 
5 
complexities of infrastructure systems and the difficulties that are associated with attempting to 
quantify the resilience of these systems.  
2.1.  Field Study Protocols Literature Review 
In order to learn from past field study protocols and the large volume of literature that 
exists in disaster research, thirty-five past field/case study reports were examined. It was not the 
intent of this selection to be exhaustive, which would involve hundreds and even several 
thousand studies, but rather to select a large enough sample with breadth across the three 
disciplines that intertwine to form the basis of modern community resilience analysis, namely 
engineering/physical infrastructure, social dimensions (including epidemiology), and economics. 
These studies were selected by first consulting leading experts in each discipline and then 
choosing studies that the author believes present a case for understanding the tools and strategies 
that have been used to conduct field studies of various disciplines for various types of natural 
disasters. There are many more studies that meet these criteria and could have been included; 
however, it is believed that the papers presented in this thesis provide the reader with a 
fundamental understanding of multi-disciplinary field studies and provide direction for future 
field studies that will focus on community resilience. Thus the reviewed reports included: 
engineering (17), sociology (6), economic (7), and epidemiologic (focusing on physical and 
mental morbidity and mortality) (5) studies. Several of the studies were multi-disciplinary and 
care has been taken to consider them as such, but they have been classified by their primary 
objective. The reviewed reports covered a number of natural hazards including earthquakes, 
wildland-urban interface (WUI) fires, tornadoes, floods, hurricanes, and tsunamis. Several of the 
reports are classified as case studies because the authors did not go int  the field to collect data; 
instead they analyzed data obtained by others, which is often characteristic of economic loss 
6 
studies since those data are typically not available for some time after the event. The sample of 
reports also contains a combination of quick response and long term investigations. Quick 
response investigations are typically conducted quickly after the disaster, as their name implies, 
in order to obtain cross sectional data about the community and are useful for collecting 
perishable data but fall short in understanding a community’s recovery over time. Long term 
studies are more useful for studying community resilience because they collect data that relates 
to the community’s recovery in the years following the disaster.  
Figure 2-1 presents a schematic showing the primary focus area of each of the studies 
that were examined as part of this literature review. This schematic shows that although several 
of the field studies were multi-disciplinary, none investigated all four categories where 
community resilience is depicted. It is important to note that while it was convenient for us to 
make edidemiology its own category for the purposes of this literature review, it is not being 
considered as its own community domain. Instead, it is typically considered to be a subset of the 
social domain. The studies that did investigate multiple domains within the community focused 
only on individual systems within the community instead of the linkages between systems that 
can affect a community’s resilience. For each study reviewed in this chapter the data collection 
methods, strategies, tools, personnel, and decision making processes were identified, and then 
each report was summarized and critically analyzed to determine its effectiveness. It is 
envisioned that identifying the methods and tools used by researchers can inform what will be 
effective for conducting community resilience field studies. Additionally, ll study methods and 
tools that were not effective were identified. This chapter reviews and assesses past field studies 
for the three key domains that, together, form the basis for understanding community resilience 
field studies: physical systems, social science (including epidemiology), and economics. 
7 
 
Figure 2-1: Reviewed Reports by Primary Objectives 
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Table 2-1 provides a list of all the reports that were rviewed, the hazard type, the 
location, and a summary of the r searchers’ methodology. While reviewing each of these reports, 
the primary focus was on the protocol, data collection methods, strategies, tools, and personnel 
that were used to collect field data. 
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Table 2-1: Field Study Protocols Comparison 
Reference 
 
Hazard Type Location/Name 
(Year) 
Study Type Summary of Approach Positives Negatives 
Adams et al. 
(2004) 
Earthquake Boumerdes, 
Algeria and Bam, 
Iran (2003) 
Engineering Pre and post-disaster satellite imagery 
was purchased and algorithms were 
used to identify low resolution 
damage to buildings. All images were 
geo-tagged and were used to guide 
field researchers to the most damaged 
building clusters. This methodology is 
difficult to apply to any earthquake 
event because building stock and 
construction material may change 
depending on the location of the 
earthquake. The algorithms must be 
modified for different sites. 
Field 
researchers 









wasted time in 
the field. 
It is difficult to 
obtain high 
resolution imagery. 
This problem is 
solved through 





improvements as in 
Zhou et al. (2015). 




Engineering A team entered the field quickly to 
obtain perishable data. They tried to 
represent the whole community with a 
moderate sample size. Used notes, 
photos, and recorded interviews. They 
started near the epicenter and 
investigated outward, focusing on 
only the most damaged components of 
the infrastructure. They collaborated 
with other research organizations to 
obtain additional data. They also 
investigated the cause and effects of 
the post-earthquake fire. 
They were able 













resilience that were 
not considered in 








Eidinger and Tang 
(2012) 
Earthquake Christchurch, New 
Zealand (2010-
2011) 
Engineering The team focused on lifelines and 
worked closely with private and 
public lifeline companies to btain 
data. They supplemented this data 
with field notes and photos, while 
focusing on damaged systems that 
would allow them to easily collect 
data. 
They were able 






to access large 
amounts of 
They did not 
emphasize the 
interconnectivities 
of lifelines and 
other infrastructure 






Borrero (2005) Tsunami Sumatra, Indonesia 
(2004) 
Engineering A field team was deployed to northern 
Sumatra seven days after the 
earthquake and tsunami. Their 
purpose was to study the 
characteristics of the tsunami 
inundation, the structural damage, and 
the shoreline erosion. They used field 
notes, interviews with community 
members and government officials, 
and aerial and ground-based geo-
located images as their methods of 
data collection.  
They were able 














primarily on the 
wave 
characteristics and 





methods did not 
allow them to 
collect high 
resolution data. 
Kuligowski et al. 
(2014) 
Tornado Joplin, MO (2011) Multi -
disciplinary 
This holistic technical investigation 
analyzed the tornado hazard, damaged 
and non-damaged structures, lifelines, 
disaster warning, morbidity, mortality, 
and emergency response. They used 
traditional field techniques to collect 
data including transcribed interviews, 
photos, field inspection data, etc. The 
main focus was on improving codes 






were able to 
approximate 
wind speed 









While this study 
was multi-
disciplinary, they 
did not attempt to 
connect disciplines 




sectors of the 
community 
independently. 
Prevatt et al. 
(2011) 
Tornado Tuscaloosa, AL 
(2011) 
Engineering Wood frame buildings that were in the 
path of the tornado were investigated. 
The team investigated transects 
perpendicular to the path of the 
tornado that were a half mile apart and 
a half mile long. LiDAR scanners 
were used to capture high resolution 
data. 




allowed them to 
obtain a 
representative 












Kashani et al. 
(2014) 
Tornado Tuscaloosa, AL 
(2011) 
Engineering This report outlines a methodology 
that can be used to estimate 
percentages of damage to walls and 
roofs after a tornado event. A wind 
estimation model then used these 
damage estimates to approximate th  
likely wind speeds at the structure. 
This methodology was also employed 
by Graettinger et al. (2013) after the 
tornado in Moore, OK. It uses 
terrestrial laser scanners to capture 
post-event geometries and aerial 
photography to capture pre-event 
geometries. Then it automatically 
estimates the damage based on 
differences in geometry using custom 
made GIS software. The method is 
tested for accuracy using data from the 




















data is a slow 
process due to the 
use of ground 
based scanners. 
They were only 
able to evaluate a 
small sample of 
structures. Aerial 
based scanners and 
field teams are able 
to collect data for 
much larger sample 
sizes. 
Graettinger et al. 
(2013) 
Tornado Moore, OK (2013) Engineering This approach was similar to the 
approach taken by Prevatt et al. 
(2011). Wood structures were 
investigated in perpendicular transects 
to the tornadoes path. However, this 
study introduced an automated 
damage assessment and wind speed 
estimation methodology using 3-D 
laser scanner data as described by 
Kashani et al. (2014). The authors also 
placed an emphasis on data collection 
through social media. All data points 
were spatial and temporal, and LiDAR 





types of data 
which allowed 
for a robust data 





them to identify 
areas of 
interest. 
This was a rigorous 
and well performed 
study for the 





resources if it were 
expanded to 
investigate all 





WUI Witch Creek 
Canyon, CA and 
Rancho Guejito, 
CA (2007) 
Engineering Performances of residences were 
investigated by field researchers. The 
initial team was deployed 4 days after 





LiDAR is not able 
to see through solid 
objects so it was 
insufficient for data 
12 
community that was highly affected 
by the fires. Interviews, surveys, field 
notes, and remote sensors were used 
for data collection. A combination of 
aerial and ground based imagery was 
used. The first priority of the field 
team was to collect perishable data 
(e.g., completely burned structres). 
Remote sensor data sources included: 
Pictometry, Ortho-rectified Imagery 
(USGS), Google Imagery, Ortho-
rectified Imagery (San Diego State 
University), LiDAR, Property 
boundaries (SanGIS), and Vegetation 
Community Types (SanGIS). This 
provided oblique imagery, aerial 
imagery, point measurements, and 
vector GIS data. 





They were able 




The report was 
rigorous and 
provided a very 
good 
understanding 





were not able to 
gain access to 
certain properties, 
and they were not 




elements. They had 





Maranghides et al. 
(2011, 2016) 
WUI Amarillo, TX 
(2011) 
Engineering The focus was on only one of the three 
areas that were affected by fire. Two 
to four teams spent 21 days in the field 
investigating performance of 
structures and to recommend changes 
to standards and codes. The study was 
performed in two tiers: WUI 1 was 
used to collect general data across the 
perimeter of the fire and WUI 2 was 
used to collect in depth fire behavior, 
timeline, defensive action, and 
structural performance. Tools used 
include digital cameras, aerial 
photography, field notes, remote 
sensing technology and more. 





WUI fire field 
studies have 
been performed. 





were able to 
enter the field 
within 48 hours 
and collect 
perishable data. 
GIS data was too 
large to transfer to 
the remote GIS 
team. They suggest 
having the GIS 




Hurricane Katrina (2005) Multi -
Disciplinary 
This five volume report was a multi-
disciplinary effort to study the impact 
of the hurricane on physical systems 
and response and recovery efforts. 
This is one of 
the few studies 
that was truly 
multi-
They did not 
attempt to connect 
socioeconomic 
factors and damage 
13 
They investigated advanced damage 
detection using remote sensing, 
damage to engineered structures, 
organizational decision making 
primarily in hospitals, and 
environmental and public health 
issues. They used face to face and 
telephone interviews to collect 
qualitative data, and numerous remote 
sensing tools, field journals, and aerial 








collect data that 









social issues as 
independent. 
Van de Lindt et al. 
(2005, 2007) 
Hurricane Katrina (2005) Engineering The most damaged wood-frame 
structures were investigated over a 
three day period by a field team. This 
team investigated more than 27 
structures (or neighborhoods) in order 
to determine the effectiveness of 
codes and construction practices. The 
tools that they used in the field 
consisted of handheld cameras and 
field notes. Wind speed estimates 
















did not attempt to 
connect the 
performance of 
wood structures to 
other aspects of the 
community. 
Zhou et al. (2015) Hurricane Sandy (2012) Engineering In order to provide a detailed damage 
assessment of residential buildings, 
dozens of images were taken of each 
structure by field teams. These images 
were then reconstructed in 3D using 
both 123D Catch and SURE software. 
The results from these two methods 
were compared with the results from a 
LiDAR scanner, and it was 
determined that the use of SURE 
software is more accurate than the use 




point cloud data 
to be captured 
without the use 
of expensive 
instruments 
such as LiDAR. 
In order to obtain 
good results, image 
overlap should be 
about 90%. In 
order to capture the 
images of the roof, 
UAVs should be 
used. This method 








Hurricane Ike (2008) Multi -
disciplinary 
This case study investigated four 
areas: the social, built, economic, and 
natural environments. They did not 
obtain any data from the field 
They were able 
to obtain vast 
amounts of data 
without ever 
They did not 
identify all of their 
data sources. They 
investigated the 
14 
themselves. Instead, they obtained 
data from government agencies, 
university researchers, and online 
resources. They focused on reporting 
the broad impacts of the hurricane and 









resilience, but did 
not discuss their 
interconnectivities. 
FEMA (2009) Flood Midwest Floods in 
Iowa and 
Wisconsin (2008) 
Engineering FEMA first sent a pre-MAT in order 
to conduct a preliminary assessment 
of the flood damage. They used this 
preliminary data to decide if they were 
going to send a full MAT into the field 
and to develop data collection 
strategies. They inspected the most 
damaged buildings and structures to 
determine causes of damage and loss 
of functionality. Their purpose was to 
provide recommendations that would 
reduce future damage and update 
building codes. They also conducted 
brief studies of social and economic 
losses and disaster preparation and 
response effectiveness. 




















in the causes of 
structural damage. 




they did not 
attempt to connect 
these losses to 
physical 
infrastructure.  
Dashti et al. (2014) Flood Colorado Flooding 
(2013) 
Engineering The twitter API was used to search for 
keywords, user IDs, and geographic 
locations in tweets during the 
flooding. 212,672 unique tweets were 
collected and 2,658 of them were geo-
located. These geo-l cated tweets 
were then combined with hazard maps 
and other remote sensing data (e.g., 
satellite imagery) in order to aid more 
detailed field research activities. 
A massive data 
base was 









that may have 
otherwise been 
lost. 
Using this method 
made it difficult to 
geo-locate. Data 




only used as an aid 
to additional field 
study activities. 
Wilson et al. 
(2014) 
Tsunami N/A Multi -
Disciplinary 
This section identifies 10 crucial 
components of a post-tsunami field 
The authors 
help identify 
The protocol is 
very general. It 
15 
study. It was created based on the 
experience of tsunami field study 
experts. It focuses on the logistical 
issues of communication, 
coordination, and collaboration. Some 
of the most important components 
include: staying in constant contact 
with the local area’s event 
coordinator, including a local expert 














provides advice on 
general procedures 





Lu et al. (2012) Earthquake Haiti (2010) Sociology: 
Dislocation 
This study tracked the locations of 1.9 
million Digicel mobile phone users 42 
days before to 341 days after the 2010 
Haiti Earthquake. The data from 
Digicel allowed them to btain one 
location data point for each mobile 
user per day. The locations of the 
users were tracked tomobile phone 
towers which limited the study’s 
spatial resolution. They concluded that 
dislocation after disasters can be 
predicted with decent accuracy. 
Collaboration 
with Digicel 
allowed them to 
obtain a 
massive data 
set. It also 
allowed them to 
avoid the bias 
of interviews 
and to obtain 
data at any 
point in time or 
space. Cell 




The sample was 
limited because it 
only included 
Digicel users. The 
time and space data 
resolution was 
limited (1 data 
point per day and 
up to tens of 
kilometers between 
data points). Power 
outages and lack of 
charging stations 
caused further data 
issues. 




A baseline survey was conducted 
before the tsunami and about 10,000 
follow-up interviews were conducted 
afterwards. The respondents were 
tracked and interviewed annually for 5 
years. Similar to Adams (2004), 
damage estimates were d veloped by 
using satellite imagery before and 
after the tsunami. Multivariate 
statistical methods were used to 










sample of both 
damaged and 
Some qualitative 
data were lost due 
to the large scale of 
the project. It was 
difficult to find 
many of the 
respondents from 
the original survey 





Sutton et al. (2008) WUI California (2007) Sociology: 
Social Media 
Data 
The goal of this report was to use 
empirical data to show the importance 
of social media playing a role in 
“backchannel” communication during 
disaster recovery. They used a 
combination of an initial field 
reconnaissance and a secondary online 
survey to gather data related to the use 
of Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) by community 
members during recovery. They 
recruited participants for their online 
survey using local forums, online 
newspapers, Craigslist, Facebook, and 
Flickr. 
The initial field 
reconnaissance 




their follow up 
survey. They 
were able to 
reach a large 
number of 
participants 
using little time 
and effort due 
to recruiting on 
social media. 
These techniques 
that were used to 
obtain qualitative 
and quantitative 
data. However, the 
sample was limited 
because only social 
media users were 
able to access the 
survey. 
Rodriguez et al. 
(2006) 
Hurricane Katrina (2005) Sociology: 
Community 
Behavior 
In order to study the pro-social 
behavior that occurred after Hurricane 
Katrina, the authors relied heavily on 
collaboration and fieldwork done by 
others. They chose a specific time 
period to study a representative 
sample of the community. Firsthand 
accounts were considered more 
credible than media accounts. There 
was a focus on studying improvised 
decision making. 
The authors 
saved time and 
money by 
building on the 
work of others 
and studying a 
representative 
sample of the 
community. 
Any propagation of 
data that were 
collected by others 
would be difficult 
to quantify. 
Sherwood et al. 
(2015) 





This study used qualitative and 
quantitative data to draw conclusions 
about dislocation in the aftermath of 
the 2013 Typhoon in the Philippines. 
The quantitative data were collected 
through a questionnaire that was 
distributed to 4,518 households in 43 
municipalities within the most 
damaged region. The qualitative data 





data to draw 
important 
conclusions. It 








fraction of the total 





findings from the first stage informing 
the development of the second stage. 
Methods included: focus groups, 
individual interviews, and site visits. 





about 2 years after 
the event which 
may have caused 
data inaccuracies 
due to memory loss 
of the interviewees.  
Quarantelli (1997) Various Various Sociology: 
Community 
Behavior 
This section summarizes the protocol 
used in hundreds of field studies 
conducted by the Disaster Research 
Center (DRC). Graduate students were 
trained and used to conduct field 
studies in a cost effective manner. One 
member of the team was put in 
leadership in order to make crucial 
decisions on the direction of the field 
study. They were prepared to travel at 
all times. Formal questionnaires were 
used, and questions were open ended. 
Photos were taken and interviews 
were recorded then transcribed. 
Using graduate 
students for 
field work kept 






Transcribing all of 
the interviews was 
tedious and time-
consuming work, 
and they eventually 
lacked funding. 
Peek-Asa et al. 
(1997) 
Earthquake Northridge, CA 
(1994) 
Epidemiology In order to study the quantity and 
causes of injuries due to the 
earthquake, the authors obtained data 
from the Los Angeles Department 
Coroner. They then screened every 
hospital in the county to check for 
earthquake related check-ins. The 
injuries were coded using the AIS 
scale, and related building inspection 
data was purchased from the local 
department of building and safety. 
There is always a great deal of 
uncertainty about quantity and type of 
injuries following a major disaster. 
They were able 
to link injuries 
to building 
damage states 
which is a 
crucial element 







and list of injury 
diagnoses were not 
always available, 
and the hospital 
screening process 
may have missed 
some earthquake 
related injuries. 
Frankenberg et al. 
(2008) 
Tsunami Sumatra, Indonesia 
(2004) 
Epidemiology In order to assess the posttraumatic 
stress reactivity (PTSR) of over 
20,000 tsunami survivors, the authors 
collected and analyzed survey data 
from coastal locations. This technique 
is similar to Galea (2007). Pre-event 




obtain a base 
line for mental 
Their focus was 
only on PTSR not 
on any other 
mental illnesses. 
There were 
inaccuracies due to 
18 
interviews were conducted with local 
residents and 97% of them were 
tracked down and interviewed after 
the event. PTSR levels were analyzed 
for correlation with damage states, 
socioeconomic factors, and numerous 








areas as well as 
damaged areas. 
assessing mental 
health using a 
survey method 
instead of clinical 
interviews by 
medical experts. 
Brunkard et al. 
(2008) 
Hurricane Katrina (2005) Epidemiology This case study provided an upper and 
lower bound estimate on deaths 
caused by Hurricane Katrina. They 
obtained their data from the Hurricane 
Katrina Disaster Mortuary Operational 
Response Team (DMORT) database 
and death certificates collected 
through Louisiana vital statistics and 
out-of-state coroners’ offices. They 
then grouped and analyzed these data 
by cause of death, race, gender, time 





allowed them to 








who died months 
after the disaster 
and people who 
died from pre-
existing conditions. 
It is difficult to 
determine whether 
or not the disaster 
was the cause of 
these deaths. They 
were not able to 
account for missing 
persons and bodies 
that were never 
found. 
Galea et al. (2007) Hurricane Katrina (2005) Epidemiology Between 5 and 7 months after the 
hurricane, over the phone surveys 
were conducted with 1,043 residents 
of Alabama, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi who were affected. This 
survey included a screening scale, 
called the K6 scale of nonspecific 
psychological distress, to estimate 
mental illness in each respondent. The 
survey included 29 questions. The 
data was analyzed for association 
between mental illness and the 




obtain a large 
sample size 
using relatively 
low funds. The 
person 
delivering the 
survey does not 
necessarily 
It was difficult to 
find and contact 
people who were 
affected by the 
hurricane. Using 
screening scales 





The sample was 
19 
following factors: age, sex, 
race/ethnicity, family income in the 
year before the hurricane, education, 
pre-hurricane marital status, and pre-
hurricane employment status. 
have to be 




limited because it 
did not include 
people who could 
not be reached by 
telephone. 
Zahran et al. 
(2008) 
Flooding Texas (1997-2001) Epidemiology In order to analyze the correlation 
between vulnerable populations and 
casualties due to extreme flooding 
events, this study analyzed 832 floods 
over a four year span from 74 counties 
in Texas. They did not collect any 
field data. Instead, all of their data was 
retrieved from external sources 
(typically government agencies). They 
used three predictors of flood 
casualties: population density, local 
preparedness, and presence of socially 
vulnerable populations (e.g., low 
income and minority populations). 
They adjusted for characteristics of 
the natural and built environment such 
as number of dams and percentage of 
impervious surface. 
They were able 




into the field. 
They were also 












Their data was 
limited to the 
county level so 





were harmed by 
flooding.  







Economic A long-term disruption model for 
individual businesses was created that 
included five components: business 
and owner characteristics, previous 
disaster experience, direct and indirect 
disaster impacts, loss containment 
measures, and owner perceptions of 
the business environment. In order to 
model these 5 components, surveys 
were mailed to all businesses in two 
separate communities that had 
survived a recent disaster. These 
surveys were completed 6 years after 
the hurricane and 8 years after the 
earthquake. They used a combination 
of mail surveys and phone calls (“total 
They were able 
to contact every 
business in the 
community due 
to the quick and 
easy nature of 
mailed surveys. 





disruption in a 
way that no 
other study had 
done 
The sample was 
limited because 
they were only able 
to contact 
businesses that had 
survived the 
disasters. They also 
did not account for 
broad economic 




response rate was 
low (27% and 
34%) due to the 
20 
design method”). previously. impersonal nature 
of mailed surveys. 
Dahlhamer et al. 
(1996) 
Earthquake Northridge, CA 
(1994) 
Economic This study investigated business 
recovery after the 1994 Northridge 
earthquake. Similar to Webb et al. 
(1999), they used a combination of 
mail surveys and phone calls (“total 
design method”) to obtain data. A 
random sample of 1,110 Los Angeles 
area firms was surveyed. A three 
staged stratified sampling design was 
used, with shaking intensity and type 














response rate of 
the surveys. 
There was a large 
amount of variance 
which the authors 
were not able to 
explain. Also, they 




that did not recover 
(or closed), and 




as a result of the 
disaster. 
Schrank et al. 
(2012) 
Hurricane Katrina (2005) Economic This paper proposes and tests a 
methodology for locating and 
contacting demised small business 
owners. They purchased the 2004 
D&B dataset and the 2009 D&B 
dataset which contain i formation on 
all businesses in a region. They were 
then able to determine which 
businesses started and which 
businesses ended after Hurricane 
Katrina. They then hired students to 
use a desktop search process called 
“record linkage” in order to obtain 
contact information for the most of the 
demised businesses. 
This desk study 












The desk study is 
very labor 
intensive. D&B 




records should be 
used instead. 
Merz et al. (2010) Flood Various Economic General guidelines are provided for 
performing economic flood damage 
assessments including conducting 
uncertainty analyses. The differences 
between quantifying direct losses and 
indirect losses and the positives and 
Many economic 




and do not 
This report does 
not provide the 
standardized 
methods and 
strategies that are 
needed for future 
21 
negatives of different economic 
models are discussed. There is 
currently no standardized method for 
flood data collection, but it is 











Addy and Ijaz 
(2011) 
Tornado Alabama (2011) Economic This case study approximated the 
preliminary fiscal impact of several 
tornadoes that went through Alabama 
in the spring of 2011 by analyzing 
data from various federal and local 
sources. Metrics that were analyzed 
include changes in employment, state 
tax collections, Alabama Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), local tax 
collections, and the effect of cleanup 
and re-building. Uncertainty was 
accounted for by providing low and 
high end estimates. 








II) from the 
BEA were used 
to account for 
unknown 
variables. 
Their method of 
analyzing tax data 
did not allow them 
to estimate fiscal 
recovery in the 
community, 
requiring them to 
make additional 
assumptions. The 
report also did not 
account for quality 
of life, physical 
and mental health 
issues, and 
displacement. 
Pan (2014) - ASCE Hurricane Ike (2008) Economic Pan developed a new framework for 
evaluating direct and indirect 
economic loss after hurricanes. He 
gauged the accuracy of his predictions 
using work from other researchers and 
Hazus models. Like Addy and Jiaz 
(2011), he relied entirely on external 
sources for data. He used GIS data and 
spatial allocation models to estimate 
economic loss and assign losses to 
small zones within the community 
His case study 
approach 




using data from 
others. His use 
of existing 
software helped 
him to estimate 
the error in the 
method. 




Estimates were not 
as close to the 
estimates as those 
made by other 
researchers.  
Dolfman et al. 
(2007) 
Hurricane Katrina (2005) Economic This case study utilized data from the 
Quarterly Census of Employment and 
Wages (QCEW) program of the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics to analyze 




of the effect of 
the disaster on 
They did not study 
the effect of the 
event on individual 
firms. They also 
focused only on 
22 
New Orleans before and up to 10 
months after the event. They utilized 
two methods: evaluate the 
concentration of jobs in each industry 
sector and compare with the national 
average and evaluate the number of 
jobs, total wages, and average weekly 















2.1.1. Studies Focusing on Physical Systems 
Sixteen field studies were reviewed with the primary objective of investigating the 
physical systems domain. The specific purposes of these field studies varied from improving 
building codes to simply providing a preliminary damage assessment. Although the disaster 
types and specific goals of each study were different, many of these field studies share common 
principles that may be important for field researchers to understand. The following section  will 
provide a brief overview of each of these sixteen field studies followed by observations nd 
conclusions for field studies of physical systems. 
Adams et al. (2004) discussed an application of remote sensing technology to damage 
assessment of buildings after the 2003 Boumerdes, Algeria and Bam, Iran earthquakes. The 
methodology described is an extension of previously developed and tested methods that have 
been used by research teams in the U.S., Japan, and Europe for earthquake damage assessments 
in urban environments. This methodology includes a Tiered Reconnaissa ce System (TRS) that 




Figure 2-2: Schematic representation of the post-earthquake Tiered Reconnaissance System  
(Adams et al. 2004) 
Satellite imagery from before and after the event was obtained from DigitalGlobe and 
analyzed using ENVI image processing software in order to obtain approximate building damage 
assessments. Building collapse was also identified using an algorithm which recognizes texture 
changes in the post-disaster imagery. The VIEWS (Visualizing Impacts of Earthquakes With 
Satellites) system translates this approximate damage assessment in order to guide field teams to 
locations of interest, and then enable them to record geo-located observations and damage 
descriptions. The authors also recommend using this system for monitoring clea up and recovery 
activities. One challenge of using this method is that it is difficult to identify damage to buildings 
that are constructed from material that is similar in color and texture to the surrounding ground. 
This was an issue for the damage assessment after the Bam, Iran earthquake because th  roofs 
were constructed from local, sand-colored material. Furthermore, it is difficult to create 
universally applicable algorithms because the algorithms vary by building stock and construction 
materials. Another issue that the authors mention is that it was difficult to obtain image
resolution that was fine enough to accurately identify damage stat s for all buildings (Adams et 
al. 2004). 
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After the devastating and historic Northridge Earthquake that occurred near Los Angeles, 
CA in 1994, a field study was led by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
with the purpose of documenting the effects of the earthquake on the built environment (Todd et 
al. 1994). Their primary task was to document perishable information immediately following the 
disaster, and to be a catalyst for more in depth studies to follow. They began organizing their 
multi-disciplinary, multi-agency field team and preparing for the field study within hours of the 
event. The field team investigated damage to physical infrastructure caused by both the 
earthquake and post-earthquake fires, and provided recommendations for future studies and code 
revisions. They conducted interviews with the engineers who designed the infrastructure and 
obtained stamped drawing sets when possible. Their primary tools were reco dings of their field 
observations and handheld cameras. They started their investigation near the epicenter of the 
earthquake and then made general observations of the damage that they saw for each building 
type, often assuming similar damage for similar types of buildings. They also investigated 
closures of medical facilities, commercial buildings, and bridges. Their approach to bridge 
damage assessment was to only investigate the few bridges that were most severely damaged. 
They were unable to inspect some bridges because demolition of the severely damaged bridges 
began within 24 hours of the event, presumably for public safety. When the bridge had already 
been demolished, they inspected what they could from what was left at the site. Ther  were 163 
bridges that were damaged, and they inspected about 5% of them. The NIST team also 
investigated lifeline systems at sites where they were already studying a structural system. A 
small section was written on airport and railroad damage, but minimal field study data were 
actually gathered. The post-earthquake fire data were gathered by interviews, news articles, and 
observations of the sites. Collaboration with other organizations was crucial for the success of 
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this field study. The NIST team collaborated with the Earthquake Engineering Research Center 
(EERC) at the University of California in Berkeley, CA and the Federal Highway Administration 
(FHWA) to obtain additional data (Todd et al. 1994). 
The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) conducted a field study in order to 
investigate the performance of lifelines after three earthquakes devastated New Zealand between 
September 4, 2010 and June 13, 2011 (Eidinger and Tang 2012). The field team investigated 
systems such as electric power, water, wastewater, gas and liquid fuels, an airport, roads, 
bridges, railways, levees, post-earthquake fire, and debris management. Their goal was to 
evaluate the damage done to each system, document the specific causes of that damage, and 
make recommendations to mitigate similar damage in the future. In order to investigate the 
electric power network and the telecommunications they analyzed all of the damage done to 
systems owned by private companies. They obtained data from these private companies by 
establishing connections with local engineers who then connected them with local companies. 
They used traditional field study tools such as photographs, field notes, and interviews in order 
to gather data for each of the three earthquakes (Eidinger and Tang 2012). 
Seven days after an earthquake and tsunami occurred in northern Sumatra, Indonesia, a 
rapid response tsunami survey team deployed to the Banda Aceh, Sumatra region to study the 
characteristics of the tsunami inundation (Borrero 2005). The data that they collected related to 
tsunami characteristics, structural damage, and shoreline erosion. Field data that were collected 
included: field observations and notes, geo-tagged photos and videos of damage and inundation 
indicators, interviews with government officials and relief workers, reports, maps, and other 
materials related to the tsunami. Information about the wave characteristics was gathered through 
interviews with witnesses and videos taken during the event. The field study and digital 
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topography data were then analyzed along with satellite imagery obtained before and after the 
event. They were also able to use photographs taken during a helicopter flight along the coast of 
Sumatra. Corresponding GPS locations were recorded for images. This report was not 
comprehensive. It only offered a preliminary investigation of the tsunami characteristics (Borrero 
2005). 
After the May 22, 2011 tornado that devastated Joplin, MO, NIST conducted a 
preliminary post-tornado field study (Kuligowski et al. 2014). The fi ld team arrived in Joplin 
two days after the tornado and spent four days there. Their purpose was to perform a preliminary 
investigation of the performance of structures, human behavior, and emergency communications. 
This initial multi-disciplinary and multi-departmental investigation led to a more in depth 
investigation, which was conducted over a span of two years. The goals of this more detailed 
study were to investigate and recommend improvements for: structures and lifeli es under 
tornado loads, tornado warning systems, emergency response procedures, fire codes for 
buildings, and public policy. Prior to the release of the final report, NIST released a special 
publication that outlined the approach and strategy of their technical investigation (Levitan et al. 
2012). This preliminary report lists four primary objectives for the technical investigation. The 
first objective was to determine the tornado hazard characteristics by developing wind speed 
estimates from both direct measurement and indirect estimation from the environment (observing 
treefall) using techniques similar to Prevatt et al. (2011). This was done by collecting data on 
meteorological conditions, pre-storm natural and built environment conditions, post-storm 
conditions, and historical tornado information in the area. The second objective was to 
investigate the causes of fatalities and injuries and to analyze the effectivenss of the emergency 
communications. These data were gathered from semi- tructured interviews (in person and over 
28 
the phone) with first responders, business owners, and friends and families of the injured or 
deceased and from official records, publications, transcripts, news stories, and newspaper 
articles. Interview questionnaires were developed from a combination of the study’s objectives, 
eyewitness news stories, and interviews conducted by the initial reconnaissance team. All 
interviews were transcribed and uploaded into a data analysis software tool to be analyzed 
similar to Quarantelli (1997). The third objective was to evaluate the performance of damaged 
and non-damaged residential, commercial, and critical buildings. Field observations and design 
drawings were obtained and analyzed, and the current building code’s effectivenss was 
evaluated. The fourth and final objective was to determine the performance of lifelines by 
collecting and analyzing data that described the lifecycle of damaged lifelines using traditional 
observational methods. They used all of these collected data to identify areas in building codes, 
fire codes, emergency communication policies, standards, and practices that require vis on. 
(Kuligowski et al. 2014). 
After the April 27, 2011 Tuscaloosa, AL tornado, a field team was assembled with the 
purpose of evaluating failure modes of wood frame structures (Prevatt, et al. 2011). The team 
arrived in Tuscaloosa five days after the event and the investigation lasted three days. The field 
team investigated the six mile long fraction of the eighty mile long tornado path that ran through 
Tuscaloosa by investigating transects that ran perpendicular to the path of the t rnado. These 
transects were approximately half a mile in length with half a mile between each transec , and 
damage assessments were performed for all buildings along each transect. The data from this 
assessment were then used to develop Enhanced Fujita (EF) wind speed ratings and capture 
damage distribution spatially over the community. Field data collection equipment included 
digital cameras, global position system (GPS) units, smart phones, and a ground based light 
29 
detection and ranging (LiDAR) scanner. Text descriptions, field measurements, and hand 
sketches were also recorded. Each of the 6,000 photos that were taken was geo-tagged and 
positioned on a map. On the last day of the study, five locations were identified for captu ing 
high precision geometric data. Team members usedlaser scanner units and panoramic photos to 
capture more detailed data in these five locations (Prevatt, et al. 2011). 
Kashani et al. (2014) proposed a method for structural damage data collection following 
tornadoes. The proposed method, which was implemented after the 2011 Tuscaloosa, AL 
tornado, was to obtain GIS point cloud data from terrestrial scanners, and then compare these 
post-event data with pre- vent aerial images to estimate damage and wind speeds at the locations 
of structures of interest. GIS models were used to overlay point data sets with image layers, and 
then customized algorithms automatically identified buildings, and assessed their amage state 
by detecting roof and wall surfaces and calculating the percent damage by comparing pre-ev nt 
and post-event geometry by estimating polygons and comparing geometric differences. Then, 
based on the percentage of structural damage, a wind speed estimation model was used to find 
the wind speeds at each location. It was determined that this method slightly underestimated 
structural damage, but accurately estimated wind speeds. It was noted that, unfortunately, the 
scanning process is time consuming and does not allow a large sample size to be obtained. The 
benefit of an aerial data collection method is that it allows researchers to gather large amounts of 
data in a short amount of time. However, aerial collected data are often less detailed and at a 
lower resolution than data collected using ground-based methods, and aerial imagery only 
captures the tops of objects, making it difficult to observe vertical elements of structures. For 
longer buildings (more than 100 meters long) the building was divided into three segments and 
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then damage and wind speed estimates were madefor each of the three segments (Kashani et al. 
2014). 
After an EF-5 Tornado passed directly through Moore, OK in 2013, an initial field study 
reconnaissance team was sent into the city to investigate the performance of wood structures and 
storm shelters (Graettinger et al. 2014). The goals of the study were to provide recommendations 
for improving building codes, improving public policy, and assisting in post-disaster social 
media strategies. The damage data collection strategy was to investigate transects perpendicular 
to the tornado’s path in order to create damage contour maps (similar to Prevatt et al. 2011). 
They obtained geo-located damage photographs through passive data collection on social media 
and supplemented this approach by actively requesting damage data from the community using 
social media. Additional data were obtained from storm chasers, news reporters, and others who 
photographed the event. Three days were spent investigating residential buildings and storm 
shelters using ground teams and aerial photography, and over 3,000 photographs were taken. All 
members of the field team collected all types of data, which enabled rapid data collection and the 
creation of a more robust dataset. During the day team members investigated are s of interest, 
recorded data, and took photographs, and at night the team compiled, geo-refer nced, and 
analyzed photographs in order to create GIS maps. They then used these maps to plan the next 
day’s work. All data were geo-l cated, using custom software created at the University of 
Alabama called Time-Image Positioning Software (TIPS), and stored in electronic format online 
providing easy access for various researchers. This data set is spatial and temporal because they 
geo-located data points and recorded the time that each data point was obtained. The method that 
was described in Kashani et al. (2014) was also used in two separate locations in order to 
conduct automated GIS damage assessments. This allowed them to compare pre-to nado 
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geometry to post-tornado imagery, and automatically estimate structural damage. Teams 
consisted of 4 to 5 members that would investigate damage along transects until they reac d a 
point where damage was no longer visible. The “Find Your Friends Application” for the iPhone 
was used to keep track of team members’ locations. After the data were collected team members 
looked at a single photo of each structure to determine the damage state and estimate an upper 
and lower boundary on wind speed based on the Enhanced Fujita Scale (Graettinger et al. 2014).
NIST deployed a field team four days after the October 2007 California fires 
(Maranghides et al. 2009, 2013). The field data collection and processing lasted fourteen months. 
The field data collection effort took approximately 1300 person hours over fourteen months (not 
all in the field). They focused primarily on the Trails development at Rancho Bernardo in which 
seventy-four homes out of 270 were destroyed and sixteen homes were damaged. This study 
included event timeline reconstruction, general fire behavior observations, and the effect of 
structure attributes, landscaping characteristics, topographical features, and potential wildland 
fire exposure on structure performance. Data collected in the field included structure particulars, 
specifically roof type, proximity of combustibles to the structure, and damage to wildland and 
residential vegetation. Some of the questions that they attempted to answer with field data 
included: How far within the Trails did the fire spread? To what extent did embers contribute to 
ignition of structures? Why did the fire spread stop when it did? Did all the structures ignit  from 
the passage of the wildland fire front, or were some structu es ignited later and why? Field 
researchers used prescribed field forms to record data and took over 11,000 photos. Then 
emergency responder data logs were obtained, and first responders and members of the Trails 
Homeowners Association (HOA) were interviewed in order to develop a fire timeline. A survey 
was then sent to each member of the community by the Trails HOA. After that the community 
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was re-visited by field researchers who performed damage assessments of non-destroyed homes. 
Researchers relied heavily on collaboration with government agencies, university programs, and 
local organizations during the data collection process. Remote sensing data were collected from 
several different sources including: Pictometry, Ortho-rectified Imagery (USGS), Google 
Imagery, Ortho-rectified Imagery (San Diego State University), LiDAR, Property boundaries 
(SanGIS), and Vegetation Community Types (SanGIS). These data sources provided oblique
imagery, aerial imagery, point measurements, and vector GIS data. Several data collection 
limitations included: lack of access to certain properties, inability to identify construction 
materials in photos and on the ground, inconsistencies in interpretation amongst observers, and 
incomplete mapping of burned features. Furthermore, LiDAR scanners cannot see through solid 
objects (e.g., fallen branches) which caused inaccuracies during vegetation data collection 
(Maranghides et al. 2009, 2013). 
Within forty-four hours of a wildland-urban interface (WUI) fire beginning in Amarillo, 
NIST deployed a team of field researchers to perform a preliminary investigation of fire losses 
and fire behavior (Maranghides et al. 2011, 2016). During the twenty-one days that this team 
spent in the field, their primary focuses were on the effects of fire losses on topographical 
features, evaluation of infrastructure construction, and mitigation attempted during the event. 
They chose to focus only on the Tanglewood Complex fires where 183 structures were destroye  
because of resource limitations. The overall goal of the study was to discover the factors 
responsible for the failure or successful performance of buildings and other structures, and to 
recommend improvements to standards, codes, and practices. They used a two-tiered approach 
for data collection. The first tier (WUI 1) was used to collect general data across the perimeter of 
the fire, and the second tier (WUI 2) was used to collect data related to in-depth fire behavior, 
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defensive action, fire timeline, and structural performance criteria. They took over 29,000 
photographs using handheld cameras, investigated 2,330 geo-located man-made features, 
recorded 281 instances of burned vegetation, and transcribed interviews with forty-eight first 
responders and homeowners. In addition, they printed descriptions of emergency services’ radio 
logs from the day of the fire. Their field measurements related to residential structures, 
combustible features, non-combustible features, fire direction, fire timeline, burned vegetation 
and defensive actions. They also investigated undamaged structures to see why they were 
undamaged. In addition, pre and post fire aerial imagery were acquired for the study area. All 
data that was collected was put into a GIS system database. They used automated vehicle 
location (AVL) systems, mobile phones, global positioning systems (GPS), and other imaging 
technologies to allow recording of real time fire information. Formal field study data collection 
questionnaires were used for all structures that were investigated. Th  authors concluded that the 
field study technology that is currently available is not sufficient for the collection of 
comprehensive WUI fire field data, resulting in a lack of rigorous WUI fire studies. It was also 
difficult to collect timely aerial imagery since data is lost with time during fires. It was 
determined that remote sensing data collection combined with field assessments is the best 
means to obtain pre and post fire vegetation information. It is also impossible to determin  the 
ignition sequence of a burned structure without eyewitness accounts. They also stress the 
importance of collecting both aerial and ground based imagery, and found that damaged 
structures provide more useful information than destroyed structures. They also emphasized the 
difficulty of collecting and documenting imagery over the life of the fire since fire data are lost 
quickly over time. The GIS data were too large to transfer to remote GIS team quickly, so they 
suggested having a GIS team on site. Finally, they stressed the importance of clearly defining 
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team member roles before the team goes into the field and properly training each of the team 
members for their respective roles (Maranghides et al. 2011, 2016). 
Hurricane Katrina made landfall on August 29, 2005 causing massive destruction and 
loss of life. Soon after the event, the Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering 
Research (MCEER) deployed a multi-disciplinary field investigation team with the objective of 
improving physical systems and response and recovery efforts for future extrem  ev nts of any 
type. Their primary goal was to collect data that could be used to make communities more 
resilient, and the topics that they addressed included: organizational decision making(primarily 
in hospitals), advanced damage detection using remote sensing, environmental and public health 
issues, and damage to engineered structures. The investigation report was divided into five 
volumes. Volume 1 (Arendt and Hess 2006) focused on the causes and effects of hospital 
decision making (e.g., hospital evacuation). In order to do this, they collected qualitative d ta 
from interviews with various hospital administrators and staff members, their family members, 
security personnel, remediation personnel, public health officials, health association 
representatives, and federal, state, and local emergency experts and recorded field notes from 
visual inspections of the hospitals one month after the event. The focus was on 15 different care 
hospitals including publicly owned, investor owned, and non-for-profit. They also obtained 
information from news reports and web sites. Volume 2 (Womble et al. 2006) focused on remote 
sensing technology for damage assessments. The objective for this team was to rapidly perform 
building damage assessments in order to preserve perishable damage data. They used remote 
sensing data from optical and radar sensors, and then deployed a ground team to collect geo-
referenced photographs and videos using the VIEWS (Adams et al. 2004) system in order to 
validate remote sensing data. They focused primarily on two areas: the Mississippi Coast and 
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New Orleans. The details of their field strategies and tools are described in detail in the report. 
Volume 3 of the series (Jenson and Ram 2007) outlined the investigation of public health, 
drinking water infrastructure, and wastewater infrastructure. The reconnaissance team consisted 
of two members: a civil engineer and a medical expert. Data for morbidity and mortality were 
obtained from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Louisiana 
Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH). The field team visited facilities throug out 
Louisiana and interviewed residents, nurses, social workers, doctors, managers, Red Cross 
personnel, and others over a four day period. Volume 4 (Mosqueda and Porter 2007) described 
the investigation of damage to commercial buildings and lifelines (electric power, water supply, 
wastewater, telecommunication, and police and fire stations). There were two deployments: the 
first was within a week of the event (September 6-11, 2005) and the second was after the flood 
waters had receded and the evacuation order had lifted (October 3-9, 2005). Twenty-three 
Buildings were investigated using traditional field notes, observations and photographs. Volume 
5 (O’Connor and McAnany 2008) focused on damage to bridges and tunnels. They obtained 
initial aerial imagery from an airplane flyover and then a field team deployed twice: September 
6-11, 2015 and October 16-21, 2005. Their goal was to capture photographs of the raw damage 
(perishable data) caused by the event in order to understand bridge performance. Their site 
inspections consisted of expert observation through the recording of field notes and photos. T e 
field inspectors kept an “Inspectors’ Daily Journal” which was attached as an appendix. 
From September 23 to 25, 2005 a team of researchers funded by the National Scie ce 
Foundation (NSF) conducted a field investigation after Hurricane Katrina with the purpose of 
collecting and analyzing perishable wind damage data for residential, woodframe structures in 
order to suggest improvement to residential building codes and improve woodframe structure 
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performance in hurricane winds (van de Lindt et al. 2005, 2007). In order to do this, they 
investigated twenty-seven damaged woodframe structures or subdivisions. Their data included 
structural observations and non-structural observations which were recorded in the field. They 
recorded damage to buildings through extensive field notes and photographs using handheld 
cameras. They obtained wind speed estimates at each structure by overlaying the structure 
locations with a wind speed map that was obtained from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA). The causes of failure for individual elements were then determined 
through expert forensic opinion using the collected data (van de Lindt et al. 2005, 2007). 
Zhou et al. (2015) proposed a new methodology for the damage assessment of residential 
buildings using image-based 3D reconstruction, and then tested this method using data from 
Hurricane Sandy. The primary problem with using remote sensing is that it often produces low 
resolution imagery. This problem is usually solved through algorithm improvement as in Adams 
et al. (2004) or through the use of expensive, high resolution equipment such as LiDAR (see e.g. 
Prevatt et al. 2011; Greattinger et al. 2012). The proposed methodology for 3D reconstructi 
does not require a LiDAR scanner or algorithm improvement. Instead, it uses photos taken by 
less expensive digital cameras to reconstruct a 3D image which can be used to estimate damage 
to structures. In order to achieve this, dozens of photos of a single building at different angles 
were taken, then the 123D Catch software by Autodesk and the SURE open sourced platform 
were used to create the 3D reconstruction, and LiDAR point cloud data were collected to validate 
the results and method. The point clouds from these three methods (LiDAR, 123D Catch, and 
SURE) were compared, and it was determined that SURE point clouds are more accurate than 
123D Catch point clouds. This study suggests that image-b s d 3D reconstruction can be a 
valuable tool for assessing the damage to buildings after a hurricane. However, if an extremely 
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detailed damage assessment is desired (e.g., displacements < 1cm) then this method cannot be 
used. Photos taken with large overlaps (more than 90%) tended to produce the highest quality 
point clouds. Unfortunately, only small portions of the roof were able to be reconstructed 
because of the images were taken at ground level. This problem may be able to be res lv d 
through the use of unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) (e.g., drones) (Zhou et al. 2015). 
After Hurricane Ike, a team from the Texas Department of Homeland Security attempted 
to assess hurricane damage in Texas in the social, built, economic, and natural environmts. 
They focused on broad topics instead of specific details. Their purpose was not to proposecode 
changes or policies but simply to report the damage. They obtained their information from 
internal government agencies, universities, and online resources. For example, they obtained a 
portion of their data on the natural environment by collaborating with the Texas Park and 
Wildlife Department (TPWD). Similar to many of the other studies discussed in this sect on, they 
focused primarily on damages and losses and chose not to study the undamaged infr structure. 
They also investigated each of the community domains individually, but there was no discussion 
on their interdependencies (Texas Department of Homeland Security 2008). 
After the 2008 Midwest riverine flooding, the Federal Emergency Management Ag cy 
(FEMA) deployed a Mitigation Assessment Team (MAT) with the purpose of determining if 
mitigation strategies employed by FEMA for buildings and other structures in Iowa and southern 
Wisconsin were effective (FEMA 2009). The conclusions and recommendations were intended 
to aid decision makers in reducing damage to structures in future flooding events and provide 
information that may be useful in updating building codes. A pre-MAT was deployed to perform 
initial inspection and determine if a MAT would be necessary. The pre-MAT entered the field 
about a month and a half after the flooding and spend seven days collecting field data. The full 
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MAT was deployed in the field for one week starting after the pre-MAT field investigation 
ended. They developed an investigation plan based on the pre-MAT’s findings in which they 
attempted to investigate the most damaged communities. Data that were collected includedfield 
notes, photographs, aerial imagery, GIS information, and interviews with building owners and 
government officials. The field team was comprised of FEMA staff, design and construction 
experts, engineers, architects, building code experts, floodplain experts, hazard mitigation 
planners, GIS specialists, and technical writers. The community components that they 
investigated include: social and economic impacts, residential and commercial buildings, critical 
and essential facilities, mitigation techniques and planning effectiveness, and risk 
communication. More specifically, they investigated systems that included foundation damage, 
non-structural damage, interior finishes, electrical and mechanical systems, and lifeli es. Their 
general methodology was to visit a structure that sustained flood damage, diagnose the specific 
causes of the damage or loss of functionality, and recommend future practices to avoid similar 
damage based on expert opinion (FEMA 2009). 
In an effort to obtain perishable damage data after disasters, a methodology was proposed 
by Dashti et al. (2014) that utilizes social media and other remote sources for data collection. 
After the September 2013 flooding in Colorado, geo-r ferenced tweets of images were collected 
and used for estimating infrastructure damage. In order to collect data from twitter, a system that 
uses a four-node Cassandra cluster to store tweets from Twitter’s streaming application 
programming interface (API) was implemented during the first nine days of the flooding. 
Twitter’s API allows the user to search for keywords, user IDs, and geographic bounds, and then 
it shows all matching tweets. A total of 212,672 unique tweets were collected and 2,658 of them
were geo-tagged. These tweets were then combined with hazard maps and satellite imagery. This 
39 
method of damage assessment is meant to be a pr liminary planning and decision making tool 
for future field investigations (Dashti et al. 2014). 
Wilson et al. (2014) provide guidelines from multi-disciplinary tsunami reconnaissance 
experts on the best practices for conducting a post-tsunami field study. The protocol consisted of 
10 components that are recommended to be followed by research and focused on coordination, 
communication, and collaboration related issues. They first address the importance of conducting 
ethical research in both studies that include human subject and those that do not. The ten 
components are:  
1. Contact event coordinator: Discuss conditions of impacted area, other survey teams, and 
local logistical support. This will help eliminate redundant data collection efforts.  
2. Prepare and share field plan: Provide event coordinate with necessary information such 
as: dates and locations of field work, names and affiliations of field team members, data 
collection plan, and dissemination plan for sharing data with others.  
3. Obtain official survey badge: After approval by the event coordinator, this identif cation 
would allow access to damaged sites.  
4. Include local experts on your team: Someone with pre-event knowledge of the impacted 
area and knowledge of local culture and language.  
5. Coordinate and communicate with others: This allows your team and other teams to 
obtain additional data and not waste time collecting redundant data. Team members must 
have communications equipment that enable them to government officials in case of 
emergency.  
6. Follow check in procedures 
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7. Pay attention to all safety regulations: The event coordinator should supply teams with 
safety regulations that must be followed. Aftershocks leading to additional tsunamis m y 
occur.  
8. Be prepared to answer questions from emergency responders, officials, and survivors: Be 
clear about your purpose, background, and expertise. Do not provide misleading 
information.  
9. Follow check-out procedures and provide out-briefings: Provide a summary of the work 
accomplished and future work intended as well as a plan for sharing information.  
10. Provide final data for others quickly: Including the individuals in the affected areas and 
other collaborators.  
Discussion of Studies Focusing on Physical Systems 
In the days immediately following a disaster, perishable data are available tht are often 
lost during the cleanup process. In order to prevent this data from being lost, it is important to 
send a preliminary reconnaissance team as soon as possible after the disaster. This team can then 
collect some of this valuable, perishable data, nd use it to aid in deciding if a more detailed field 
study should be conducted (Todd et al. 1994; FEMA, 2009; Kuligowski et al. 2014). There are 
different data collection strategies for different disaster types. For a t rnado field study, it is 
common to investigate damage along transects perpendicular to the tornado path (Graet inge  et 
al. 2014; Prevatt et al. 2011). However, for an earthquake field study, it is more practical to 
investigate starting from the earthquake epicenter and moving outward (Todd et al. 1994). Data 
collection strategies should be carefully planned and modified to fit the specific disaster and 
community. The development of a data collection strategy should be informed by preliminary 
data and, preferably, aerial imagery (O’Connor and McAnany 2008).  
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Part of the planning process includes the selection and training of field team members. It 
is important to have a diversity of skills and expertise within the field team (Todd et al. 1994; 
Kuligowski et al. 2014; MCEER 2006-2008; FEMA 2009). Every member of the field team must 
be trained properly for their specific task. When team members are not trained prop rly, the field 
study can become chaotic and possibly unsuccessful (Maranghides et al. 2011, 2016). Also, 
during the planning process, interview questionnaires should be developed for the specific 
disaster and community. The development of questionnaires should be informed by data from 
preliminary investigations (Kuligowski et al. 2014). All interviews should be transcribed and 
analyzed using software if resources allow (Kuligowski et al. 2014; Maranghides et al. 2011, 
2016)  
Technological advancements are rapidly changing the tools and methods that are being 
used for field data collection. Approximate damage estimates can be provided quickly by the use 
of pre and post event satellite imagery. These damage estimates should be used to guide field 
researchers to locations of interest, and not as a final product (Adams et al. 2004; Borrero et al. 
2005). Ground and aerial-based scanners can be useful for collecting damage data with varying 
resolution. Aerial scanners collect data quickly, but the resolution can be coarse. Ground based 
scanners take a long time to collect data points, but the resolution is often more fine d pending 
on the specific equipment that is used. It is most beneficial to use both ground-base  and aerial 
data collection methods. However, it is typically not feasible to use terrestrial scanners as the 
primary method of damage data collection due to time and resource constraints. They are often 
supplemented with traditional data collection methods (field notes, photos, and videos recorded 
by team members). In certain situations, it may be useful to combine pre-event satellite imagery 
with post-event data obtained using terr strial scanners. This allows researchers to obtain fairly 
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accurate estimations of wind speed and structual damage (Kashani et al. 2014; Graettinger et al. 
2014; Prevatt et al. 2011; Maranghides et al. 2011, 2016; Maranghides et al. 2009, 2013; 
Womble et al. 2006). 
An alternative to remote sensing technology is to use digital photos for 3D reconstru tion 
as in Zhou et al. (2015). Another method of obtaining geo-referenced damage data is through the 
use of social media (Dashti et al. 2014; Graettinger et al. 2014). In order to obtain unbiased 
samples, field researchers should inspect a representative sample of infrastructure that is not 
based on their damage states (Kuligowski et al. 2014). Throughout the field study process 
collaboration with other researchers, government agencies, and universities is crucial in order to 
gain additional data and prevent redundant data collection (Todd et al. 1994; Maranghides et al. 
2009, 2013). When possible, field study data should be made available to other researchers and 
the public. This can be done by creating an easily accessible online database (Graettinge  et al. 
2014). 
2.1.2. Studies focusing on Social Dimensions of Communities 
In order to understand the strategies and techniques that researchers have used to collect 
field data that help them understand the social science domain after disasters, five field stud s 
were reviewed that focused on studying human behavior after disasters. These five reports are 
summarized below.  
After the Haiti earthquake of 2010, Lu et al. (2012) sought to track the locations of 
affected people before, during, and after the event. In order to do this, they collaborated with 
Digicel, the largest mobile phone operator in Haiti, to track the locations of 1.9 million 
anonymous people from forty- wo days before the earthquake to 341 days after. It was assumed 
that this sample of Digicel users was representative of the entire population of Haiti. Digicel 
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provided them with the locations (to the nearest cell tower) of all mobile phone users onc  per 
day. The spatial resolution was from 100 meters to a few tens of kilometers depending o  the 
distance between cell towers. This alternate data collection method allowed Lu et al. to avoid the 
bias of interviews and to obtain data at any point in time or space. It also allowed them to 
accurately study population movement as a surrogate for investigating the recovery trajectory of 
individuals affected by the disaster. They concluded that population dislocation is reasonably 
predictable in the aftermath of disasters. This method may be applicable to the NIST CoE field 
study methodology because our field studies will focus on more developed countries which will 
likely have even more prevalent mobile phone use than Haiti. Unfortunately, this study had a 
limited sample because they were not able to track people who don’t use mobile phones or don’t 
use Digicel. This may be less important for developed countries because of more prevalent 
mobile phone use. The study was also limited by low resolution of time and space (1 data point 
per day and up to tens of kilometers between data points). Also, the data provided by Digicel did 
not provide any demographic or socioeconomic information about the users. Finally, the study 
was limited because they could not account for power outages (or lack of charging stat ons) and 
mobile phone tower disruption (Lu et al. 2012). 
Gray et al. (2014) utilized a combination of techniques to estimate and model population 
dislocation after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami including: surveys, satellite imagery, and multi-
variate statistical analyses. First, they obtained data from a survey that was done before the 
tsunami as a baseline. Then, they tracked a sample of the original responders from app oximately 
10,000 households and interviewed them annually for the first five years after the tsunami with 
plans to interview them again ten years after the tsunami. Local university students conducted 
the interviews after undergoing four weeks of training. These interviews were refused by less 
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than 1% of the respondents, although the students sometimes had to visit a site up to five times 
over a year in order to obtain the data they needed. The interviewees were asked where they were 
living before, during, and after the tsunami. The authors then approximated the damage extent of 
the tsunami using techniques that were similar to Adams et al. (2004): pre and post disaster
satellite imagery was compared to determine damage to communities. Multivariate statisical 
methods were then used to analyze the major socio-economic factors that affect displacement. 
The primary limitation of this study is that there was some difficulty in tracking the individuals 
from the pre-tsunami survey because many of them were missing or deceased. Al o, people 
dislocate very quickly after disasters which makes it difficult to obtain a representative sample of 
the original population. The information that they got from the questionnaires had to be very 
broad because the sample was so large which caused them to miss some important details. (Gray 
et al. 2014). 
Sutton et al. (2008) investigated the communication practices of community members 
during the October 2007 California Wildfires. Their goal was to show that “backch nnel” 
communications supported by social media may be used more prominently in the future of 
disaster response. Backchannel communication occurs when community members communicate 
their needs to emergency responders after a disaster. Days after the fires started, the research 
team began collecting qualitative data from interviews and online resources. After evacuation 
orders were lifted, an online questionnaire was developed to investigate the use of information 
and communication technology (ICT) by community members. The questions on this form were 
developed from initial research findings and earlier research, and included multiple choice and 
open ended questions. The questions that were asked were related to the effectiveness of ICT use 
for communicating with others during the fire, evacuation, and cleanup process. They post d
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solicitations on social media (Facebook and Flickr), local forums, and online newspapers in the 
affected communities. They had 279 respondents who completed the form. This method of 
distributing and recruiting for the survey allowed them to reach a greater number of people with 
less time and money spent (Sutton et al. 2008). 
In order to study the non-traditional and prosocial behavior that occurred after Hurricane 
Katrina, Rodriguez et al. (2006) used databases that were created by field researcher at the 
University of Delaware Disaster Research Center (DRC), media reports, and government 
agencies. They investigated five areas in the community: hotels, hospitals, neighborhood groups, 
rescue teams, and the joint field office (JFO). The data that they anal zed came from quick 
response field studies that were performed by teams that entered the field about three weeks after 
the event and remained there for five to ten days. The data collection activities included: 
interviews, observations, and the gathering of related documents. The field teams visited local 
response centers and interviewed local, state, and federal officials, relief workers, and evacuees. 
Firsthand accounts were assumed to be more credible than media accounts because in the 
aftermath of Katrina there were many media stories that falsely portrayed the community 
response as anti-social. They used the acquired data to analyze individuals’ responses at three 
stages of the disaster: immediately before, immediately after, and long term (Rodriguez et al. 
2006). 
In November 2013, Super Typhoon Haiyan, the strongest storm ever recorded at landfall, 
hit the central Philippines causing over four million people to be displaced. In order t  study and 
learn from this mass dislocation, Sherwood et al. (2015) used a method that was meant to explore 
the relationships between pre-event socioeconomic conditions, the experience of the displaced, 
and the obstacles to recovery. They collected quantitative and qualitative data from December 
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2014 to March 2015. The quantitative data were collected through a questionnaire which was 
designed to investigate socioeconomic conditions before and after the event and the experiences 
of the displaced. The survey was distributed in the region most damaged by the disaster, and all 
other regions were neglected. In all, 4,518 households in forty-three municipalities received the 
survey. To supplement the surveys, qualitative methods were used to gain a deeper 
understanding of the displaced persons’ experiences. Qualitative fieldwork was conducted in two 
stages with the initial findings from the first stage informing the development of the fieldwork 
strategies for the second stage. These methods included: thirteen focus group discussion  (one to 
two hours long), site visits to heavily damaged sites, and interviews (45 minutes to 2.5 hours 
long) with thirty-four individuals including local government officials. These individuals were 
selected based on characteristics that allowed the researchers to gain a wide-ranging perspective 
of the experiences of the displaced. Conclusions and recommendations were drawn from the 
trends in the quantitative and qualitative data (Sherwood et al. 2015). 
From 1967 to 1988 the Disaster Research Center (DRC) conducted over 450 sociology 
oriented field studies. The DRC was originally established by Quarantelli a  The Ohio State 
University, but has since moved to the University of Delaware. In this article, Quarantelli 
attempts to capture the general protocol that was used in these field studies. Most of the data 
were collected by graduate research assistants (GRAs). These GRAs had to underg extensive 
training and preparation. A large emphasis was placed on having researchers at the ite during 
the peak of the disaster recovery process. Field study kits were pr pared and ready for dispatch at 
all times. Once in the field, formal interview guides were used. The opening questions were 
usually general and open ended. The guidelines given were usually loose, so researcher  had to 
have a complete understanding of what the purpose of the study is and what data needs to be 
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collected. Qualitative data can be collected formally through interviews or informally through 
casual conversation, etc. One member of the field team w s placed in a leadership position and 
made the decisions regarding strategies and direction in the field. All interviews were audio 
recorded, and photographs were taken to record significant findings. When funding allowed, all 
recorded interviews were transcribed and used for analysis. At the end of ach day in the field 
the researchers would meet together, discuss their findings of the day, assess whether they were 
meeting the goals of the project, and decide on strategies for the next day’s work. Like several 
other organizations including NIST, they would do a reconnaissance study first, then report back 
and decide whether or not to do an in depth study. Since GRAs were used as field study 
researchers, their positions were inherently temporary. The DRC attempted to solve this problem 
by having a constant cycle of older, more experienced GRAs training new GRAs. Delays in the
post data processing (due to GRAs work schedules) sometimes caused the final data to be flawed 
(Quarantelli 1997).  
Discussion of Studies Focusing on Social Dimensions of Communites 
Conducting field studies that focus on social issues typically involves surveys and/or
interviews of various community members. Just like physical data, perishable social data are lost 
quickly after a disaster due to the inability to track individuals and groups, so it is important to 
have an initial field team enter the field rapidly following a disaster. (Sutton et al. 2008; 
Sherwood et al. 2015). The development of surveys and interview guides should be guided by 
the data that are collected after thedisaster if a longer, more detailed study is to be conducted 
(Sutton et al. 2008; Sherwood et al. 2015). Unskilled workers can be used to conduct surveys and 
interviews if they are trained properly (Gray et al. 2014). When researchers are to conduct 
interviews or surveys in a foreign culture, it is best to train local citizens to conduct the 
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interviews if possible, which leads to higher rates of cooperation from the affected community 
(Gray et al. 2014). 
Sometimes, detailed social data may be available from before the disaster occurred. It is 
important to find and obtain any data that may have been collected in the community before th  
disaster. These data can serve as a baseline for data that are collected after the disaster (Gray et 
al. 2014). It is important to use survey methods that avoid bias in population samples (Lu et al. 
2012). There are several effective methods for obtaining survey data including face to face 
surveys (Gray et al. 2014), online surveys and solicitation on social media (Sutton et al. 2008), 
mail surveys (Webb et al. 1999), and telephone surveys (Galea et al. 2007). Most importantly, it 
is critical that field teams communicate with government agencies, news reporters, other 
researchers, and private firms (e.g., cell phone companies), so that they can obtain social data for 
which they would otherwise not have access (Lu et al. 2012; Rodriguez et al. 2006). 
The majority of these studies do not investigate specific connections between huma
behavior decisions and physical infrastructure systems damage and functionality which are 
believed to be needed to model community resilience. For example, in order to understand why  
family has been displaced from their home, researchers should investigate the physical damage, 
social issues, and econmic stressors that caused the family to make the decision to leave their 
home. The decision to dislocate is often driven by a combination of these (and other) issues. If 
this decision-making process can be modeled then community models move from data-driven 
models to physics or first principle models.  
2.1.3. Studies focusing on Epidemiology 
This section includes studies that investigated quantities, locations, and causes of death 
and injuries. Reports are also included that investigate mental illness and post-traumatic stress 
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disorder (PTSD) resulting from disasters. The five reports that were review d include both field 
studies that used surveys and interviews to identify morbidity and case studies that obtained data 
from government agencies or other organizations. These five reports are summarized below.  
In order to investigate the injuries that occurred during the 1994 Northridge earthquake 
that resulted in hospital admission or death, Peek-Asa et al. (1998) obtained mortality data from 
the Los Angeles City Coroner, and then screened all seventy-eight hospitals in Los Angeles 
County for earthquake related admissions. A total of 171 earthquake related injuries we e 
identified, thirty-three of which were fatal. These injuries were coded using the Abbreviated 
Injury Severity (AIS) scale, which classifies the nature, severity, location, and type of anatomic 
structure of the injury, and then analyzed by gender, age, and cause of injury. Census data were 
then obtained and used to determine injury rates. The injuries were linked to specific buildings 
when possible (fifty-seven linkages), and the Los Angeles City Department of Building and 
Safety inspection data were then purchased for these buildings. This study was limited because 
complete autopsies and lists of injury diagnoses were not always available, and the hospital 
screening process may have missed some earthquake related injuries. There is always a great 
deal of uncertainty about quantity and type of injuries following a major disaster, nd this report 
concludes that predicting injuries due to earthquakes is a complex process which includes many 
behavioral and environmental variables (Peek-Asa et al. 1998). 
In order to assess the posttraumatic stress reactivity (PTSR) of over 20,000 tsunami 
survivors, Frankenberg et al. (2008) conducted a study that collected and analyzed survey data 
from Aceh, Indonesia and North Sumatra, Indonesia, using techniques similar to Galea et l. 
(2007). A representative sample of the population was interviewed before the tsunami as a part 
of the National Socioeconomic Survey (SUSENAS) which was performed by Statistics 
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Indonesia, and then these interviewees were located after the event (with the help of Statistics 
Indonesia) for a follow up interview. Ninety-seven percent of pre- vent interviewees were 
contacted for the secondary survey. The pre-ev nt interviews took place in 2004, the tsunami 
occurred on December 26, 2004, and the post-event surveys took place from May 2005 to July 
2006. The survey removed bias by including individuals from undamaged areas as well as 
damaged areas. PTSR was measured by using a seven symptom checklist before the disaster and 
at the point of maximum stress during or after the disaster. Yes/No, multiple choice, and open-
ended questions were all a part of these surveys. The rates of mental illness wer linked to 
building damage estimates, and it was found that the individuals with the highest level of PTSR 
were from the most severely damaged areas. Approximate damage estimates were obtained using 
remote sensing data from NASA’s MODIS sensor, reports by community leaders, and 
observations of field teams. The data were also analyzed for trends related to gender, age, and 
socioeconomic status (socioeconomic status was found to be the least significant factor). 
Multivariate regression analyses were used to draw conclusions from various demographic and 
other pertinent data (Frankenberg et al. 2008). 
Brunkard et al. (2008) performed a case study that sought to document and describe 
Hurricane Katrina related deaths in Louisiana in order to help reduce mortality in future events. 
They obtained their data primarily from the Hurricane Katrina Disaster Mortuary Operational 
Response Team (DMORT), which is a federal response team that deals with mortuary activities 
in the aftermath of disasters, database and death certificates collected by Louisiana vital statistics 
and out-of-state coroners’ offices (such data did not become available until two years after the 
disaster). Mortality data points were geo-located and analyzed spatially. They grouped and 
analyzed the data by cause of death, race, gender, time of death, location of death, and age, and 
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then analyzed these data using advanced statistical methods to discover which population groups 
were most vulnerable to Hurricane Katrina. A lower bound and an upper bound mortality count 
were estimated by adding the deaths that occurred in the proper time frame that wre originally 
classified as “indeterminate.” The mortality estimates that they provided were conservative 
because they included people who died from a number of different causes in the weeks and 
months after the hurricane. Many people died from pre- xisting conditions (primarily the 
elderly), and it is difficult to determine whether or not the hurricane aggravated these diseases. 
The study was not able to account for missing persons and bodies that were never found. 
(Brunkard et al. 2008). 
Galea et al. (2007) used surveys to determine the connection between DSM-IV anxiety-
mood disorders and hurricane related stressors among residents affected by Hurricane Katrina. 
From five to eight months after the event, 1,043 individuals were given a survey over the 
telephone. Respondents were selected from three sources: a random sample of teleph ne 
numbers connected to households in the areas affected by the hurricane, a sample from telephone 
numbers of those who applied for assistance from the American Red Cross, and a sample from 
the hotels that sheltered evacuees. The survey included twenty-nine closed ended questions, 
several additional open ended questions, and the respondents were asked to rank their stress level 
during the hurricane on a scale of one to ten. This allowed researchers to identify traumatic and 
non-traumatic stressors. They used the K6 scale of nonspecific psychological distress to predict 
the probability that the respondent would be diagnosed with a mental disorder as a result of the 
hurricane. The data were analyzed for association between mental illness and age, sex, 
race/ethnicity, family income in the year before th  hurricane, education, pre-hurricane marital 
status, and pre-hurricane employment status. One challenge of this study is that it was difficult to 
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locate and contact people who were affected by the hurricane. Only 64.9% of potential 
respondents were eventually able to be contacted. The survey volunteers were also required to 
commit long term to the study so that changes could be tracked over time. This commitment 
level likely dropped the response rate even further. The sample was limited because it did not 
include people who could not be reached by telephone, and additional factors that were not 
mentioned in the survey may have been the cause of mental disorders. Another limitation is that 
they used screening scales rather than clinical interviews which results in less precise estimations 
of mental illnesses (Galea et al. 2007). 
Zahran et al. (2008) investigated casualties due to extreme flooding events in order to 
determine if socially vulnerable populations see a disproportionate number of deaths due to 
flooding. They analyzed 832 flood events in seventy-four counties in eastern Texas from 1997–
2001, primarily focusing on geographic localities characterized by high percentages of socially 
vulnerable populations. Three socioeconomic predictors of flood casualtie  were used: 
population density, local preparedness, and presence of socially vulnerable populations. Social 
vulnerability was measured based on household income and racial data from the U.S. Census. 
They obtained mortality data from the Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for the United 
States (SHELDUS) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) which provide 
data at the county level. This forced them to perform their analysis at the county scale, which 
means that they were not able to determine the socioeconomic status of individuals harmed by 
flooding which they stated created intrinsic error in their models. Other important data that were 
collected and included in their analysis were: precipitation data (National Climate Data Center), 
number of dams in each county (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers), percent of impervious surface 
(NASA Stennis Space Center imagery), property damage (SHELDUS), FEMA socioeconomic 
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rating (FEMA Community Rating System), population density, and social vulnerability index 
(US Census Bureau Population and Housing Files). Zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) 
regression models were used to analyze these data. (Zahran et al. 2008). 
Discussion of Field Studies focusing on Epidemiology 
Epidemiologic studies that focus on morbidity and mortality caused by disasters have a 
great deal of uncertainty and typically utilize data are typically gathered from remote sources 
(e.g., government agencies and hospitals) (Brunkard et al. 2008; Peek-Asa et al. 1998; Zahran et 
al. 2008). The exception to this is mental morbidity studies which often involve surveys that 
evaluate individuals’ mental health before, during, and after a disaster. Studies of this type may 
be inaccurate because they rely on surveys to determine mental health instead of clinical 
interviews (Galea et al. 2007). It would be beneficial to obtain a mental health survey of 
individuals before the disaster if these data are available (Frankenberg et al. 2008). It is common 
for researchers to obtain approximate estima es of physical damage using satellite imagery or 
other quick methods in order to link morbidity and mortality to the severity of physical damage. 
These approximate damage estimates are sometimes validated through field observati n o  
obtaining data from other sources (Frankenberg et al. 2008). In order to remove sampl bi s, data 
must be collected for individuals of varying levels of morbidity (no injury to death) (Frankenberg 
et al. 2008). 
When conducting community resilience focused field studies, it is necessary to link 
morbidity and mortality to other community domains. In the studies that were reviewed, several 
of the authors connected morbidities and mortalities to physical systems. However, there are 
other community systems that affect mental and physical injuries during disasters. For example, 
a treatable injury may lead to death because the emergency responders could not perform th ir 
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jobs effectively because of damage to transportation networks, or an individual’s PTSR score 
might be extremely high because they did not receive the financial aid that they needed after a 
disaster. These are examples of the critical linkages that should be investigated when collecting 
data to model community resilience.  
2.1.4. Studies Focusing on Economics 
The following six studies focus on how disasters affect a community’s economy. The 
purposes of these studies range from investigating how individual businesses were affected by a 
disaster to creating a model of a community’s economy that estimates direct and indirect loses 
after a disaster.  
Webb et al. (1999) conducted a field study to investigate the long term recovery of 
individual businesses eight years after the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake and six year  after 
Hurricane Andrew in South Florida. They used a modified version of Dillman's (1978) "total 
design method," which combines mail surveys and follow up phone calls to maximize the 
number of quality responses. The surveys were sent only to businesses that were open at the time 
of the disaster and were still in business at the time of the study. The 4,286 businesses in South 
Dade County had a 27.0% response rate and the 3,705 businesses in Santa Cruz County firms 
had a 33.6% response rate. Data collected included physical damage, duration of closure, number 
of lifelines lost, and disruption of operations. They were also asked whether the business was 
currently worse off, about the same, or better off than it was before the disaster, and the owners 
were asked to identify whether the changes that took place were disaster related or not. Ordinary 
least square (OLS) regression techniques were then used to analyze the data. The results of the 
surveys suggested that the greatest indicators of business interruption in order of importance 
were: economic sector, pre-disaster financial condition, business age, primary market (e.g., local 
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or international), and business size. They also created a business disruption model that is based 
on five factors: business and owner characteristics, previous disaster experience, direct and 
indirect losses, measures taken to contain losses, and owner perceptions of the business 
environment. One large limitation of the study was that it only measured businesses that were 
successful in staying open after the disaster (Webb et al. 1999).  
A model of business recovery was developed and tested by Dahlhamer et al. (1996) using 
surveys of businesses that survived the 1994 Northridge earthquake (similar to Webb et al. 
1999). A random sample of Los Angeles area firms was selected for the survey by using 
stratified sampling, with shaking intensity, type of business, and size of business as sub-groups. 
A modified version of Dillman's (1978) "total design method” was used to conduct the surveys. 
The collected data included: Business size, disruption of business operations due to the 
earthquake, characteristics of the earthquake at the site, and the availability/use of external aid. 
The results of this study lead to two important conclusions. First, physical damage is not the only 
indicator of business performance. The effects of the disaster on business operations and the 
impacts of the disaster on the businesses’ surroundings must also be investigated. Second, the aid 
available to businesses following disasters may not actually help them. Sometimes the aid only 
created more problems such as additional debt. This study was limited because it did not evaluate 
businesses that performed better as a result of the disaster (e.g., manufacturi g nd construction 
sector), and it did not investigate businesses that closed as a result of the disaster (Dahlhamer et 
al. 1996). 
Studies such as Webb et al. (1999) and Dahlhamer et al. (1996), while useful, leave a gap 
in knowledge of small business behavior after disasters because these studies only investigated 
surviving businesses. After disasters, businesses often move, close, are renamed, sell, or morph 
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into something else making it difficult to find and contact the owners. Schrank et al. (2012) 
proposed a methodology for tracking owners of small businesses after disasters and te ted the 
methodology after Hurricane Katrina. The authors attempt to solve many problems related to 
post-disaster reconnaissance such as: timing, generalizability, and access. Th y first selected a 
representative sample of small businesses (0 – 2 0 employees) that were in operation prior to 
Hurricane Katrina by purchasing data from the 2004 Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) database, and 
then identified businesses that began after Katrina and businesses that had closed after Katrina by 
comparing the 2004 D&B databse to the 2009 D&B database. Once they identified potentially 
demised businesses, student workers called the old phone number to see if it was operational, 
and if it was not operational, then they used an online search process called “record linkage” 
which finds information across pairs of files to determine if those pairs are associated with the 
same business. Using this method they were able to find and contact the vast majority of the 
demised business owners. In addition to this, they sent four team members into the field over a 
period of twelve days to try to find these business owners. The field team members were not 
nearly as effective at finding and contacting the demised business owners as the desktop search 
process. One of the limitations of this study is that D&B records have some inaccuracies. If 
possible, state business license records should be used instead of D&B records (Schrank et al. 
2012). 
Merz et al. (2010) review the current state of the art practices for economic flood damage 
assessments and identifies future research directions. Oversimplified approaches to economi 
damage assessments are often used by researchers due to lack of data and knowledge. They 
argue that uncertainty analyses of model inputs and assumptions should always be performed. It 
is important to understand the spatial and temporal boundaries of the specific study tha  you want 
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to do. The authors identify 4 types of damage (direct, tangible; direct, intangible; indirect, 
tangible; and indirect intangible) and 3 types of special scales (micro, meso, and macro). For the 
NIST COE methodology, we are interested in all three of these spatial scales. The following 
three steps describe a procedure that is often used for the evaluation of direct fiscal flood 
damage:  
1. Classify elements of interest into homogenous groups 
2. Identify the quantity, type, and estimated values of at risk elements. 
3. Evaluate vulnerability by relating flood impacts to damage to assets.  
Indirect economic losses are a result of changes in the economy due to direct damages. 
Business interruption is a common result of indirect damages. In order to understand indirect 
economic damages, linkages within the economic system must be defined. Two examples of 
immediate short term losses after a disaster are: input/output losses to firms who are 
manufacturers or suppliers to the impacted businesses and reduction of demand or consumption. 
Indirect losses are difficult to measure which has led to the use of economic models to estimate 
losses. Examples of economic models include: input-output models, simultaneous equation 
models, and computable general equilibrium models. There are many limitations of economi 
data assessments. Very few data sets are publicly available and little is known about their 
quality. Standardized methods of flood damage data collection have not been developed, but 
have consistently requested (Merz et al. 2010). 
Addy and Ijaz (2011) provided preliminary estimates of the fiscal impact of the numerous 
tornadoes that occurred in Alabama on April 27, 2011. This study is characterized as a case study 
not a field study because the authors analyzed data that had already been collected instead of 
collecting data in the field. They attempted to define the fiscal impact on the state a   whole by 
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looking at individual metrics such as changes in employment, Alabama gross domestic produ t 
(GDP), state and local tax collections, and cleanup and rebuilding costs. They depended on 
several organizations for data including: Alabama Department of Finance, Alabama Department 
of Industrial Relations (ADIR), Alabama Department of Revenue (ADOR), U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA), U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and media reports. They used 
the reported sales and income tax revenues to determine the total loss of state tax revenue. As is 
often the case with post-disaster fiscal impact studies, there was a great deal of uncertainty in the 
analysis. This uncertainty was accounted for by providing low and high end estimates, and 
empirical multipliers were used to account for unknowns in the analysis such as recovery of 
waste management and construction industries. They made the assumption that economic 
damages occur only in 2011 and assumed values for amounts spent on cleanup, assistance, and 
rebuilding. These assumptions ensure that the estimates are conservative This r port did not 
attempt to estimate the disaster’s effect on important resilience metrics such as quality of life, 
displacement, and mental and physical health issues (Addy and Ijaz 2011). 
Pan (2014) evaluated the economic loss associated with Hurricane Ike in Houston and 
developed a framework for loss estimation. Like several other economic studies (e.g., Addy and 
Ijaz, 2011), Pan analyzed data from existing databases and relied on data from government 
sources. Pan used GIS data and spatial allocation models to estimate direct and indirect 
economic losses and assign these losses to small zones within a community. The tools that he 
used included: GIS software, census data, Hazus models, and interviews with community leaders 
and business owners. His method for estimating uninsured losses relies on knowing the total 
insured losses and then applying a factor to predict the uninsured losses. (Pan 2014). 
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Dolfman et al. (2007) discuss the effects of Hurricane Katrina on the employment and wage 
patterns in New Orleans. They did not collect any field data during this process. Instead, they 
obtained their data from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) program of 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Economic patterns were compared before and up to ten months 
after the event, and the number of jobs lost and the total loss of wages during these ten months 
were estimated. They measured the economic diversity of the community by evaluating the 
concentration of jobs in each industry sector and comparing it with the national average. They 
then evaluated the changes in the total employment, total wages, and average weekly wag s over 
time in order to track the recovery of the community. Levels of employment in thecurrent month 
were compared with levels of employment in the same month of the prior year in order t  
remove the bias of seasonal patterns of employment. They concluded that the city of New 
Orleans reached its low point of job loss in November 2005 (105,300 less jobs than the previous 
year), after which employment began to increase slowly. The authors state that i  is important to 
identify all tangible costs which include direct and indirect damages (including cost of 
emergency services). It is also commonly accepted to use depreciated values of goods that are 
damaged instead of full replacement costs (Dolfman et al. 2007). 
Discussion of Studies Focusing on Economics  
Post-disaster field studies that collect data focusing on fiscal impact to a community are 
rare. It is more common for researchers to obtain data from external public or private sources in 
order to develop models. Fiscal impact studies are similar to epidemiologic studies in that they 
both primarily analyze data collected by government agencies or other researchers, which are not 
made publicly available until several years after a disaster occurs. They also typically include 
large assumptions and uncertainties (Addy and Ijaz, 2011; Pan 2015). However, some survey 
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type studies have been conducted to investigate the effects of disasters on individual businesses 
(Webb et al. 1999; Dahlhamer et al. 1996). The greatest difficulty while conductig these types 
of studies is locating and contacting owners of businesses that have closed, moved, been 
renamed, merged, etc. This problem can be addressed by using the time consuming process of 
“record linkage” to locate business owners, which was determined to be a far more effective 
method than using a field team to track business owners (Schrank et al. 2012). Certain industries 
such as construction or manufacturing may actually perform better after disasters, and future 
studies should investigate these effects (Dahlhamer et al. 1996).  
In future community resilience focused field studies, it will be important o not only 
predict values of direct and indirect economic losses due to disasters, but also investigate what 
physical damage caused these economic losses and how these economic losses affect the 
everyday lives of individuals within the community. For example, economic losses may lead to 
loss of employment, population dislocation, or school closings. Post-disaster research must begin 
to be able to quantify and predict these types of secondary effects and interdependencies.  
2.1.5. Discussion and Closure 
There are many important lessons that can be learned from the thirty-five reports that 
were reviewed herein. Although several of these reviewed studies were multi-disciplinary 
(Kuligowski et al. 2014; MCEER 2006-2008; Texas Department of Homeland Security 2008), 
there is still a dearth of studies that provide insight into the int rconnectivity of the physical, 
social (including epidemiology), and economic domains or even the interdependencies across 
physical infrastructure sectors within that domain. Individual networks and systems are a part of 
a resilient community, but all three domains, and the sectors within the domains, must work in 
concert and continue to be functional following an event for a community to be truly resilient. 
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Hence, the linkages across the physical, social (including epidemiology), and economic domains 
must be understood in order to study and model community resilience. Models of these linkages 
are constantly improving and becoming more detailed, and conducting field studies that have the 
ability to quantify community resilience is crucial for the future of disaster research. 
There are numerous linkages that can be found through additional data inquiries related 
to other sectors within the physical systems domain. While many of the reviewed studies 
investigated the physical systems domain, they did not investigate how damage to infrastructure 
may have affected the social science and economic domains. For example, residential buildings 
are interconnected with the social science and economic domains because when a residence loses 
functionality (i.e., its ability to provide shelter for its residents) then the residents’ physiological 
needs are no longer being met and they may choose to relocate which decreases economic 
activity in the community. As another example, religious buildings are interconnected with the 
social science and economic domains because when a religious building is no longer functional 
then individuals will lose social connections and a sense of fulfillment. Furthermor , religious 
organizations often provide volunteer services and financial aid for individuals in need, ad if the 
organization has no building in which to meet, then their ability to provide these services will be 
impaired. These are just two example of how these community domains interact with each other 
to drive individual decision making. In order to conduct future community resilience focused 
field studies these interconnected factors that influence individual decision making must be 
captured by quantifiable data.   
2.2.  Infrastructure Dependencies Overview 
In order to study a community’s resilience, it is important to understand the complex 
infrastructure systems that affect the everyday life of its residents. These infrastructure systems 
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include but are not limited to power generation and supply, water and wastewater treatment, oil 
and natural gas production, transportation, buildings, and communication. Many of these syst ms 
are dependent on each other, so if one fails the other one cannot function properly. Oth r systems 
are interdependent, meaning that they both rely on each other to function properly. This section 
contains a brief overview of the dependencies and interdependencies of infrastructure systems. It 
is not intended to be comprehensive, but only to provide a few examples of interdependencies for 
each physical system and the questions that might be asked in order to study them furt r. For a 
more detailed literature review of lifelines and their dependencies the interested reader is referred 
to NIST CGR 16-917-39 (Applied Technology Council 2016).  
Table 2-2 was created in order to show a summary of each of the systems, their primary 
dependencies, and suggested field data collection methods. This is followed by further 
explanation of each system’s dependencies. The most significant finding of this review is that in 
nearly all cases, the use of backup generators and batteries greatly increases the system’s
resilience and minimizes functionality interruption.  
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Table 2-2: Critical Infrastructure Primary Dependencies 
System Primary 
Dependency 
Explanation Reference Data Needed Data 
Collectio
n Method 
Power Generation Oil and Natural 
Gas 
Oil and natural gas 








Was there an oil 












Electric Power Pumps ned electric 
power to function. 
Loss of power leads to 
loss of pumps which 
leads to loss of 
pressure which can 






Did you have 
power outages? 














Oil and natural gas 






networks, and other 
critical business 
systems to operate and 
connect their 
infrastructures. 
Lesar et al. 
(2001) 











Transportation Oil and Electric 
Power 
Urban communities 
rely on electric signals 
for traffic regulation 






Did you lose 
power? Why? 











Loss of functionality 
depends on the 
purpose of the 
building. Some 
businesses depend on 
communication 
systems while 
hospitals depend on 
electric power, etc. 
Pederson et 
al. (2006) 






Communication Electric Power Communication 
systems are largely 
powered by electricity.  
Lesar et al. 
(2001) 
Did you lose 










Table 2-3 (Pederson et al. 2006) shows a list of utilities and services and their 
dependencies. An “H” means that there is a high level of dependency, an “M” means that there is 
a medium level of dependency, and an “L” means that there is a low level of dependency. This 
matrix supports and affirms the information given previously in Table 2-2.  
 
Table 2-3: Interdependency Matrix 
(Pederson et al. 2006) 
 
 
Figure 2-3 (Rinaldi et al. 2001) shows a diagram of the dependencies and 
interdependencies for each system within a community. This diagram is not comprehensive but 
65 
is believed to be the first of its kind, and it does provide good examples of the types of 
interdependencies that exist within a community. 
 
 
Figure 2-3: Infrastructure Interdependencies Diagram 
(Rinaldi et al. 2001) 
2.2.1. Power Generation 
The majority of power outages are caused by physical damage to transmission and 
distribution lines, or occasionally to generation systems. However, the electric power 
infrastructure increasingly relies on oil and natural gas for electric power generation (Gursesli 
and Desrochers 2003). Oil and natural gas provide the fuel that is required to keep generators 
functioning and lubrication for the machinery. If access to natural gas and oil is cut off, power 
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generators will cease functioning when the reserves are empty. Power generation is also highly 
dependent on water to cool the machines. However, since most power lants are constructed near 
a natural water source they do not rely on external infrastructure for their water needs. Power 
failure has a significant effect on the resilience of a community because of the broad range of 
other systems that it impacts. Figure 2-4 (Rinaldi et al. 2001) shows a diagram that illustrates the 
dependencies of other systems within a community on electric power.  
 
Figure 2-4: Electric Power Dependencies Diagram 
(Rinaldi et al. 2001) 
 
Sample questions for plant manager (or similar) during a potential field study: 
Sample Question 1: Did you have failure of transmission and distribution lines? Why or why 
not? 
Sample Question 2: Did you have enough water for cooling? Why or why not? 
Sample Question 3: What is the source of your water supply? How was the source affected? 
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Sample Question 4: Did you have enough fuel for the power generators? Why or why not? 
Sample Question 5: Where do you obtain your oil and natural from? How was the source 
affected? 
2.2.2. Water and Wastewater Treatment 
Water production is directly dependent upon power generation (Gursesli and Desrochers 
2003). Power disruption may cause pumps to become ineffective which in turn causes a loss of 
water system pressure, which often leads to boil-water advisories, since without pressure, 
groundwater and potential contaminants can leak into the system. Power outages also cause 
sewer lift stations to stop working, which causes sewage build up and in some cases, discharge of 
raw sewage (Miles et al. 2015).  
Sample questions for plant manager (or similar) during a potential field study: 
Sample Question 1: Did you have power outages? How did they affect water treatment and 
transportation? 
Sample Question 2: If there was a power outage, did sewer lift stations stop working? How did 
this affect wastewater transportation and treatment 
Sample Question 3: Did you have a backup generator r batteries on site? How long can the 
generator or batteries supply power to your primary systems? 
2.2.3. Oil and Natural Gas 
According to a report by the National Petroleum Council Committee on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (Lesar et al. 2001), oil and natural gas systems are primarily dependent 
upon information technology, telecommunications, and electric power. They also rely on e-
commerce, commodity trading, business-to-business systems, electronic bulletin boards, 
computer networks, and other critical business systems to operate and connect their systems. 
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This increasing dependence on communications systems is creating new problems and 
complexities for oil and natural gas resilience. As refineries continue to become more automated 
they become more dependent on external resouces such as communications systems and electric 
power. Most new natural gas appliances use electronic ignition and will not operate without 
electricity. Petroleum production and delivery also depend o  transportation systems. Petroleum 
products are often transported through the use of pipelines, but the primary method of 
transporting petroleum products to the end user is through the use of barges, rail, and trucks. 
Therefore, if transportation infrastructure is damaged then the petroleum products wil never 
reach their destination. In addition, gas stations require electricity in order to operate pumps, and 
many gas stations do not have backup generators (Gursesli and Desrochers 2003; Lesar et al. 
2001).  
Sample questions for oil or natural production plant manager (or similar) during a potential field 
study: 
Sample Question 1: Did you lose communication between systems? For how long? Why? 
Sample Question 2: Did you have power outages? How did they affect production and 
transportation of petroleum products? 
Sample Question 3: What is the source of your power supply? How was the source affected? 
Sample Question 4: Did you have a backup generator r batteries onsite? How long can the 
generator or batteries supply power to your primary systems? 
2.2.4. Transportation  
Most modes of transportation are dependent upon oil or gas to power their engines; 
however, electric power is also crucial for certain transportation systems. For example, in urban 
communities traffic flow is largely regulated with the use of electric traffic signals. If power to 
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these traffic signals is cut off, traffic will be significantly disrupted. Another example is the 
dependence of electric trains and similar public transportation systems on electric power to 
function (Miles et al. 2015). These are just a couple i lustrative examples of interdependencies in 
transportation systems, but there are many more that are not discussed herein.  
Sample questions for city transportation engineer (or similar) during a potential field study: 
Sample Question 1: Did you have power outages? How did outages affect electric trains and 
traffic signals? 
Sample Question 2: What is the source of your power supply? How was the source affected by 
the event? 
Sample Question 3: Did you lose telecommunication service? How did this affect public 
transportation? 
Sample Question 4: Who provides this telecommunication service?  
Sample Question 5: Was there an oil or gas shortage? How did this affect traffic patterns? 
Sample Question 6: Was there an increased usage of public transportation after the event?
2.2.5. Buildings 
Although community resilience focuses on all physical and non-physical sectors within a 
community, it is clear that functionality of certain buildings in a community plays a central role. 
The causes of loss of functionality vary depending on the purpose of the building. Most 
businesses depend on electric power for computer use, telecommunications, and typically their 
ability to function properly. Other types of buildings may depend on other systems such as water 




Sample questions for building and facility manager (or similar) during a potential field study: 
Sample Question 1: What is the primary function of your building (if not apparent)? Was this 
function interrupted? If so, for how long? 
Sample Question 2: Did you have enough water for necessary building functions? Why or why 
not? 
Sample Question 3: What is the source of your water supply (if not apparent)? How was the 
source affected? 
Sample Question 4: Did your wastewater systems work properly? How did this affect your 
building’s functionality? 
Sample Question 5: Did you have enough oil and natural gas (heating, cooling, a d fuel source)? 
Why or why not? 
Sample Question 6: Where do you obtain your natural gas from? How was this ource affected? 
Sample Question 7: Did you have power outages? How did they affect your building’s 
functionality? 
Sample Question 8: What is the source of your power supply? How was the source affected? 
Sample Question 9: Did you have a backup generator r batteries onsite? How long can the 
generator supply power to your primary systems? 
2.2.6. Communication Systems 
Communication systems are primarily dependent upon electric power. Without powerthe 
systems will cease to function. As discussed previously, electric power is primarily dependent 
upon oil and natural gas. When the oil and natural gas reserves are depleted or when the 
transportation of oil and natural gas is disrupted, electricity cannot be produced and 
telecommunications will be cut off unless a backup generator is connected (Lesar et al. 2001). 
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This is an example of the complexities of physical infrastructure dependencies, and how a single 
system may depend on multiple other systems.  
Sample questions for communications coordinator (or similar) during a potential field study: 
Sample Question 1: Did you lose power? For how long? 
Sample Question 2: Where do you obtain your power? Why was this source affected? 
Sample Question 3: Did your parent server lose functionality? Why? 
Sample Question 4: Did you have a backup generator r batteries onsite? How long can the 
generator or batteries supply power to your primary systems?  
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3. Identifying Resilience Metrics 
In order to conduct community resilience field studies and fill the gaps in past field 
studies that were identified in Section 2.1, a set of quantifiable metrics must be identified. This 
chapter provides a brief review of two reports that have been published by NIST that describe a 
conceptual framework for assessing resilience at the community scale and then uses this 
conceptual framework to help identify the specific field data needs for seven crucial resilience 
metrics. 
3.1. NIST Conceptual Framework for Assessing Resilience at the Community Scale 
NIST has published two reports as a part of their Community Resilience Assessment 
Methodology (CRAM) project with the goal of providing a basis for assessing resilience at a 
community scale. The first report (Lavelle et al. 2015) reviewed nine existing methodologies for 
evaluating community resilience. Each of the nine methodologies provided a separate set of 
quantifiable resilience metrics. Each of them was reviewed, analyzed, and scored based on their 
effectiveness. The second report (Kwasinski et al. 2016) proposed a conceptual framework for 
assessing resilience at the community scale that combines the strengths of these existing 
methodologies and fills  any gaps that were identified. The authors propose that it is the primary 




3. Housing and Shelter 
4. Security and Safety 
5. Education and Personal Development 
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6. Culture and Identity  
7. Belonging and Relationships 
These essential community dimensions are supported by community services that include 
communication, transportation, water, sewage, energy, education, policing, fire protection, t . 
These services are fueled by resources that are separated into the following categories: financial, 
built, political, social, natural, time, etc. If a community loses its ability to provide these 
resources or these services forits members, then its ability to provide the seven community 
dimensions becomes impaired. Any of these community dimensions, services, or resources can 
be dependent on other dimensions, services, and resources. Th y might also be mutually 
dependent on each other, or interdependent. This concept is outlined in Figure 3-1 (reproduced 
from Kwasinski et al. 2016) below. 
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Figure 3-1: NIST Community Dimensions 
(Kwasinski et al. 2016) 
 
The authors recommend that in order to quantify resilience, several important community 
dimensions must be selected and analyzed. This involves determining the services and resources 
that are required to achieve a certain community dimension and investigating dependencies and 
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interdependencies. Performance indicators should be identified in order to achieve this. Some 
examples of performance indicators are: population dislocation, employment levels, housing 
availability, crime levels, etc. The terms performance indicator and resilience metric are used 
interchangeably throughout this thesis. Performance goals can be established for each indicator, 
and then the actual performance of each system as easured in the field can be compared with 
the performance goals in order to gain an understanding of resiliencies and vulnerabilities within 
a community. Figure 3-2 (Kwasinski et al. 2016) shows a visual of the end result of this 
conceptual framework. This plot allows us to see where a community is resilient and where it is 
vulnerable by looking at the difference between the black and blue lines. Th  black line 
represents the measured resilience and the blue line represents the performance goals. 
Community systems with very large negative gaps are colored purple or red and are i  need of 
improvements in resilience. Community systems with no gap or a positive gap are colored green 
and do not necessarily need to be made more resilient based on the targets selected. This 
conceptual framework is the basis of the development of resilience metrics or performance 
indicators that are quantifiable with field study ata which are described in Section 3.2. 
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Figure 3-2: Community Resilience Assessment Tool  
(Kwasinski et al. 2016) 
3.2. Resilience Metrics 
The field study methodology developed in this thesis is driven by a desir  to measure and 
quantify community resilience. In order for this to be possible a clear set of resilience metrics 
(i.e., performance indicators) must be defined. Several examples which are believed to be good 
metrics, but are yet to be proven, are used throughout this thesis. The resilience metrics that are 
outlined below have been identified through a combination of literature review and expert
opinion. The purpose of these metrics is to provide an illustrative relationship between 
community resilience and field study data that allows the utilization of the data processing 
methodology described later in this thesis. The field study concept described herein builds off of 
the NIST conceptual framework described in Section 3.1. In order to achieve this, the 
community dimensions, essential services, and resources described by the recommendations of 
Kwasinski et al. (2016) were incorporated into the development of a set of illustrative res li nce 
metrics. However, these resilience metrics cannot necessarily be directly equated to the 
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community dimensions and more development may be needed to understand how these two 
concepts are aligned. In the following sections seven resilience metrics are described that may be 
used to characterize resilience in any community; however, these metrics may need to be revised 
depending on the specific community and field study’s goals. The seven primary resilienc  
metrics that were selected are listed below. To see a more substantial list of metrics tha  can be 
used to describe community interconnectivities, please see Appendix A.  
Possible Community Resilience Field Study Metrics: 
1. Population Dislocation 
2. Business Interruption 
3. Employee Dislocation 
4. Critical Facilities Impact 
5. Housing Loss 
6. Physical and Mental Morbidity and Mortality 
7. Fiscal Impact 
3.2.1. Population Dislocation 
Population dislocation is an ambiguous term that can mean a number of different things 
depending on the cause or timing of the dislocation. For the purpose of this thesis, it is defined as 
the migration or displacement of an individual or family immediately following a disaster. This 
does not include forced evacuation or dislocation that occurs after an extended period of time. 
Population dislocation is believed to be one of the most important measures of a community’s 
resilience, although this has not yet been proven. This metric primarily contributes to four 
essential community dimensions from the NIST conceptual framework: housing and shelter, 
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security and safety, culture and identity, and relationships and belonging. When members of a 
community are dislocated, the community cannot provide these four dimensions effectively. 
There is an abundance of research that has been conducted to define, measure, and model 
population dislocation immediately following a disaster. For the purpose collecting data that are 
compatible with the data processing toolbox described in Section 6, it is assumed that the 
primary indicator of population dislocation is residential building damage. Five classifications of 
damage measures or damage states are defined in the Hazus-MH Technical User’s Manual (DHS 
and FEMA 2011, 2015). The Earthquake Engineering Research Institute Field Study Manual 
(EERI 1996) takes a different approach and classifies damage to buildings by loss of market 
value of the building. 
Using these damage classifications, field investigators can record residential damage 
states. Then using a field study questionnaire similar to the one in Section 4.2, the duration of 
dislocation of the corresponding residents can also be recorded. Using the methodology 
described in Section 6, these data can be processed and probabilities of exceedance of dislocation 
can be found for different durations of dislocation at any location. Performance goals can then be 
determined for these probabilities as suggested in the NIST conceptual framework. Finally, the 
measured probabilities can be compared with the performance goals in order to determine 
whether an area is vulnerable or resilient (similar to Figure 3-2). This process of finding 
probabilities of exceedance and comparing them with performance goals is similar for all of the 
identified resilience metrics.  
The dislocation durations for which probabilities of exceedance are found must be 
divided into categories. For example, the durations can be divided into six categories, and a 
different probability can be produced for each category listed below. 
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Category 1: The residents are dislocated for 1 day or longer 
Category 2: The residents are dislocated for longer than two months 
Category 3: The residents are dislocated for longer than five months 
Category 4: The residents are dislocated for l nger than eight months 
Category 5: The residents are dislocated for l nger than ten months 
Category 6: The residents are dislocated permanently 
Secondary Factors: 
Physical damage is not the only reason that residents decide to leave their homes 
following a disaster. There are many secondary factors that c n have a significant effect on 
population dislocation. When applicable, data should also be gathered in order to modify the 
probabilities of population dislocation based on secondary factors. Several of the possible 
secondary factors are listed below. This list is not comprehensive, and any secondary factor can 
be considered as long as the data that are collected for that factor are correlated with the location 
of the residence. 
1. Loss of lifelines 
2. Loss of job of head of household 
3. Damage to surrounding infrastructure 
4. Insurance coverage 
5. Household Demographics 
3.2.2. Business Interruption 
Businesses interruption in the aftermath of disasters can result in loss of jobs, lower 
incomes, and additional challenges for households, neighborhoods, and communities as they 
attempt to recover from disasters (Tierney 2006). In order to quantify these effects, business 
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interruption can be measured by the number of days that a certain business is closed after a 
disaster. The primary indicator of business interruption is assumed to be damage to the buildings 
that contain businesses. This may be highly related to housing loss as 52% of small businesses 
are operated from the owner’s home (Pratt 2000). Using this simplifying assumption, we can 
predict probabilities of business interruption for different durations. This metric primarily 
contributes to three essential community dimensions from the NIST conceptual framework: 
sustenance, security and safety, and culture and identity.  
Two data fields are required in order to quantify business interruption. The first data field 
is the damage states of the buildings that contain businesses, which can be obtained using the 
damage classifications described in Section 5.5. The second data field is the durations that 
businesses lost functionality, which can be obtained by interviewing business owners, 
community leaders, and government officials using a field study questionnaire similar to the one 
in Section 4.2. Performance goals for the probability of business closure can be determined, and 
gaps between the measured probabilities and the performance goals identified (similar to Figure 
3-2). 
The business closure probabilities can be divided into six categories based on loss of 
functionality duration, and a different probability can be produced for each of the six categories 
as listed below. 
Category 1: The business is closed for 1 day or longer 
Category 2: The business is closed for longer than 2 months  
Category 3: The business is closed for longer than 5 months  
Category 4: The business is closed for longer than 8 months  
Category 5: The business is closed for longer than 10 months  
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Category 6: The business is closed permanently 
Secondary Factors: 
Physical damage to buildings is not the only reason that businesses lose functionality 
after disasters. There are many secondary factors that have a significant effect on business 
resilience, vulnerability, and recovery. When applicable, data should also be gathered for 
secondary factors in order to allow modified probabilities of loss of business functionality to be 
found. Several possible secondary factors are listed below (Tierney 2006; DHS and FEMA 
2015). 
1. Loss of lifelines 
2. Loss of customer base 
3. Damage to surrounding infrastructure 
a. Damage to transportation (shipping and receiving) networks 
4. Insurance coverage 
5. Economic sector 
6. Pre-disaster financial condition 
7. Business age 
8. Primary market 
9. Business size 
10. Owner demographics 
According to a survey performed by Webb et al. (1999), the factors that have the greatest 
effect on business closure are: type of business, pre-disaster financial condition, business age, 
primary market (e.g., local or international), and business size in that order. Several of these 
factors are accounted for in the field study questionnaire in Section 4.2.  
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3.2.3. Employee Dislocation 
Employee dislocation is a second order r silience metric because it depends on two 
previous metrics: population dislocation and business interruption. The unit of measure for 
employee dislocation is the duration of time that that an employee does not report to work after a 
disaster, and it is assumed that its primary indicator is damage to the employee’s residence. This 
metric primarily contributes to four essential community dimensions: sustenance, security and 
safety, education and personal development, and culture and identity.  
Employee dislocation is quantified by finding the number of employees that missed work 
for specified durations of time. In order to obtain these data, the field team should interview 
business owners, managers and employees in order to find out how many employees missed 
work and for how long. The questions that should be asked are escribed further in the field 
study questionnaire in Section 4.2. In addition, the damage states of the employees’ residences 
can be obtained using the damage classifications that are proposed in Section 5.5. It may be 
difficult or nearly impossible to perform a damage assessment of each mployee’s home, but an 
attempt should be made to assess the damage of the homes that are easily accessible and record 
the corresponding duration of work missed; even providing spot checks for consistency. 
Performance goals for the probability of employee dislocation can be determined, and gaps 
between the measured probabilities of exceedance and the performance goals identified (similar 
to Figure 3-2). 
The employee dislocation probabilities can be divided into six categories based on 
dislocation duration, and a different probability can be produced for each of the six categories as 
listed below. 
Category 1: The employee is dislocated for 1 day or longer 
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Category 2: The employee is dislocated for longer than 2 months  
Category 3: The employee is dislocated for longer than 5 months  
Category 4: The employee is dislocated for longer than 8 months  
Category 5: The employee is dislocated for longer than 10 months  
Category 6: The employee is dislocated permanently 
Secondary Factors: 
Physical damage to residences is not the only reason that employees are dislocated after 
disasters. There are many secondary factors that have significant effects on employee 
dislocation. When applicable, data should also be gathered for secondary factors in order to 
allow modified probabilities of employee dislocation to be found. Several possible secondary 
factors are listed below. Additional secondary factors can be considered as long as the data that 
are collected for those factors are correlated with the residence location. 
1. Loss of lifelines 
2. Damage to surrounding infrastructure 
3. Insurance coverage 
4. Demographics 
5. Morbidity or mortality 
3.2.4. Crit ical Facilities Impact 
Critical or essential facilities are defined as facilities that are necessary for society to 
function at its most fundamental level. This includes hospitals, fire stations, police stations, 
storage of critical substances, and schools (DHS and FEMA 2015). Impact to these facilities is 
measured by the duration of loss of functionality. Loss of functionality occurs when the facility 
is no longer able to perform its most basic function (e.g., a hospital loses functionality when it 
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can no longer be used to treat patients effectively). It is important to note that a service (e.g., 
healthcare) can be provided through temporary means during the imm diate aftermath of a 
disaster. The ability of a community to provide temporary services lik ly accelerates the 
recovery of a community. It is assumed that the primary indicator f loss of functionality is 
damage to the structure. This metric primarily contributes to three ssential community 
dimensions: health, security and safety, and education and personal development.  
Data that should be collected includes the damage states of critical facilities and the 
duration of loss of function for the corresponding facilities. Damage data can be obtained using 
the damage classifications that are described in Section 5.5. In order to obtain the loss of 
functionality data, the field team should interview the managers of the critical facilities, if 
possible, and any local government officials and community leaders to find out how long each 
facility lost functionality according to the guidelines in Section 4.2. These data can then be 
processed using the methodology described in Section 6.2 in order to find probabilities of 
exceedance of critical facility loss of functionality for different durations. Performance goals for 
the probability of loss of critical facility functionality can be determined, and gaps between the 
measured probabilities and the performance goals can be identified (similar to Figure 3-2). 
The loss of functionality probabilities can be divided into six categories based on 
duration, and a different probability can be produced for each of the six categories as listed 
below. 
Category 1: The critical facility loses functionality for 1 day or longer 
Category 2: The critical facility loses functionality for longer than 2 months  
Category 3: The critical facility loses functionality for longer than 5 months  
Category 4: The critical facility loses functionality for longer than 8 months  
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Category 5: The critical facility loses functionality for longer than 10 months  
Category 6: The critical facility loses functionality permanently 
Secondary Factors: 
In addition to physical damage, there are many secondary factors that have a significant 
effect on the loss of functionality of critical facilities. When applicable, data should also be 
gathered for these secondary factors in order to allow modified probabilities of loss of 
functionality to be found. Several possible secondary factors are listed below, and additional 
secondary factors can be considered as long as the data that are collected for those factors are 
correlated with the facilities’ location. 
1. Loss of lifelines 
2. Damage to surrounding infrastructure 
3. Insurance coverage 
4. Demographics 
5. Employee dislocation 
3.2.5. Housing Loss 
The loss of available housing in a community is believed to be an important resilience 
metric because it can result in population dislocation, employee dislocation, a d economic loss. 
The unit of measure for housing loss is the duration of loss of functionality of a residence, where 
loss of functionality refers to the lack of a building’s ability to provide shelter. It is assumed that 
the primary indicator of this loss of functionality is the damage state of a residence. This metric 
primarily contributes to four essential community dimensions from the NIST conceptual 
framework: housing and shelter, security and safety, culture and identity and relationships and 
belonging. 
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In order to create probabilistic models of housing loss, the damage states and durations of 
loss of functionality for residences must be collected. The damage states of the residences can be 
obtained by using classifications such as those proposed in Section 5.5. It is also common for 
post-event inspectors to place either green, yellow, or red tags on each residence. The color of 
the tag on the building describes the corresponding damage level based on a cursory inspection. 
It may be useful to utilize these tags as an alternative measure of damage state. An example of 
what they typically mean is given below, and the formal placards can be downloaded from the 
Applied Technology Council’s website. 
Green Tags: “The building has been inspected and no restrictions on use or occupancy have 
been found. The placard includes the date of inspection and inspector’s identification number. 
An evaluation form is prepared and given to the building official. Events after the inspection, 
such as severe weather or aftershocks, could require additional inspections and a change of the 
placard” (Brallier 2006). 
Yellow Tags: “The building has been inspected and found to be damaged as described on the 
placard. This placard can be used to cover a wide range of hazards that may limit use of the 
building or portions of the building but not make it completely unsafe. Examples of such hazards 
include water saturated ceiling drywall, collapsed chimney on a portion of the roof or creating a 
falling hazard on an adjacent structure, electrical power lines that had been inundated during 
flooding, or a portion of the building has collapsed but other portions do not appear to have been 
damaged. A yellow card may allow for limited use of the building, but restrict continuous 
habitation or sleeping in the building” (Brallier 2006). 
Red Tags: “The building has been inspected and is damaged and unsafe. No entry is allowed, 
except as specifically authorized in writing by the jurisdiction. A red placard does not imply that 
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the structure is condemned and must be demolished. Repairs can be made to mitigate the hazard. 
Specific hazards are noted on the placard and may include falling hazards, hazardous materials, 
loss of safe exits or a potential for collapse” (Brallier 2006). 
In order to obtain the loss of functionality data for this metric, the field team can 
interview government officials, community leaders, and local residents as described in the field 
study questionnaire in Section 4.2. Damage data can be obtained using the damage 
classifications that are described in Section 5.5. These data can then be processed using the 
methodology described in Section 6 in order to predict housing loss probabilities. Performance 
goals for the probability of housing loss of functionality can be determined, and gaps between 
the measured probabilities of exceedance and the performance goals can be identifi d (similar to 
Figure 3-2). 
The loss of functionality probabilit es can be divided into six categories based on
duration, and a different probability can be produced for each of the six categories as listed 
below. 
Category 1: The residence loses functionality for 1 day or longer 
Category 2: The residence loses functionality for longer than 2 months  
Category 3: The residence loses functionality for longer than 5 months  
Category 4: The residence loses functionality for longer than 8 months  
Category 5: The residence loses functionality for longer than 10 months  
Category 6: The residence loses functionality permanently 
Secondary Factors: 
In addition to physical damage, there are many secondary factors that have a significant 
effect on the loss of functionality of residential structures. When applicable, data should also be 
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gathered for secondary factors in order to allow modified probabilities of housing loss to be 
determined. Several possible secondary factors are listed below. Additional secondary factors 
can be considered as long as the data that are collected for those factors are correlated with the 
residence locations. 
1. Loss of lifelines 
2. Damage to surrounding infrastructure 
3. Insurance coverage 
4. Household demographics 
3.2.6. Physical and Mental Morbidity and Mortality 
Morbidity and mortality are often the most reported statistics after a disaster occurs. 
Research is available on the prediction morbidity and mortality during disasters (e.g., Jennings 
2014, DHS and FEMA 2015). However, it is rare for field study teams to attempt to investigate 
the number of morbidities and mortalities that are caused by a disaster because it tak s months or 
even years to determine an approximate number of deaths nd injuries due to factors such as 
missing persons, delayed fatalities, and unclear causes of injury, illness, or death (Brunkard 
2008). This metric primarily contributes to three essential community dimensions from the NIST 
conceptual framework: health, security and safety, and belonging and relationships. 
Simplifying assumptions have to be made in order to create probabilistic models of 
morbidities using the methodology described in Section 6. The primary indicator for death and 
injury is assumed to be damage to physical infrastructure. Data should be collected for locations 
and causes of morbidities and mortalities using a questionnaire similar to the one in Section 4.2. 
Then damage states can be evaluated for each corresponding infrastructure element using the 
damage state descriptions in Section 5.5. Finally, using the methodology described in Section 6, 
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these data can be processed and probabilities of exceedance of morbidities can be found for 
specific locations. Performance goals can then be set for these probabilities of exceedance as 
suggested in the NIST conceptual framework. Then the measured probabilities can be compared 
with the performance goals in order to determine whether or not an area is vulnerable (similar to 
Figure 3-2).  
In the methodology presented in this thesis, the severity of physical morbidities is 
described by the six severity levels shown in Table 3-1 where Severity Level 1 is no injury and 
Severity Level 6 is death (category descriptions taken directly from DHS and FEMA 2015). A 
different probability is generated for each of the six severity levels that are listed below.  
Table 3-1: Morbidity Category Descriptions 
(DHS and FEMA 2015) 
 
Injury Severity Level  Injury Description  
Severity Level 1 No injury or an injury of lesser severity that could be self-tr ated. 
Severity Level 2 An injury requiring basic medical aid that could be administered by 
paraprofessionals. This type of injury would require bandages or 
observation. Some examples are: a sprain, a severe cut requiring 
stitches, a minor burn (first degree or second degree on a small part 
of the body), or a bump on the head without loss of consciousness.  
Severity Level 3 An injury requiring a greater degree of medical care and use of 
medical technology such as x-rays or surgery, but not expected to 
progress to a life threatening status. Some examples are third degree 
burns or second degree burns over large parts of the body, a bump 
on the head that causes loss of consciousness, fractured bone, 
dehydration or exposure. 
Severity Level 4 An injury that poses an immediate life threatening condition if not 
treated adequately and expeditiously. Some examples are: 
uncontrolled bleeding, punctured organ, other internal injuries, 
spinal column injuries, or crush syndrome. 
Severity Level 5 Instantaneously killed or mortally injured. 
 
Mental morbidity can be just as damaging to a community as physical morbidity. This 
field study methodology accounts for rates of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in a 
community after a disaster by treating PTSD as a binary input where a person either has PTSD or 
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does not have PTSD. Whether or not a person has developed symptoms of PTSD would need to 
be determined through either the use of mental health surveys or discussions with mental health 
professionals. This process is described further in the field study questionnaire i  Section 4.2.  
The quantities of each severity level for morbidity can be divided into six categories, and a 
different probability can be produced for each of the six categories that are listed below, and for 
each of the severity levels li ted in Table 3-1. 
Category 1: There is 1 or more of a certain morbidity category related to a certain type of 
infrastructure. 
Category 2: There are more than 10 of a certain morbidity category related to a certain type of 
infrastructure. 
Category 3: There are more than 30 of a certain morbidity category related to a certain type of 
infrastructure. 
Category 4: There are more than 50 of a certain morbidity category related to a certain type of 
infrastructure. 
Category 5: There are more than 100 of a certain morbidity category related to a certain type of 
infrastructure. 
Category 6: There are more than 500 of a certain morbidity category related to a certain type of 
infrastructure. 
Secondary Factors: 
In addition to damaged infrastructure, there are many secondary factors that have a 
significant effect on morbidity and mortality rates. When applicable, data should also be 
gathered for secondary factors in order to allow modified probabilities of morbidity severity 
levels to be found. Several possible secondary factors are listed below.  
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1. Building function 
2. Number of building occupants 
3. Time of disaster 
4. Community’s emergency services capacity 
5. Demographics 
6. Population density 
3.2.7. Fiscal Impact 
Fiscal impact is a crucial metric because the economy controls many important aspects of 
community recovery. If the economy is doing well, then the city will recover more quickly and 
vice versa. This metric primarily contributes to four essential community dimensions: 
sustenance, security and safety, education and personal development, and culture and identity. 
Fiscal impact is a second order metric because it is a function of business interruption, 
population dislocation, employee dislocation, and other metrics. This is a complex metric to 
quantify because there are many unknowns and constantly changing variables. It is common for 
fiscal impact reports to be released months or even years after a disaster occurs. Due to all of 
these factors, it may be difficult to gather these types of data in the field. It is typical for an 
economist to investigate the fiscal impact of a disaster on a community by conducting a case 
study; obtaining secondary data from private and publically available data bases. However, using 
only secondary data could result in a study missing perishable data, and collecting data in the 
field may add additional value to economic models, but little exploration has been done in this 
area. It may be advantageous to consider methods of collecting fiscal impact field data in future 
field studies. This work is outside the scope of this thesis.  
92 
3.2.8. Summary Table  
Table 3-2 below shows a summary of the information in Sections 3.2.1 through 3.2.7. It 
includes each resilience metric, its primary indicator, and the minimum data that need to be 
collected in the field in order to enable the development of probabilistic models as described in 
Section 6.2. It should be noted that these metrics are only examples, and can be revised for future 
field studies. Although not listed in the table, additional data related to individual demographics 
and secondary factors should be collected if possible. Fiscal impact is excluded from this table 
because it cannot be modeled using the same methods as the other six resilience metrics. 
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Table 3-2: Resilience Metric Indicators and Data Requirements 
Resilience Metric Primary Indicator Minimum Data Needed to 
Model 
Population Dislocation Physical damage to residential 
buildings 
Durations of dislocation; 
damage states of residential 
buildings 
Business Interruption Physical damage to businesses Durations of business 
closure; damage states of 
businesses 
Employee Dislocation Physical damage to residential 
buildings 
Durations of employees 
missing work; damage states 
of residential buildings 
Critical Facilities Impact Physical damage to critical 
facilities 
Durations of critical facilities 
closure; damage states of 
critical facilities 
Housing Loss Physical damage to residential 
buildings 
Durations of loss of housing 
functionality; damage states 
of residential structures 
Physical and Mental 
Morbidity and Mortality 
Physical damage to 
infrastructure 
Severity of physical 
morbidities; mental 
disabilities (yes or no); 
damage states of 
infrastructure 
 
Note: These metrics are illustrative and recommended, but additional and alternative metrics 
should be developed based on the specific goals of the field study being planned.   
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4. Physical, Social, and Economic Interconnectivity 
This section further develops the methodology by providing guidance on investigating 
the interconnectivities between the physical, social, and economic do ains of a community. An 
interconnectivity diagram was developed that provides interview questions that might be used to 
connect these three community domains. In order to provide a more practical application of this 
interconnectivity diagram, a questionnaire was then developed that provides 27 questions and 
sub-questions that could be asked throughout the course of a field study. The goal of this 
questionnaire is to produce data that allow the modeling of the resilience metrics from Section 
3.2 and the investigation of related interconnectivities.  
4.1. Field Study Interconnectivity  Diagram 
In order to understand community resil ence, the interconnectivities or linkages between 
the physical, social, and economic domains of a community must be identified. Figure 4-1 shows 
an example diagram presenting potential interview questions to relate these three domains. A 
diagram such as this could be used during the initial field study planning period to provide 
guidance and direction for investigating the interconnectivities within a community and 
developing a detailed questionnaire. It articulates an understanding of how a single system is 
connected to many other systems and can allow field teams to ask the proper interview questions 
that enable them to investigate this interconnectivity. Many of the original metrics that this 
diagram originated from are discussed in detail Masterson and Peacock et al. (2014). For a more 





Figure 4-1: Field Study Interconnectivity Diagram 
Note: An arc in an arrow means that one arrow does not intersect another arrow 
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4.2. Field Study Questionnaire 
A sample questionnaire was developed with guidance from the field study 
interconnectivity diagram shown in Figure 4-1 which provides 27 questions and sub questions 
with the purpose of assisting in obtaining data from interviews and surveys that enable the 
quantification of six of the resilience metrics listed in Section 3.2. These metrics include (1) 
population dislocation, (2) business interruption, (3) employee dislocation, (4) critical facilities 
impact, (5) housing loss, and (6) physical and mental morbidity and mortality. It does not cover 
the seventh metric, fiscal impact, because field study data do not typically need to be collected to 
study these effects. In addition to quantifying resilience metrics, the data supplied by these 
questions will link the physical, social, and economic domains of a community.  
In order to show an example of how to establish these linkages a  part of a field study, 
the formulation of this question aire relies heavily on the field study interconnectivity diagram 
shown in Figure 4-1. However, it is important to note that the questions in this questionnaire are 
not the same as the questions in the interconnectivity diagram because their primary focus is on 
collecting the data required to quantify resilience metrics. The questions are organized first by 
the resilience metric that they will be used to quantify and second by the recipient of the 
question. The type of interconnectivity that is correlated with each of the questions is also 
described. There are many other questions that could be added to this list, but in order to account 
for time demands and resources, only these 27 were selected herein. This section only provides 
an example of a possible field study questionnaire. Many of these questions should be altered 
depending on the characteristics of the specific community and the disaster to be studied.  
In addition to a questionnaire, a demographics survey should be filled out by every 
interviewee, which will provide data on the interviewee’s gender, race/ethnicity, age, marital 
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status, household size, education, and employment status. There should also be a separate 
demographics survey for businesses.  
Population Dislocation 
The following questions were selected because they provide data that can be used to 
quantify population dislocation and the related interconnectivities in accordance with the 
methods described in Sections 3 and 6.  
Questions for community residents: 
1. Did you leave your home before, during or after the disaster? 
2. If so, why did you leave your home? 
a. Damage to home, loss of power/water/heating/air conditioning, loss of job, 
damage to surrounding roads/bridges/neighborhood, etc. 
b. Was your home insured? 
3. Where did you stay while you were away from your home? 
a. Hotel, friends, family, rental, out of state, etc. 
b. How long did you stay at each of these locations? 
c. How far away from home were you? 
4. When did you return to your home? What made it possible for you to return? (Insurance 
payout, rebuilding efforts, etc.) 
Questions for community leaders/government officials/collaborating researchers: 
5. How many people were displaced from their homes? For how long? 
6. How many people utilized public shelters over time? 
a. Were these shelters free? 
b. How close were these shelters to the community? 
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Questions 1 - 6 provide data that connect residential building damage tohe physiological 
needs of individuals (see Figure 4-1). There are many different factors that can lead to 
dislocation after a disaster, but the primary indicator is damage to residential buildings.  
Business Interruption and Employee Dislocation 
The following questions were selected because they provide data that can be used to 
quantify either business interruption or employee dislocation and the related interconnectivities. 
These two metrics are grouped together in th s questionnaire because they are closely related to 
each other, and the questions that can be asked to obtain data for them are similar. When 
interviewing business owners or managers, a demographics urvey that includes questions about 
the businesses’ economic sector, pre-disaster financial condition, age, primary market (e.g., local 
or international), and size should be completed by each business owner.   
Questions for business owners/managers: 
7. What type of business do you operate? 
8. Did this business close? 
9. If so, why did this business close? 
a. Damage to building, loss of power/water/heating/air conditioning, loss of 
customer base, damage to surrounding roads/bri ges/neighborhood, etc. 
b. Was this business insured? 
10. When did this business re-open? What allowed it to re-open? 
11. What was the total financial loss of this business due to the disaster? What was the 
primary cause of this loss? 
12. Was this business able to access any public or private assistance to help with repairs or 
lost revenue? 
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a. Small business loans, grants, donations, etc. 
13. How many employees did not report to work and for how long? Why? 
Questions for community leaders/government officials/collaborating researchers: 
14. What assistance was given to local and corporate businesses? 
Questions for community residents: 
15. What was your job prior to the disaster? 
16. Are you still employed at the same location? 
a. If yes, did you have to take any time off of work due to the disaster? How long? 
b. If no, why did you lose your job? 
17. Are you employed now?  
a. If yes, where do you work now? Are you satisfied with your job? 
Questions 7 - 10 provide data that connect commercial building damage to the 
physiological needs of employees and other community members (s e Figure 4-1). Community 
members rely on commercial buildings remaining open in order to obtain food, water, clothing, 
and other necessities. Questions 13, 15, 16, and 17 provide data that quantify employee 
dislocation, while also describing the interconnectivity between commercial building damage, 
the physiological need of community members to earn money, and the sense of esteem of 
community members that are working in their respective fields. Questions 12 and 14 help in 
understanding the assistance given tobusinesses throughout the recovery process, although much 
of this is traceable through FEMA and other entities. This allows the finding of the 
interconnectivity between commercial building damage and community response. Question 11 
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investigates the broader effects of the disaster on the economy as a whole, whi  describing the 
interconnectivity between damage to commercial buildings and economic structure. 
Critical Facilities Impact  
The following questions were selected because they provide data that can be used to 
quantify impact to critical facilities and the related interconnectivities. Critical facilities are 
defined here as facilities that are necessary for a community to function at its most fundamental 
level after a disaster. This includes hospitals, fire stations, police stations, storage of critical 
substances, and schools. The following questions can be used in conjunction with field damage 
estimates to assess the total impact to critical facilities. 
Questions for facility managers/community leaders/collaborating researchers: 
18. Did critical facilities (hospitals, fire stations, police stations, storage of critical 
substances, and schools) close? For how long? 
19. Why did critical facilities close? 
a. Damage to building, loss of power/water/heating/air conditioning, damage to 
surrounding roads/bridges/neighborhood, etc. 
b. Were these facilities insured? If so, which ones were or were not? 
Questions for community residents: 
20. During the disaster, did you or a family member need to utilize any critical services, such 
as an ambulance, hospital, fire department, or police assistance? 
a. If so, why? 
b. If so, were you satisfied with the level of care that you received? Why or why 
not? 
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Question 18 - 20 connect critical facilities to the physiological needs of c mmunity 
members and the sense of safety in the community (see Figure 4-1). Healthcare and emergency 
services are always necessary after a disaster, and these questions will help us understand how 
these critical facilties and emergency services performed following the disaster. 
Housing Loss 
The following questions were selected because they provide data that can be used to 
quantify housing loss and the related interconnectivities. The following questions can be used in 
conjunction with field damage estimates and observations of green, yellow, and red tags to assess 
the total impact to buildings. It should be noted here that housing loss is also studied following a 
natural disaster using permit data from the county or city. The following inquiries can typically 
be answered through a request for data, and not surveys or interviews.  
21. How many housing units were damaged due to the disaster? 
a. How many of each housing type (single family home, multi family home, 
apartment complex, etc.) were damaged? 
b. What level of damage? How many green, yellow, and red tags were placed (if 
applicable)? 
22. What area of the community contained homes that were the most damaged? 
a. Did levels of damage vary based on the characteristics of each neighborhood such 
as income level, race/ethnicity, age, etc.? 
23. Which areas were able to begin rebuilding or making repairs the fastest? 
a. How many permits have been issued and at what locations? 
24. Did your house lose functionality? For how long?* 
25. If so, why did your house lose functionality? 
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a. Damage to building, loss of power/water/heating/air conditioning, damage to 
surrounding roads/bridges/neighborhood, etc.  
b. Was your home insured? 
*Loss of functionality refers to the lack of ability to support and provide shelter for the 
residents. 
Questions 21, 24, and 25 provide data that connect residential building damage to the 
physiological needs of community members. Community members need shelter in order to 
survive and recover; therefore, creating resilient residential buildings is crucial to the survival of 
a community. Questions 22 and 23 provide data on the interconnectivity between residential 
building damage and pre-existing socioeconomic structures.  
Physical and Mental Morbidity and Mortality 
The following questions were selected because they provide data that can be used to 
quantify physical and mental morbidity and mortality and the related interconnectivities. 
Morbidity data can also be collected from external organizations in the months and years 
following a disaster, but this makes it difficult tofind the exact locations and causes of each 
death.  
Questions for collaborating researchers and government agencies: 
26. Identify the location, the cause, and the severity of morbidities and mortalities. 
a. If the person was injured in a building, what was the daily occupancy of the 
building? (This sub-question aids in the modeling of morbidities.) 
Questions for physically and mentally injured persons and/or their loved ones: 
27. Were you physically injured during the disaster? 
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a. Where were you during the disaster? 
b. Describe your experiences during the disaster.  
c. Fill out survey that evaluates the probability that an individual developed a mental 
disorder due to a disaster (Galea et al. 2007). 
Questions 26 and 27 provide data that connect a community’s physical domain to 
physiological needs and a sense of safety within a community. 
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5. Planning and Executing Field Studies 
This chapter provides practical processes and strategies that can assist field researcher  in 
conducting community resilience field studies. It includes recommendations related to making 
the decision to enter the field, mandatory training for studies involving human subjects, selecting 
the field team, selecting necessary and optional equipment, conducting damage assessments, 
conducting interviews and surveys, managi g time in the field, following up with field studies, 
and protecting and storing data. These guidelines are based on the work and opinions of 
sociologists and engineers with extensive field experience as well as best practices extracted 
from the literature review that is ummarized in Section 2.1. Elements of this field study 
approach that must be modified based on hazard type include the damage assessment 
methodology, field study questionnaire, equipment selection, and data collection strategies. Parts 
of this chapter heavily reference the Institutional Review Board (IRB) Protocol (see S ction 5.2) 
which was created for the NIST CoE by Lori Peek and Jennifer Tobin-Gurley and is the 
culmination of many years of field study experience and the combination of numerous check 
sheets that were created prior to entering the field. This IRB Protocol is attached to this thesis as 
Appendix B.  
5.1. Field Study Decision Progression 
The first step to making the decision of whether or not to enter the field is to conduct a 
desk study immediately after a disaster occurs in order to gather critical data and information 
remotely. These data include things like the number of deaths and injuries, critical facility 
damage, business damage and closures, number of people in temporary shelters, location and 
spread of damage, and other relevant information. This information can typically be found 
through news reports, articles, and collaboration with local university and industry re earchers, 
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government officials, and community leaders. However, with some exception it will be unlikely 
to know if resilience or a lack thereof is an issue for a community during or immediately 
following an event. The focus of the field study methodology utlined in this thesis is, in general, 
on developed countries. This may include communities within and outside of the U.S. depending 
on their physical infrastructure, social systems, and economic systems.  
  After the initial desk study, if the community is determined to be a good candidate for a 
community resilience field study (CRFS), then a small field team, termed a pilot team, should be 
sent out to conduct a preliminary investigation with the goal of collecting data that provide a 
broad summary of the impact to the community. The team should consist of a few people, and 
the duration of the study should be a few days to one week for most communities, although an 
event with a large spatial footprint may require additional time and resources at this early tage. 
Activities of this pilot team might include interviewing community leaders, business owners, and 
emergency response teams, preliminary documentation of damage to infrastructure systems and 
setting up the mechanisms for collaborating with local researchers. Once this pilot nvestigation 
is concluded, all of the preliminary data can be gathered and a decision can be made on whether 
or not to conduct a full, arge scale field study. The data collected during the pilot study will also 
inform the development of field study objectives for a large scale field study.   
The time at which the field study occurs will depend on several factors including type, 
location, and scale of the disaster, security and access limitations, and the speed of emergency 
response and debris management activities. For example, if a large footprint flooding event is to 
be studied, even the pilot team may not be able to enter the field until the water has rceded and 
access to damaged locations is permitted. However, it is important for the team to enter the field 
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for the first visit as soon as reasonable after a disaster in order to obtain perishable data that may 
be lost during the initial cleanup process.  
During the planning process, before th  full scale field study occurs, it is crucial for each 
of the field team members to gain an understanding of what data sets are to be acquired and why 
those data sets are important. Specific goals for data collection must be set befor  the team goes 
into the field. These goals include the type of data needed, the demographics of the participants, 
and the tolerance for error in the data (see S ction 6.3). Each of these goals should be decided 
based the experience of the field study leaders.  
5.2. Institutional Review Board (IRB) Protocol 
Any research that involves human subjects must be approved by each participating 
institution’s Institutional Review Board (IRB). The IRB is a committee whose purpose is to 
approve, monitor, and review research involving human subjects. A detailed description of the 
field study methodology and any interview questionnaires must be provided to the IRB before 
the study is approved. Consent forms and release forms must be provided to each of the human 
subjects involved in the study in accordance with the submitted IRB protocol. The IRB protocol 
for the NIST CoE was created by Lori Peek and Jennif r Tobin-Gurley and is attached to this 
thesis as Appendix B. Additionally, all participating individuals must pass the Collaborative IRB 
Training Initiative (CITI) ethics training modules before seeing or handling any of the field study 
data. 
5.3. Field Team Roles 
In general each field study will have multiple teams that are made up of a fewpeople 
each, and each team will focus on data collection for one or two community sectors. The number 
of teams will vary depending on the size and scope of the field study. Team member roles should 
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include a principal investigator (PI), several team leaders, and field researchers. Optional roles 
include a technician, a translator (for international studies), and a possible remot data analysis 
or GIS expert. Examples for job descriptions, the number of people that would be typical, and 
logical selection criteria for each of these positions are provided in Table 5-1.  
Table 5-1: Field Study Example Job Descriptions 
Position Title Number 
Needed 




1 Oversees all of the 
field teams and the 
progress of the field 
study as a whole. 
Makes all final 




daily activities, etc. 
(May also act as a 
Team Leader). 
Should have extensive experience 
in conducting field studies of 
various types. Must have 
completed the CITI ethics 
training modules. 
Team Leader 1 per 
team 
Oversees a single field 
team (2-4 members). 
Makes daily decisions 
related to data 
collection strategies 
and daily activities. 
Reports to the PI 
throughout the field 
study. 
Should have experience in 
conducting field studies. Should 
be familiar with the field study 
protocol and have comprehensive 
knowledge of the sector being 
investigated. Should have 
working knowledge of field study 
equipment. Must have completed 
the CITI ethics training modules. 





takes photos and 
videos, records data, 
and performs any 
other tasks that are 
necessary to achieve 
the field study goals. 
Should have knowledge of the 
goals and methods of the field 
study. Should have working 
knowledge of field study 
equipment. May be an engineer, 
sociologist, economist, or another 
discipline; including a student. 
Must have completed the CITI 
ethics training modules. 
Technician Varies Solves all problems 
related to tools, 
Must have comprehensive 
knowledge and experience with 
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equipment and data 
recording. 
applicable field study equipment. 
Must have completed the CITI 
ethics training modules. 
Remote Data 
Analysis Expert 
Varies Analyzes all recorded 
data using the data 
processing techniques 
described in Section 
6.1. Develops data 
collection strategies 
and provides insight 
on daily activities for 
teams based on data 
needs. 
Must have a comprehensive 
understanding of the field study 
protocol and the data processing 
methods in Section 6. For the 
method presented herein, must 
have experience in MATLAB 
coding. Must have completed the 
CITI ethics training modules. 
Translator Varies Translates interviews, 
surveys, and 
conversations between 




Must be fluent in English and the 
primary language of the 
community being studied. Must 
have completed the CITI ethics 
training modules. 
 
A rational team member selection process should be decided on by the PI and other core 
groups conducting the field study. For example, team members could be selected based on the 
following criteria (not in order of importance or weight): 
1. Attendance of field study meetings and workshops. 
2. Pre-completion of the CITI ethics training. 
3. Availability during the specified duration of the fieldwork.  
4. Proximity to the disaster site. 
5. Interest in the field work.  
6. Expertise in a relevant or important area related to the field study.  
7. Cultural relevancy (e.g., a translator in a non-English speaking location). 
8. The principal investigator’s judgement.  
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5.4. Equipment 
The following equipment would typically be taken into the field to perform this type of 
study. This list is not comprehensive and does not include everything that a team will need 
throughout the course of a field study. It simply provides a checklist of equipment that is needed 
to achieve the fundamental goals of this methodology. 
1. Smartphones: Researchers should upload damage data, GPS data, interview and survey 
results, and other relevant information to a common data base.  
• In order for the real time data processing procedure described in 6.3 to be successful, 
researchers must have access to tools that upload their data points to a common 
database in real time. This could be a smartphone app or similar.  
2. GPS camera and video recorder (most smartphones have this capability).  
3. Audio recorder for interviews 
4. Safety equipment (e.g., hardhats, vests, safety glasses, etc.) 
5. Means of transportation for researchers and gear
6. Laptop with MATLAB installed 
7. LiDAR scanner or similar (optional) 
8. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) (E.g., Drones) (optional) 
5.5. Damage Assessments 
The primary method for collecting data on damage to physical infrastructure should be 
through inspections of select physical infrastructure with f eld notes, geo-located pictures, and 
videos. It may also be beneficial to use a ground-based Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) 
scanner, which was used by Prevatt et al. (2011). The decision to use LiDAR or similar 
equipment should be made on a case by case basis depending on the disaster type and the 
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community characteristics. It is vital that damage data be recorded for all structures that are 
correlated with interviews or other data collection activities to provide the linkage between 
physical infrastructure damage and the social science domain. This includes structures that 
appear damaged as well as structures that do not appear damaged, so that the sample is unbiased. 
Further discussion of bias indata samples is provided in Section 6.2. A portion of the damage 
data can be recorded by any team member of any background or discipline, but the member 
recoding it should annotate so questions can be traced back to them for follow up if needed.  
There are several possible damage classifications for various physical infrastructure components 
available from research organizations such as DHS and FEMA (2011, 2015) and EERI (1996). 
These damage classifications include descriptions of damage states for many building types, 
non-structural components, roads, bridges, tunnels, and more. Depending on the hazard being 
studied the team should decide and agree on the classification scheme prior to entering the field. 
This should align with IN-CORE for CoE community resilience studies, i.e. four damage states 
not including a “no damage” state.  
5.6. Interviews and Surveys 
Prior to arriving in the field, a formal questionnaire should be developed in order to 
satisfy the specific data needs of the field study. The field study interconnectivity diagram 
(Figure 4-1) and the sample questionnaire in Section 4.2 should be referenced during the 
development of the field study questionnaire, but the specific questions should be revised on a 
case by case basis. A formal and professional format should be developed in order to make it 
easy for field researchers of any background to interview community members. 
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Data can be collected from willing participants using several different methods including 
face to face interviews, door surveys, mail surveys, online surveys, and more. Several 
recruitment methods may be employed including but not limited to: flyers, social media, word of 
mouth, internet searches, and newspaper articles. The delivery and recruitment methods that are 
chosen will vary depending on the specific field study and the resources that are available. Two 
types of interviews should be conducted: in depth, semi-structured interviews and closed ended 
survey questionnaires. The in-depth, semi-structured interviews should be conducted by at least 
two team members, last twenty to thirty minutes, and be audio recorded. These intervi ws will 
provide both quantitative and qualitative data that will help us understand the cause and the 
effect of human actions. Closed ended survey questionnaires may be conducted in person or 
remotely in order to provide quantitative data. A minimum of two follow-up interviews should 
be performed between one and three y ars after the vent. After three years, additional follow-up 
interviews should be conducted as needed for the modeling of community recovery.  
Interviewees must be adult volunteers and may include: business owners and managers, 
government officials, first responders, city planners, owners of non-profits, members of service 
organizations (e.g., religious leaders), school administrators, emergency managers, health care 
administrators, and other residents. This may include elderly and non-English speaking people, 
but should not include mentally disabled people, pregnant women, minors, prisoners, or students. 
If it is necessary to interview one or more of these vulnerable populations, then a separte 
request must be made to the IRB. It is important that all interviewers understand the delicacy of 
the situation and the vulnerabilities of the interviewees and behave ethically in accordance with 
their CITI ethics training. When resources allow, interviews should be recorded, transcribed, and 
analyzed with Atlas.ti, a qualitative data analysis software program.  
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5.7. Daily Activities 
This section provides an example of a schedule of daily activities of the field team. An 
initial schedule should be created by the PI during the planning process, but it is important to 
note that the initial schedule will continually change based the revised data collection 
requirements. If it is known that the field study will have a longer duration (several w eks, but 
this would be rare), then it is important to develop a schedule that will be sustainable for th
team members. The longer that a team stays in the field the more fatigued they will become, 
which could lead to a greater chance of errors and mistakes.   
Table 5-2: Sample Daily Schedule for Field Studies Considered Sustainable 
Time Activity  
7:30 AM – 8 AM 
Full team meeting to discuss 
data collection strategies for 
the day. 
8 AM – 12 PM 
Individual team data 
collection activities. 
12 PM to 1 PM 
Teams meet for lunch (if 
possible) and discuss the 
morning’s progress, strategy 
modifications, and plans for 
afternoon data collection. 
1 PM – 5 PM 
Individual team data 
collection activities. 
5 PM – 5:30 PM 
Full team meeting, debriefing, 
and planning for next day’s 
activities. 
6 PM – 7 PM Full team dinner. 
7 PM – 9 PM 
Possible data analysis 
activities or free time. 
 
5.8. Follow-Up Field Studies 
 Investigating community resilience specifically includes quantifying the long-term 
recovery of the community in the years following a disaster. In order to quantify a community’s 
long-term recovery, follow-up field studies and data collection activities are necessary. The 
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decision to conduct a follow up field study will vary case by case and will depend on specific 
data needs. Field teams may be required to return to the site multiple times over a span of several 
years. Follow-up data collection activities may include but are not limited to: 
1. Conducting follow-up interviews and surveys with community members. 
2. Taking pictures and videos of previously damaged infrastructure in order to capture its 
recovery over time. 
3. Meeting with collaborating researchers, government officials, community leaders, 
business owners, etc.  
 It is important to note that due to the longevity of these types of field studies, the NIST 
CoE may have several field studies ongoing at the same time at various stages, and resources 
will need to be allocated accordingly. 
5.9. Data Protection and Storage 
 In order to protect the sensitive information that is collected in the field, several safety 
measures must be implemented for the storage of field study data. Any physical data that are 
collected must be safely secured and locked in file cabinets. Any electronic data that re 
collected (e.g., images, field notes, audio recordings of interviews) must be ecured in locked 
rooms on password protected computers. These data must be coded in order to protect the 
identities of the study participants. Specific names should not be mentioned in any publications 
or other works resulting from the field study, and videos or photographs of participants should
only be used with the written permission of each individual.  
  
114 
6. Data Processing 
Once the field data have been collected, they must be organized and processed. This 
section describes a general derivation of a formula that uses field data to produce fragility curves 
for evaluating resilience metrics for potential inclusion in IN-CORE. The text then describes an 
algorithm that has been written to process raw field data and a framework that can be used for 
real-time data processing and assessment of data quantity requirements.  
6.1. General Derivation 
The result of the following derivation is an equation that produces the probabilities of 
certain decision variables (i.e., resilience metrics or performance indicators), given certain 
damage states of corresponding infrastructure. This allows the user to process field data in order 
to create probabilistic models of the resilience metrics that are described in Section 3.2. This 
derivation references the seismic loss framework established by the Pacific Earthquake 
Engineering Research Center (PEER) (Cornell and Krawinkler, 2000). 
Variable Definitions: 
DV = Decision variable: Resilience metrics or performance indicators such as population 
dislocation, business interruption, morbidity and mortality, critical facilities impact, etc.  
DM = Damage measure: E.g., one through five where damage state one represents no damage 
and damage state five represents complete destruction (See Section 5.5). 
IM = Intensity measure: Measures of hazard intensity such as spectral acceleration, wind speed, 
wave height, etc. 
IT = Infrastructure type: Type of building, bridge, tunnel, etc. (eg., single story wood frame 
building). 
l = The number of different damage states that are present in a given data set. 
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m = The number of different infrastructure types that are present in a given data set. 
n = The number of data points given in the hazard curve data set. 
Assumption: This is a Markovian process. Therefore, the probabilities of future events depend 
only on the present state, not on past events. 
Derivation: 
Using the theorem of total probability: 
P(DV ≥ dv | IT=it, IM=im) =  P(DV≥ dv| DM=dmi, IT=it)* P(DM=dmi | IT=it, IM=im)  [6.1] 
P(DV ≥ dv | IM=im) = P(DV ≥ dv | IT=it, IM=im)* P(IT=itj)  [6.2] 
Substitute [6.1] into [6.2]: 
P(DV ≥ dv | IM=im) =  P(DV≥ dv| DM=dmi, IT=it)* P(DM=dmi | IT=it, IM=im)   
    *P(IT=itj)  [6.3] 
Using convolution we obtain: 
P(DV ≥ dv) = P(DV ≥ dv | IM=im)* P(IM=imk)  [6.4] 
Substitute [6.3] into [6.4]: 
P(DV ≥ dv) = P(DV≥ dv| DM=dmi, IT=it)* P(DM=dmi | IT=it, IM=im) 
          * P(IT=it j)* P(IM=imk) [6.5] 
 The final result of this derivation is P(DV ≥ dv) [6.5] or the probability that a decision 
variable is greater than or equal to a defined value. This probability of meeting or exceeding a 
decision variable is only applicable to the physical location or community which provides the 
physical, social, and hazard data. The most important result of this derivation is P(DV ≥ dv | 
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IM=im) [6.3] or the probability that a decision variable is greater than or equal to a defined value 
given an intensity measure. These probabilities of exceedance can be found and plotted for 
different intensity measures to yield a resilience metric fragility curve. These fragility functions 
can be used within IN-CORE. This equation has been written as a code which can be performed 
using MATLAB in order to process raw field study data as described in Section 6.2. 
6.2. Data Processing Toolbox  
One of the primary purposes of this thesis is to develop methods that can be used to 
collect data that will be integrated into the IN-CORE data base. In order to do this, a data 
processing toolbox was developed with the capability of producing fragility functions for the 
resilience metrics listed in Section 3.2. These fragility functions give auser the ability to input a 
particular intensity measure (e.g., wind speed) and output the probability of exceedance of 
certain resilience metrics (e.g., population dislocation). Figure 6-1 shows an example of ragility 




Figure 6-1: Example of a Fragility Curve for Evaluating Resilience Metrics 
Note: Some population dislocation fragility curves do not begin at zero because a small number 
of residents were displaced even though their residences were not damaged. 
 
The general derivation for creating resilience metric fragility functions i  described in 
detail in Section 6.1 of this report. This data processing toolbox is an application of that 
derivation within MATLAB . It includes the capability to isolate the data for any secondary factor 
that the user specifies. For example, it can create fragiliti es that are shifted to account for only 
members of the community who are below the poverty line. This process is described in detail i
the following paragraphs.  
The first input that is required is the raw data from the field. This may include 
information/data such as household address, household demographics, building damage states, 
duration of displacement, etc. The user then has the option to isolate the data based on some 
characteristic (e.g., race). If the user chooses to isolate the data then all of the data points that do 
not have the specified characteristic are utomatically removed from the dataset. After the 
dataset is isolated, the toolbox finds the probability that the specified metric is greater than a 
certain value given a certain damage state and an infrastructure type (e.g., the probability that a 
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resident will be dislocated for at least one day given that their home is in damage state three and 
is a single story woodframe structure). This is written symbolically as P(DV≥ dv| DM=dmi, 
IT=it) where the variables are defined in Section 6.1. The toolbox finds these probabilities of 
exceedance by first grouping the data points into different infrastructure types and then grouping 
those data points into different ranges of the metric (e.g., divide dislocation data into groups 
where one group includes any individuals whose homes were in damage state two and were 
dislocated more than one day, another group includes any individuals whose homes were in 
damage state two and were dislocated more than wo months, etc.). Once the data points are 
grouped, the groups are divided by the total number of data points within their respective damage 
states (e.g., divide by the total number of residences that were in damage state two, etc.) in order 
to produce probabilities of a certain decision variable given a certain damage state and 
infrastructure type. These probabilities can be plotted and lines can be fit to the data points as 
shown in Figure 6-2.  
 
Figure 6-2: Example of Plot of P(DV≥ dv| DM=dmi, IT=it) 
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The next inputs are the damage fragilities in probability density function (PDF) form. 
These damage fragilities provide the probability that an infrastructure element is in a certain 
damage state given a certain intensity measure. This is written symbolically as P(DM=dmi | 
IT=it, IM=im). Then the resilience metric fragilities, which are represented symbolically as 
P(DV ≥ dv | IT=it, IM=im), for each infrastructure type are produced using the theorm of total 
probability. This is found by multiplying each of the values in the damage fragilities (e.g., the 
probability that a wood light frame building is in damage state two given a wind speed of 90 
mph) by each of the values from Figure 6-2 (e.g., the probability that a resident will be dislocated 
for at least one day given that their home is in damage state three). Th se values are then added 
together for each damage state. This process is written symbolically below in equation [6.1]. 
P(DV ≥ dv | IT=it, IM=im) =  P(DV≥ dv| DM=dmi, IT=it)* P(DM=dmi | IT=it, IM=im)  [6.1] 
The next (optional) step is to combine the resilience metric fragility curves of different 
infrastructure types. This step is helpful if the user is interested in finding the probability of a 
certain resilience metric for a certain location in a community, and damage fragility information 
is known for multiple infrastructure types that are represented in the dataset. This is done by 
finding the probabilities that infrastructure types occur in the given dataset, multiplying these 
probabilities by the corresponding resilience metric fragility values (from equation [6.1]), and 
then summing the values for each infrastructure type. This process is written symbolically below 
in equation [6.2].  
P(DV ≥ dv | IM=im) = P(DV ≥ dv | IT=it, IM=im)* P(IT=itj)  [6.2] 
The resilience metric fragility curves that are found in equation [6.2] are the primary goal 
of this data processing toolbox. Thes  curves can be plotted with ntensity measure values on the 
120 
x-axis and probability of exceedance of a certain metric values on the y-axis as shown in Figure 
6-1. They can then be fit to the appropriate distribution and input into the IN-CORE data base. It 
is important that field data sets to be unbiased in order to create accurate fragility curves. If fi ld 
researchers only collect data that have a certain characteristic in common (e.g., physical damage, 
dislocation, loss of job, etc.) then the fragility curve will be truncated and inaccurate. For 
example, if researchers were to only investigate residences that were in higher damage states, 
then a fragility curve that is produced from this data would be left truncated and not useful for 
modeling purposes. This would also apply if field researchers were to only interview dislocated 
residents or only focus on any characteristic that introduces bias to the sample.  
The final (optional) step of the process is to use convolution to find the probability of a 
certain resilience metric at a given location. Then the measured probabilities can be compared 
with performance goals in order to determine whether or not an area is vulnerable (similar to 
Figure 3-2). This process does not need to be completed by the data processing toolbox because 
it can be done within the IN-CORE software. However, the data processing toolbox also contains 
this capability, for completeness. 
The final input that is required before convolution can occur is a hazard curve for a 
specific location and disaster type. This can often be found for earthquakes on The United States 
Geological Survey (USGS) website, and in other publications for other hazard types. In order to 
find the probability of a certain resilience metric for hazard data that corresponds to a certain 
location, the outputs of the resilience metric fragility functions found using equation [6.2] are 
multiplied by the corresponding probabilities that a certain intensity measure occurs and then all 
values are summed. This process is written symbolically in equation [6.3]. 
P(DV ≥ dv) = P(DV ≥ dv | IM=im)* P(IM=imk)  [6.3] 
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The whole process can be represented by substituting [6.1] into [6.2] and then [6.2] into 
[6.3], resulting in the equation below: 
P(DV ≥ dv) = P(DV≥ dv| DM=dmi, IT=it)* P(DM=dmi | IT=it, IM=im) 
          * P(IT=it j)* P(IM=imk)  [6.5] 
6.3. Data Collection Quantity Requirements 
It is important for researchers in the field to know the quantity and type of data that they 
need to collect at the start of each day in the field. The process that is described in this section 
allows for rapid data analysis and error estimation which enables field team leaders to plan 
fieldwork and develop data collection strategies at the start of each day in the field. A method for 
real-time data processing in the field is needed when collecting data that seeks to connect 
damage to physical infrastructure and social science. Specifically, the decisions made by people 
and families are not known prior to entering the field and the interview taking place, thus in 
order to gather a representative sample across all combinations of the damage- ecision space, 
data processing while in the field may be needed. It is recognized that the volume of data needed 
to achieve the quantities presented herein may not be attainable for most field studies, but 
nevertheless, the methodology holds in the event that this is a possibility. The first step of this 
process is to collect an initial field data set by following the guidelines provided in this 
methodology. After an initial dataset is collected, fragility curves can be produced for each of the 
field study metrics using the process described in Section 6.2. In order for this to be successful, 
researchers must have access to tools that upload their data points to a common database in real 
time or, at the very least, at the end of each day in the field. These fragility curves hould then be 
fit to the appropriate distribution, which yields characteristic parameters that vary for each type 
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of fit (typically a shape parameter and a scale prameter). In the case where a normal distribution 
best fits the fragility curve, these parameters will be the mean, µ, and standard deviation, σ. 
After these parameters are found for the initial data set (e.g., the data that was collected during 
the first day in the field), the data set should be expanded by adding more data points and 
increasing the sample size ( .g., adding the data that was collected during the second day in the 
field). Characteristic parameters for the fragility curve fits can then be found for the larger, 
combined data set. This process is outlined in the flow chart shown in Figure 6-3.  It is important 
for the data sets to be combined for the error to converge. As the data set gets larger, a reduction 
in error is expected.  
 
Figure 6-3: Real Time Data Processing Procedure Flow Chart 
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An example of using real time data processing to determine data quantity needs is given 
in the paragraph below: 
 A field study is being conducted in a community after a tornado. One of the goals of the 
field study is to develop population dislocation fragility functions within allowed error, dall, 
of 10%. After the first day, a total of 100 homes were surveyed, and the data was processed and 
analyzed. The population dislocation fragility curve for these 100 data points best fits a 
lognormal distribution with a mean of 4.5 and a standard deviation of 0.40. On the second day, 
an additional 100 homes were surveyed, and the data was processed and analyzed. The 
population dislocation fragility curve for the total of 200 data points best fits a lognormal 
distribution with a mean of 4.7 and a standard deviation of 0.45  The measured error for each of 
these parameters is calculated below.  
dm = (0.7-0.6)/0.7)*100% = 4.4% 
4.4% < 10% OK 
ds = (0.40-0.45)/0.6)*100% = 8.3% 
8.3% < 10% OK 
Both parameters are within the tolerance, so no additional data for population dislocation 
of this type need to be collected. This process can then be repeated for all other data fields.  
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7. Data Processing Case Study – Hurricane Andrew Data 
The data processing toolbox described in Chapter 6 was tested for a sample of Hurricane 
Andrew population dislocation data that was provided by Walter Peacock and Nathanael 
Rosenheim at Texas A&M University (Peacock et al 1997). Damage fragilities for a single story 
wood frame structure subjected towind loading were used for all residences because the 
structural system of each residence was not recorded in the provided data set. After processing 
these data using the techniques described in Section 6.2, a number of fragility curves were 
produced. These fragility curves were modified based on two secondary factors: race (white, 
black, or Hispanic) and housing type (mobile home, single family home, or attached apartment). 
These secondary factors were selected based on the data that were available. The fragility curves 
for all of the data and those that were shifted based on race ar  shown in Figures 7-1 through 7-4.  
 




Figure 7-2: Hurricane Andrew Population Dislocation Fragility Curves - Non-Hispanic White 
Residents 
 




Figure 7-4: Hurricane Andrew Population Dislocation Fragility Curves - Hispanic Residents 
In order to create these different fragility curves 1,097 data points were provided by 
Walter Peacock and Nathanael Rosenheim at Texas A&M University (Peacock et al 1997). Each 
data point consisted of the resident’s race/ethnicity, the damage state of the residence, th 
housing type, and duration of dislocation. It took an extraordinary amount of time and effort to 
collect this robust data set. The scope of this thesis did not include conducting a formal analysis 
of the error in order to find the optimal number of data points, but this is important work that 
should be done in the future.  
Several observations were made based on these results: 
1. Non-Hispanic white residents are more likely to be dislocated at each duration category 
than the population as a whole.  
2. African American residents are more likely to be displaced for at least one day, but 
slightly less likely to be displaced for longer durations than the population as a whole.
3. Hispanics are the least likely to be displaced for more than a month. Furthermore, the 
probability that a Hispanic resident leaves their home increases significantly around wind 
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speeds of 120 miles per hour, but the probability that a non-Hispanic resident leaves their 
homes sees a similar increase at less intense wind speeds of approximately 100 miles per 
hour.  
These fragilities functions can be fit to the appropriate distribution and used within IN-
CORE to help calibrate population dislocation predictions, althoug  it is noted that many other 
factors are present that may affect this decision.  
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8. Field Study in Support of the Joplin Hindcast 
This section describes a community resilience field study with the intent of supporting a 
hindcast for the 2011 Joplin, MO tornado. The field work took place in Joplin from July 18 to 
21, 2016, approximately five years after it was hit by an EF-5 tornado. This chapter includes 
background on the city of Joplin, a review of existing literature related to the tornado impact and 
recovery, a discussion of the data requirements, and a description of the methodology used and 
the field data collection activities that took place. In addition, Section 8.5 is a standalone section 
that discusses the interconnectivities between the physical, ocial, and economic domains within 
Joplin and how the decisions made by Joplin School District related to transportation affected 
these interconnectivities. This standalone section is intended to show a single and direct example 
of how the linkage between human decision and community resilience occurs.   
8.1. Introduction  
The term hindcast refers to data collection activities that allow the validation of 
community-level models before and after an event. These are also used to validate mathematical 
representations of a physical or social process or system. The Joplin field study was done directly 
in support of developing a hindcast study of the 2011 Joplin, Missouri tornado. Data was 
collected through interviews with key stakeholders in Joplin, obtaining data from local 
organizations, government agencies, and other researchers, taking geo-located photos, and field 
notes. Obtaining data from other sources is important for all field studies, but it is even more 
important for studies taking place after community recovery has begun. Local organizations, 
government agencies, and other researchers often continue to collect data on the recovery of the 
community long after the event occurs, and it is crucial to obtain data from these groups. Once 
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the data has been gathered and analyzed, the results of the analysis can be communicated to the 
entities providing data for their benefit.   
The primary objective of this community recovery field study was to collect data that can 
be used to evaluate the accuracy of and interaction between the physical, social, and economic 
models that are being developed for implementation into IN-CORE. The two primary objectives 
for this specific field study were to gather immediate and long-term data that can be used to (1) 
calibrate models focused on the interaction of the domains including physical, social, and 
economic and (2) develop restoration and recovery functions that are driven by physical 
infrastructure conditions and guided by social and economic decision-making and consequences. 
The focus of the field teams that went o Joplin was on gathering long-term data on the 
community’s recovery. Of particular interest was learning about the immediate impact and the 
long-term trajectory of Joplin’s resilience and recovery including decisions that were made 
immediately following the event and during the recovery so that they could be modeled during 
the final phase of the hindcasting process. While this field study was in support of the hindcast as 
previously stated, this section will focus only on the field study methodology, planning, 
execution, and conclusions formed from qualitative data. It will not discuss the hindcast process 
explicitly.  
8.2. Literature Review 
In order to understand the physical, social, and economic consequences of the 2011 
Joplin tornado, a number of published reports and journal articles were collected and reviewed. 
A selection of important background information from these reports is summarized in the 
following section. 
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After the May 22, 2011 tornado in Joplin, MO NIST conducted a post-tornado field study 
with the purpose of investigating the performance of structures, human behavior, and emergency 
communications (Kuligowski et al. 2014). The field team arrived in Joplin two days after the 
tornado and spent four days there collecting data. The methods, tools, and processes that this 
team used are summarized in Section 2.1.1 of this thesis. In addition to the NIST report, a 
number of other reports and articles were reviewed. The following paragraphs briefly describe 
the information that could be gathered from news articles, formal reports, and online resources 
related to the seven resilience metrics from Section 3.2 of this report.  
 Population Dislocation 
Before the tornado the population of Joplin was 51,140. After the tornado the city’s 
population dropped (in 2012 Joplin was the second fasted shrinking city in U.S) and then slowly 
recovered until it finally reached 51,324 in 2014, surpassing its pre-tornado population. The most 
recent data shows the population of Joplin at an all-time high at 51,818 in 2015 (SEMA 2016; 
Office of Missouri Governor Jay Nixon 2016). The exact number of dislocated persons is 
unknown, but 586 households that were forced to leave their homes stayed in temporary housing 
provided by FEMA, and 300 individuals that were dislocated by the tornado stayed in an 
American Red Cross shelter at Missouri Southern State University (MSSU) (FEMA 2011). All 
of these families had left the FEMA temporary housing units by June 9, 2013 (Onstot 2016). The 
schools in Joplin only lost 2% of enrolled students after the tornado, which likely means that 
families that were dislocated tended to stay near Joplin. It is estimated that 98% of families who 
lost their homes stayed within 25 miles of Joplin, either renting or buying an ap rtment or 
staying with family or friends (Smith and Sutter 2013). 
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Business Interruption  
Many businesses (531 total) were significantly damaged by the tornado, but 485 of these 
businesses have re-opened since the tornado (Office of Missouri Governor Jay Nixon 2016). The 
rest of the businesses that were open before the tornado closed permanently after the event 
(Onstot 2016).  
Employee Dislocation  
The tornado impacted more than 5,000 employees in Joplin when 531 businesses were 
significantly damaged, and 3,000 individuals in the city of Joplin lost their jobs. Since the 
tornado, new jobs for 1,045 full-time and 818 part time employees have been created. The 
unemployment rate in Joplin was 7.9 percent before the tornado, an  has decreased to 3.9 percent 
in 2015 (Office of Missouri Governor Jay Nixon 2016). 
Critical Facilities Impact  
This section discusses damage to those facilities in Joplin that are believed to be cri ical 
according the definition provided earlier in this thesis. Nine schools, f urteen child care 
facilities, two hospitals, and a number of other critical facilities were damaged or destroyed in 
the tornado. Two severely damaged school buildings (Joplin high school which was built in 1968 
and Joplin middle school which was built in 2009) were investigated in detail by Coulbourne and 
Miller (2012). The performances of these two buildings were found to be similar despite their 
difference in age. Four new schools were constructed from 2011 to 2015, and a new hospital 
(205 beds) opened in March of 2015. Each of these new buildings is equipped with safe rooms to 




Housing Loss  
Eight thousand homes and buildings (about a fourth of total housing in Joplin) were 
destroyed or damaged in the tornado. Damaged or destroyed construction types included: pre-
cast concrete, brick, metal, masonry, and wood-frame buildings (FEMA 201). Since then 2,090 
new single family homes, 1,483 apartments, and 1,293 duplex unites have been constructed, for a 
combined total of 4,866 new housing units (Office of Missouri Governor Jay Nixon 2016). The 
“rebuild Joplin” organization helped people that were underinsured rebuild their homes at little 
or no cost to them. All of the families had left the FEMA temporary housing units by June 9, 
2013 (Onstot 2016).  
Physical and Mental Morbidity and Mortality  
About 1,000 people were injured and 161 people lost their lives in the tornado. $2 million 
were given to establish the Joplin Child Trauma Treatm nt Center which provides critical mental 
health services to children and families, and has served more than 3,800 children since the event. 
Almost 200 teachers were trained in identifying and caring for children that were impacted by 
the disaster (Office of Missouri Governor Jay Nixon 2016). Adams et al. (2015) surveyed 340 
adolescents from Joplin between September 2011 and June 2012 in order to determine the rates 
of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), major depressive episode (MDE), and substance use 
disorder (SUD). The results of this study showed that the rates of these conditions were: 3.7% for 
PTSD and MDE, 1.1% for PTSD and SUD, 1.0% for MDE and SUD, and 0.7% for PTSD, MDE 
and SUD. They also showed that gender and parental injury were highly correlated with these 
mental effects. Houston et al. (2015) conducted a separate study that surveyed 380 adults six 
months after the event and 438 adults 2.5 years after the event. This study showed that the PTSD 
relevance was 12.63% six months after the event and 26.7% two and a half years after the event. 
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Comparing these two studies shows that adults were highly more likely than children to d velop 
mental disorders after the tornado. 
Fiscal Impact  
As of October 31, 2012 the total losses in the city of Joplin were $2,017,564 and the total 
losses paid by insurance companies were $1,651,650 (Onstot 2016). 
8.3. Data Requirements 
Because this field study was intended to support a hindcast, the data collection 
requirements had to be slightly altered in order to achieve the goals of the hindcast. The 
traditional field study methodology had to be applied to specific data collection activities that 
could be done in Joplin over a three day period. Parts of the traditional field study methodology 
were not applicable because the study occurred five years after the disaster (e.g., damage 
inspections did not occur). The methods of collecting data for each of the resili nce metrics listed 
in Section 3.2 had to be changed to account for data th t had already been collected because it 
was possible to obtain data from other rsearchers or online data bases. The modified data 
collection strategies for six of the r silience metrics are described in this section, but fiscal 
impacts are not discussed because they were modeled by economists who are affiliated with the 
NIST CoE using secondary data that were not collected in the field. 
The data needs that are listed in this section were developed by assuming the ideal 
situation where field researchers have unlimited time and money. However, many of these data 
were not actually collected in the Joplin field study due to limited resources. The quantitative 
data that could not be collected were substituted with qualitative data from interviews w th 
community leaders and local government officials. The following sections were written during 
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the field study planning period before the team entered the field and are, therefore, written in 
future tense.  
8.3.1. Data Requirements for Each Resilience Metric 
Population Dislocation 
There have not been any field investigations in Joplin that have specifically studied 
population dislocation. Therefore, we will  not be able to obtain this data through collaboration 
with other researchers. Instead, we must conduct interviews and surveys with community 
members in order to find out how long they were displaced and where they went after the 
tornado. We can use multiple methods to obtain these data. We can either mail a survey to a 
representative sample of households in Joplin or we can conduct face to face interviews. If a mail 
survey method is implemented, Dillman’s “Total Design Method” should be used to increase the 
response rate (Dillman 1978). Each respondent should first fill out a demographics form, which 
will provide crucial data that will allow us to modify the fragility curves that are developed based 
on race, income, gender, etc. (see Section 6.2). Guidelines for developing a population 
dislocation questionnaire can be found in Section 4.2. 
Business Interruption and Employee Dislocation  
There are several existing studies that have been conducted that provide details on 
damage to select commercial buildings (Kuligowski et al. 2014; Prevatt et al. 2013). However, 
none of these investigated the duration of closure of individual b sinesses or the economic 
effects of the tornado. Therefore, we will need to collect additional data through interviews and 
surveys of business owners, public officials, and community leaders. This can be done through 
either a combinations of mail surveys and follow up phone calls using Dillman’s “Total Design 
Method,” or through face to face interviews. Questions should be dev loped to provide data that 
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can be used to quantify either business interruption or employee dislocation in accordan e with 
the methods described earlier in this report. In addition to these questions a demographics form 
that also contains data fields for businesses’ conomic sector, pre-disaster financial condition, 
age, primary market (e.g., local or international), and size (Webb t al. 1999) should be 
completed by the business owner.   
Critical Facilities Impact  
Several studies were completed immediately after the tornado that captured perishable 
damage data related to critical facilities in Joplin (Kuligowski et al. 2014; Prevatt et al. 2013; 
Coulbourne and Miller 2012; FEMA 2011). These data can be obtained through collaboration 
with government agencies (e.g., NIST), research groups (e.g., ASCE), and university researchers. 
In addition, researchers at Missouri Southern State University have been monitoring the long 
term recovery of Joplin’s buildings over the last five years. The unit of measure that we are most 
interested in is loss of functionality of a facility, which occurs when the facility is no longer able 
to perform its most basic purpose. E.g., a hospital loses functionality when its workers can no 
longer treat patients properly. Loss of functionality data may need to be obtained hrough 
interviews with critical facilities managers and local officials.  
Housing Loss:  
Similar to critical facilities impact, housing loss data can be obtained through various 
collaborations (Prevatt et al. 2013; Luo 2014; Kuligowski et al. 2014; FEMA 2011). Additional 
loss of functionality data may need to be obtained through interviews with homeowners and local 
officials or through tax assessor data. 
Physical and Mental Morbidity and Mortality  
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Several studies on physical and mental morbidity and mortality were conducted after the 
event (Kuligowski et al. 2014; Curtis and Fagan 2013; Paul and Stimers 2012, 2014). The data 
from these studies should be sufficient for basic model validation. Curtis and Fagan (2013) 
developed a database containing name, age, gender, date of death, and location of death f r all 
mortalities caused by the tornado. Kuligowski et al (2014) obtained several databases that 
included deaths, injuries, and disease information; h wever, data on the locations of the injured 
persons were somewhat limited. Two significant studies on mental morbidity have been 
conducted. Adams et al. (2015) surveyed 340 adolescents from Joplin after the event in order to 
determine the rates of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), major depressive episode (MDE), 
and substance use disorder (SUD), and Houston et al. (2015) conducted a separate study that 
surveyed 380 adults six months after the event and 438 adults two and a half years after the 
event. These researchers and organizations should be contacted in order to share data and related 
information.  
Physical Infrastructure Interdependencies: 
Understanding physical infrastructure interdependencies is an important part of studying 
the resilience and recovery of communities. Building functionality is often dependent on 
numerous utilities. Utility damage and restoration data have already been collected by others 
(Kuligowski et al. 2014), and we can use these existing data to study physical interdependencies 
between electric power, water, oil and natural gas, transportation, and communication 
infrastructure. Additional data may be gathered through interviews and collaboration with utility 
managers and owners.  
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8.3.2. Summary of Data Requirements 
One of the objectives of the field study portion of the Joplin hindcast is to collect data 
that can be used to quantify the following six resilience metrics: population dislocation, business 
interruption, employee dislocation, critical facilities impact, housing loss, and physical and 
mental morbidities and mortalities. Some of the data that we need are already available through 
collaboration with others (e.g., damage to buildings and morbidities and mortalities). However, 
other data that would ideally be collected by the team include: 
1. A representative, random sample (both damaged and undamaged hom s) of durations of 
dislocation of community members, duration of time away from work, corresponding 
residential damage states, and resident demographics. 
2. A representative, random sample (both damaged and undamaged buildings) of business’ 
duration of closure, corresponding building damage states, and business characteristics 
(economic sector, pre-disaster financial condition, business age, primary market (e.g., 
local or international), and business size). 
3. Durations of loss of functionality of critical infrastructure and residential buildings, 
corresponding damage states, loss of lifelines, and wind speed (estimate) at structure 
(optional). 
4. Supplemental physical and mental morbidity data, corresponding infrastructure damage 
state, and individual demographics.  
8.4. Methodology 
8.4.1. General Process 
Planning for the Joplin field study began about a month and a half before the teams 
actually entered the field. During this planning period, weekly meetings were held with potential 
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field team members in order to discuss the goals and objectives of the study. Completion of the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) CITI ethics training was a pre-requisite for all potential team 
members because the data included information on human subjects. The team members were 
selected based on their interest, availability, and area of expertise. On June 27, six sub-groups 
were created according to their primary objective: Housing (4 members), Buildings (3 members), 
connectivity (4 members), and networks (3 members). These teams are described further in 
Table 8-1. Each group then focused primarily on their respective objectives in preparing for the 
field study.  
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Table 8-1: Joplin Field Study Teams 























Lori Peek and 
Hassan Masoomi 
Jennifer Tobin-
Gurley and Todd 
Clapp 
John van de Lindt, 









1 Engineer and 
1 Sociologist 
2 Engineers 
1 Engineer and 1 
Sociologist 
1 Engineer and 1 
Sociologist 
3 Engineers 3 Engineers 
Primary 
Objective 
To collect data 











To collect data 







To collect data 







To collect data 
that aids in 
modeling water, 
power, gas, 
traffic, and debris. 
To collect data 






The initial task of each group was to determine the data needed in order to understand 
and model their respective community domains. Each group conducted preliminary research to 
identify data that were available from secondary sources (e.g., online resources or published 
works), and to determine which data needed to be collected from primary sources (e.g., data 
collection activities in the field). All  data from secondary sources were collected and compiled 
before the team entered the field. The four sub-groups met each week in order to share their 
progress from the previous week. Since this field study was in support of a hindcast, it had 
different goals than the methodology presented in this thesis. One of these differences is that the 
team was not attempting to collect data in order to create probabilistic models of resilience 
metrics, so the methodology outlined in Chapters 3 and 6 was not applied directly for Joplin.  
The NIST CoE collaborated with Professor Andrew Graettinger and several of his students from 
the University of Alabama and Professor Steve Smith at Missouri Southern State University who 
mapped the recovery of infrastructure along the tornado route on six month intervals over the last 
five years. Professor Smith provided maps of the City of Joplin that included data on building 
footprint, height, damage, and zoning. Several of these maps were plotted in 4’ x 6’ or 3’ x 4’ 
and used throughout the planning and execution of the field study. 
Two weeks before deployment, the meeting matrix that is shown in Table 8-2 was 
created. The purpose of this matrix was to organize meeting schedules in order to send only one 
or two team members to speak with each interviewee. This lessened the burden on the 
interviewees and ensured small, focused discussions. After it was determined which city offices 
we wanted to contact, the city manager was contacted in hopes that he would enables meetings 
with other city officials. Then all of these officials were called by the principal investigator (PI) 
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Tracy Godfrey and Gary 
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James Furgerson 
Connie Hoover (Jasper) 
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The PI then developed a rough schedule to be followed by the combined field team. This 
schedule is shown in Table 8-3. Each individual team leader prepared their specific team’s 
schedule based on this general template. 
Table 8-3: Joplin Field Study General Schedule 
Date Time Activity  
Monday, July 18th 
Varies 
Field team leaders arrive in 
Joplin. Preliminary meetings 
between field team leaders 
and city officials. 
Afternoon 
The rest of the team arrives 
in Joplin and travel to hotels. 
Tuesday, July 19th 
8 AM – 9 AM Full team morning meeting. 
9 AM – 12 PM 
Individual team data 
collection activities. 
12 PM to 1 PM Lunch and full team meeting. 
1 PM – 6 PM 
Individual team data 
collection activities. 
7 PM – 9 PM 
Dinner and full team 
meeting. 
Wednesday, July 20th 
8 AM – 9 AM Full team morning meeting. 
9 AM – 12 PM 
Individual team data 
collection activities. 
12 PM to 1 PM Lunch and full team meeting. 
1 PM – 6 PM 
Individual team data 
collection activities. 
7 PM Dinner on your own. 
Thursday, July 21st 
9 AM – 12 PM 
Final team debriefing, data 
sharing, and action items. 
12 PM – 5 PM 
Possible final meetings with 
contacts and depart Joplin. 
 
This schedule was revised in the field according to the PI’s judgment and data needs. For 
example, full team meetings were held each day from 4PM to 5PM instead of during or after 
dinner. Also, several team members including the PI attended additional interviews in the 
morning of Thursday, July 21st. In order to avoid scheduling conflicts the final team debriefing 
which included data sharing and action items was held on Wednesday afternoon. At this final 
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meeting, the data from all of the t am members was downloaded onto one central hard drive. 
Sharing data before leaving the field prevented issues with transferring data remotely since team 
members came from multiple locations across the U.S. It was also requested that each team 
leader submit a “two-pager” which outlines their team’s objectives, the work that they 
completed, the data that they collected, and the data that still need to be collected. Each team 
submitted their two-pager to the PI before leaving Joplin. An example of a two-pager is shown in 
Section 8.4.3. One week after leaving Joplin, a virtual meeting was held with the combined team, 
at which each group briefly summarized the work that was completed and the data that were 
collected and discussed the next steps that should be taken in order to c mplete the hindcast. 
8.4.2. Equipment 
• All team members had smartphones which were used for communication and the taking 
of geo-located photographs.  
• GPS Devices (DeLorme Earthmate PN-Series) – three units from the University of 
Alabama (UA). 
o The students from UA were trained to use these units 
• Cameras (D-SLR or smartphone). 
• Nikon camera that had the capability of exporting data to ArcGIS. 
8.4.3. Connectivity Team Activities 
As an example of the daily activities of each team, this section will discuss the specific 
tasks and data collection activities that were conducted by the two connectivity teams. During 
the preparation phase, these two teams worked together to collect preliminary data and plan data 
collection activities in the field. A meeting was held on July 1st with the four team members and 
the P.I. in attendance in order to discuss a preparation work plan. Each member of the team 
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prepared a list of data that they believed was most important to collect in the field, and then two 
primary focuses were selected: schools and healthcare. These two subjects were selected because 
we believed that it was more important to obtain in-depth knowledge on a couple of topics than 
to obtain less comprehensive data about a broad scope of topics. Six action items were then 
identified as follows: 
1. Go through transcripts of old interviews and pull out data or anecdotes that are related to 
the study and share them with the full team.  
2. Find and record recent news stories that have come out of Joplin related to our interests. 
3. Research secondary data sources: what is available publically and privately (e.g., 
enrollment data, CDC).  
4. Look at each of the five components of physical infrastructure for schools and see how 
they affect the way that people behave or modify physical interdependencies.  
5. Create a map of Joplin containing: locations of all schools and hospitals and their relative 
damage level and recovery over time and which students went to which schools before 
and after. 
6. Identify key points of contact within Joplin healthcare and School District and set up 
interviews with them. 
These six tasks were all completed prior to the field investigation. It was then determined 
that four of the most important questions that needed to be answered included: 
1. What information do we already have and how do we avoid redundant data collection? 
2. Who can help us obtain healthcare and education data?
3. How did damage to hospitals effect the long term lives of individuals (e.g., beingforced 
to travel long distances to obtain care)? 
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4. Which institutions are able to adapt and which are not (e.g., mental health facili ies are 
able to adapt by going door to door while still working at a high level of productivity)? 
The following pages contain a summary of the work that was completed in field by the 
connectivity team and work that still needed to be done. This “two-pager” was originally created 
by Lori Peek, and then edited by the connectivity team before leaving Joplin. 
Connectivity Team – Joplin, Missouri Hindcast Field Investigation  
July 21, 2016 
Contr ibutors:  
Jennifer Tobin-Gurley, Todd Clapp, Hassan Masoomi, Lori Peek, and John van de Lindt 
Objective 
To collect qualitative and quantitative data regarding the interconnections between the built, 
social, and economic environments, with a special emphasis on schools and the health car 
sector. 
Summary of Field Work 
On Tuesday, July 19, Wednesday, July 20, and Thursday, July 21 the connectivity interviewed 
the following key stakeholders: 
• Facilities Director, Joplin Schools 
• Director of Transportation, Joplin Schools 
• Assistant Superintendent of Operations, Joplin Schools  
• Vice President Clinical Services, Ozark Center (Mental Health) 
• Coordinator of Crisis Services and Accreditation, Ozark Center (Mental Health) 
• Associate Professor and Chair, Department of Social Work, MSSU and Chairperson of 
the Long-Term Recovery Committee  
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• Chairperson, Joplin Citizens Advisory Recovery Team 
• Director of Facilities, Mercy Hospital 
• Director of Safety, Mercy Hospital  
Data gathered prior to the investigation:  
• The team mapped and traced the location of schools and hospitals before and in the five 
years after the tornado.  
• The team searched for and compiled all publically available data sets.  
• The team researched and compiled specific impacts of the disaster related to the built, 
economic, and social environments.  
Data gathered during the field investigation:  
• In-depth, qualitative data regarding community recovery in the form of field notes and 5 
audio recordings that will be transcribed verbatim as soon as possible.  
• Spreadsheet containing 2011-2012 student homeless population information and post-
disaster bus routes for Joplin Schools. 
• Joplin schools facilities director offered to provide building plans for old and new 
buildings via email.  
Main Points: 
• Schools 
o 3 Phases:  
1. Get students back in school by August 2011. This required summer repairs 
and build out of the mall school and identification of other temporary 
locations. 
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2. Pass bond issue to secure money for new schools. Put out RFQ’s. Start 
rebuild of new schools. 
3. Safe room installations. 
o Some schools were over 100 years old, other (e.g., the high school) were built in 
the 1950’s. East Middle School was a fairly new build. 
o YouTube video, Bus Rescue: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P8RCTSijtn4 
o Pre-tornado there were 81 buses. Went up to 98 after the tornado. Now they are 
running 83. 
o They ran 41 buses for summer school in 2011. Offered both summer and winter 
camps to occupy the students.  
o Buses drove over a million miles.  
o Pre-tornado they served 7,000 students, now they serve 7,500 students. 
o Made changes in the way they speak about inclement weather over the bus radios. 
o Made sheltering changes. Used to recommend getting out and laying in a ditch, 
now they recommend staying in the bus if they cannot get to a storm shelter.  
o The younger the children the more likely to move away permanently 
o Expected 15-18% attrition due to tornado, but only saw approximately 3% at high 
school and 8% across elementary schools 
o The high school was back to pre-tornado enrollment about two years after the 
event.  
o 4 hope counselor’s assigned to high school 
o 15 high school faculty lost homes 
o 4,200 of 7,500 in district displaced 
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o West Elementary, 90% poverty rate 
o Kids helped pass the bond measure by voter turnout. Vote passed by 47 votes. 70 
kids registered to vote.  
o If the tornado would have occurred during school hours there may have been 
hundreds of student/staff injuries and several deaths due to flying debris and 
collapsed ceilings  
• Mental Health, Ozark Center 
o 8 buildings lost, 2 buildings had roofs destroyed, last building rebuilt November 
2015 (Autism Center, funded by $3Million estate fund) 
o Temporary command center was the only building with power, had to use as 
substance abuse center 
o 425 employees pre-tornado, 600 employees now 
o 35 buildings 
o The population of served mental health patients went from 13,000 to 14,500 after 
the tornado; these individuals were drawn from a four county region of 
approximately 250,000-300,000 
o Therapists for children increased from 2 to 14 
o Major adult needs didn’t present until year three after the tornado, then a 
substantial uptick in needs 
o Cumulative losses mattered…losing home, school, job, accumulated and resulted 
in more severe symptomatology  
o 60% of children that were seen after the tornado had trauma histories 
o Autism facility destroyed, which was hard because they need care every day 
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o Lots of medications destroyed, got new shipments in to be distributed thanks to 
Governor of Missouri mobilizing resources  
o Percent of people not able to go back to work one month following: <.5% 
o Executive director of the Ozark Center rote $14 Million in grants in the first 18 
months 
o Jasper counties in the top ten counties in the US for high suicide rates since 2001. 
Large increase in child suicide.  
o 40% increase in domestic violence rates 
o 80% increase in substance abuse 
What is Still Needed 
• We were not able to secure an interview with a representative from Freeman hospital 
system.  
• More quantitative data to summarize the interlinkages and connectivity issues most of 
interest for the model (e.g., damage to students’ residences linked to absences or 
behavioral issues).  
• School data – enrollment data (e.g., number of students who left the district and number 
of students who were new to the district in the years following the tornado); educational 
attainment data (e.g., drop-out rates pre-post tornado; test scores; average GPA per class; 
etc.).  
• Hospital data – data on admissions, by health outcome, over time.  
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8.5. Connectivity Illustrative Example - School Bus Routes 
The following section was originally written as a standalone technical memo and then 
modified for this thesis. Therefore, some of the details may reiterate points that were mentioned 
in previous sections of this chapter.  
8.5.1. Introduction  
Joplin is in the southwest part of the state of Missouri. The northern section of the city is 
in Jasper County and the southern section is in Newton County. The population of Joplin is 
51,818 (2015) and swells to approximately 250,000 during the daytime due to the large 
metropolitan area surrounding Joplin. The total population of the area within 40 miles of Joplin 
is 400,000 which makes it the fourth largest metropolitan area in Missouri. The primary 
industries near Joplin are education, health, agriculture, construction, transportation, retail trade, 
and manufacturing. Before 2011 there were two hospitals, six post-secondary educational 
institutions, one public high school, three private high schools, and many junior high schools and 
elementary schools located in or near the city (FEMA 2011; Kuligowski et al. 2014).  
Joplin is in an area of the Midwest that is often called “Tornado Alley” due to its high 
tornado risk. The 80 mile area surrounding Joplin experienced 766 tornadoes from 1950 to 2011; 
however, only twenty-four percent of these were rated EF-2 or greater on the enhanced Fujita 
Scale and only one EF-2 or greater tornado has impacted Joplin directly (1971). (FEMA 2011, 
Kuligowski et al. 2014).  
8.5.2. Tornado Impact (Kuligowski et al 2014) 
On Sunday May 22, 2011 at 5:41 PM an EF-5 tornado devastated a six mile long and one 
mile wide path through Joplin, MO. It was the most deadly tornado in the U.S. in more than sixty 
years, killing 161 and injuring more than 1,000 people. Total economic losses were nearly $3 
billion making it the most costly tornado ever recorded (Kuligowski et al. 2014). In total, 553 
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businesses and 7,500 residential structures were damaged. The reason that this tornado was so 
much worse than many of the tornadoes in the past is because it went through a densely 
populated area with many commercial buildings, schools, and healthcare facilities, whereas most 
tornadoes only impact rural regions (Kuligowski et al. 2014). 
The event was on the same day as the graduation ceremony for Joplin High School, 
which occurred at Missouri Southern State University. The high scool was severely damaged, 
but nobody was inside during the event. I  lost several components which included the 
gymnasium, the auditorium, and many other buildings on site that were damaged, making the 
high school unusable. Joplin East Middle School was also severely damaged and lost 
functionality after the tornado. Other schools that were damaged included Irving Elementary 
School, St. Mary’s Catholic Elementary School, and Emerson Elementary School, and even 
more schools were less severely damaged.  
The damage to roadways was severe, and three million tons of debris added to the 
transportation issues in Joplin. The daytime swelling of the population of Joplin increased the 
stress on the transportation networks. Many commuters were forced to find alternate routes 
which increased traffic flow on undamaged streets (City of Joplin 2012). Many utilities were 
affected including power, water, gas, and telecommunications. Empire District Electric lost 
towers, poles, substations, high voltage lines, and in-facility power distribution systems, causing 
20,000 customers to lose power. Power was restored to most users within nine days of the event. 
4,000 service lines were damaged which caused water leaks and decrease in water pressure and 
prevented two elevated storage tanks from functioning. A boil advisory was in affect for five and 
a half days after the event. Water that was used for fire protection services was restored after four 
days. A single water treatment plant was also damaged. 55,000 feet of gas main and 3,500 gas 
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meters were disrupted which affected 3,500 community members. Seventy percent of the 
damaged mains were repaired one year after the event. Twenty-one cell towers lost function, and 
many wireline network cables were damaged, rsulting in difficulty with phone calls for a few 
days while still being able to text. 
8.5.3. Joplin Field Study 
From July 18 to July 21, 2016 a multi-disciplinary team of engineers and sociologists 
from the NIST CoE went to Joplin, MO to conduct a community resilience field study five years 
after the tornado. The team’s objective was to collect qualitative and quantitative data regarding 
the interconnections between the built, social, and economic domains of the effected community. 
During the preparation phase, the team collected preliminary data and planned data collec ion 
activities in the field. Weekly phone meetings were held with the team members in order to 
discuss a preparation work plan. Each member of the team prepared a list of data that they 
believed was most important to collect, and then two primary focuses were selected: schools and 
healthcare. These were s lected because it was decided that obtaining depth of knowledge on a 
couple topics was more important than obtaining minimal data on a broad scope of topics; 
thereby enabling a better understanding of the connectivity in the objective outlined above. The 
following five tasks were also completed during the preparation phase: 
1. A team member went through transcripts of old interviews that took place soon after the 
disaster and pulled out data or anecdotes that were related to connectivities in order to share 
them with the full team.  
2. A team member found and recorded recent news stories that came out of Joplin and were 
related to our objective. 
3. A team member identified secondary data sources to determine what data were available 
publically and privately (e.g., enrollment data, student absences, etc.).  
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4. A team created maps of Joplin containing locations of all schools and hospitals and their 
corresponding damage levels and recovery over time and the school district zoning areas 
before and after the event. 
5. Team members identified key points of contact within Joplin healthcare and education 
systems and set up interviews with them for the site visit. 
It was then determined that four of the most important questions that needed to be answered 
included: 
1. What information do we already have and how do we avoid redundant data collection? 
2. Who can help us obtain healthcare and education data and how do we contact them? 
3. How did damage to schools and hospitals effect the livesof individuals in the years that 
followed (e.g., being forced to travel long distances to get to school)? 
4. Which institutions are able to adapt and which are not (e.g., mental health facilities are able 
to adapt by going door to door while still working at a high level of productivity while 
schools are confined to a centralized location)? 
Two weeks before deployment, a meeting matrix was created that allowed us to lessen 
the burden on the interviewees and conduct small, focused discussions. City officials that we 
wanted to contact were called by the principal investigator (PI) in an attempt to set up interviews. 
On Tuesday, July 19, Wednesday, July 20, and Thursday, July 21 the connectivity team 
interviewed the following nine key stakeholders: 
1. Facilities Director, Joplin Schools 
2. Director of Transportation, Joplin Schools 
3. Assistant Superintendent of Operations, Joplin Schools  
4. Vice President Clinical Services, Ozark Center (Mental Health) 
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5. Coordinator of Crisis Services and Accreditation, Ozark Center (Mental Health) 
6. Associate Professor and Chair, Department of Social Work, MSSU and Chairperson of the 
Long-Term Recovery Committee  
7. Chairperson, Joplin Citizens Advisory Recovery Team 
8. Director of Facilities, Mercy Hospital 
9. Director of Safety, Mercy Hospital  
These interviews were audio recorded and then transcribed verbatim. In-depth, qualitative 
data related to community recovery were collected from each interview. Fl xibility as a team 
was crucial. For example, while interviewing the Facilities Director of Joplin Schools, we were 
introduced to the Director of Transportation at Joplin Schools with whom we then conducted an 
impromptu interview. The Director of Transportation provided us with a spreadsheet containing 
locations of temporary residences of the students who were displaced due to the tornado. The 
locations of these displaced students were mapped out and are shown in Figure 8-1, and the 
Facilities Director of Joplin Schools offered to provide building plans for old and new buildings 
via email. Some of the main takeaways from the interviews with Joplin School District 
employees are described in the next section. 
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Figure 8-1: Joplin Schools Displaced Students’ Locations 
(Data from Pettit 2016) 
156 
8.5.4. Joplin School District’s Actions 
This section describes the qualitative data that were gathered from interviews with Joplin 
School District employees. It focuses on the actions that were taken by the school district in the 
immediate aftermath of the tornado related to transportation issues and bus routes. Four of the 
actions that were taken by the school district are described below.  
1. Immediately after the tornado they sent buses to help St. John’s Regional Medical Center 
(SJRMC) with the evacuation of patients (School Bus Rescue 2012). 
2. They left the pre-tornado bus routes intact after the tornado and continued to make stops at 
locations where housing was badly damaged. At times there were no pickups, but some 
parents took their children to these stops.  
3. People who had been displaced within thirty-five minutes of Joplin (living with family, 
friends, or rental) were picked up and taken to the same school that they had attended pre-
tornado. 
4. After school, they bused some high school children from school to the location of their after 
school activities.  
In order to organize the transportation of displaced students, the school buses or parents 
took displaced students to Beacon School, a school for at risk children or children with 
behavioral issues from twelve surrounding districts, in Joplin as a morning hub, and then Joplin 
buses would pick up students from Beacon School and take them to their respective schools. In 
the afternoon, Eastmorland Elementary School was similarly used as a busing hub. In order to 
execute these decisions the school district had to increase their number of operational buses from 
eighty-one before the tornado to ninety-eight after the tornado, requiring them to lease ten new 
buses for two years. They also increased the mileage of the buses from about seven hundred 
thousand miles per year before the tornado to over one million miles per year after the tornado, 
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but this did not result in an increase in fuel costs because th y purchased fuel contracts for long 
durations in advance.   
In addition to transportation, the school system offered several services that helped 
community members in the immediate aftermath of the tornado. The first thing that the school 
district did after the tornado was contact families of each student in order to identify the child’s 
status and location immediately following the tornado. They started summer classes just three 
weeks after the tornado, offering a longer summer session in 2011 than in previous years, and 
they offered optional classes over the winter break. The school district’s push to open school on 
time (August 17, 2011) allowed students’ and parents’ lives to get back to normal as quickly as 
possible. Finally, school staff members were trained over the summer to better understand and 
support the affected students with issues that they were facing (Kanter and Abramson 2014; 
Johnson 2016; Pettit 2016; Sachetta 2016). 
8.5.5. Potential Effects of Joplin School District’s Actions 
This section discusses the potential effects that the school district’s transportation related 
decisions had on the community, specifically on the students and their families. It first discusses 
social impacts such as quality of life, school attendance rate, grades, and school discipline trends, 
and then it describes the conomic cost for the school district and the families of the students.  
8.5.5.1. Social Effects 
The decision to leave the pre-tornado bus routes intact was important because as people 
rebuilt their homes the bus stops were already in place when they returned, and it allowed 
parents to bring their kids to the bus stops that they were familiar with before the tornad . This 
helped parents and students to anticipate the post-tornado bus routes. Even though this allowed 
children to continue attending their former schools, there were some issues with this plan that 
affected students and parents. The bus routes that were developed for displaced tudents 
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extended commute times, which lead to a loss of quality of life for the students. Displaced 
children got out of school at 2:45 pm but often didn’t get home until 6 pm, according to the 
transportation director. The decision of the school district to offer classes over the summer and 
winter breaks and to provide free transportation was crucial to the social recovery of the 
community. This allowed parents to focus on rebuilding their family and work structure without 
the added responsibility of children at home during the daytime, and it allowed children to share 
their experiences in a safe, social environment at school (Kanter and Abramson 2014, Johnson 
2016, Pettit 2016, Sachetta 2016). 
To supplement the qualitative data that were collected through interviews with school 
district employees, quantitative data were found in publically available, online data bases created 
by the Joplin School District. The data that were found included yearly enrollment, attendance 
rate, ACT test scores and rate, number of suspensions and suspensions rate, and English, Math, 
Science, and Social Science test scores. Figures 8-2 through 8-11 (data from Missouri 
Department of Elementary and Secondary Education 2016) show how each of these categories 
changed over time in Joplin School District.  
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Figure 8-2: Joplin Schools Enrollment Over Time 
(Data from Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education 2016) 
 
 
Figure 8-3: Joplin Schools Attendance Rates Over Time 






















































Figure 8-4: Joplin Schools ACT Test Scores Over Time 
(Data from Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education 2016) 
 
 
Figure 8-5: Joplin Schools ACT Test Rates Over Time 
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Figure 8-6: Joplin Schools Suspensions Over Time 
(Data from Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education 2016) 
 
 
Figure 8-7: Joplin Schools Suspension Rates Over Time 
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Figure 8-8: Joplin High School English Test Scores Over Time 
(Data from Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education 2016) 
 
 
Figure 8-9: Joplin High School Math Test Scores Over Time 
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Figure 8-10: Joplin High School Science Test Scores Over Time 
(Data from Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education 2016) 
 
 
Figure 8-11: Joplin High School Social Studies Test Scores Over Time 

































Joplin H.S. MSIP5 Science Test Scores 
% Basic or Greater



































Joplin H.S. MSIP5 Social Studies Test Scores 
% Basic or Greater




Figures 8-2 through 8-11 show several interesting trends in the social and academic 
behavior of students in Joplin in the years after the tornado. The total enrollment dropped slightly 
in the first year after the tornado, but then it began to increase every year for the nex  four years. 
The enrollment in 2015 was nearly back to theenrollment before the tornado. Of the students 
who remained enrolled, the attendance rate increased slightly. This may be due to the decisions 
made by the school district that helped transport the children to school and the damage that was 
done to students’ homes making school a better alternative than home. The dropout rate 
increased slightly (0.9%) in the year after the tornado, but then it decreased below its level prior 
to the tornado. ACT test scores of high school students remained constant in the year after the 
tornado, and fluctuated up and down in succeeding years. School suspensions decreased 
significantly in the years following the tornado; however, it is unknown whether this decrease 
was due to the behavior of the students or the flexibility of the staff. The high school English, 
Math, Science, and Social Science grades fluctuate over the years depending on the subject, and 
there is no clear increase or decrease in performance.  
All of this evidence suggests that, on average, the social and academic lives of students in 
the Joplin School District were not significantly impacted in a negative way in the years after the 
tornado. In an interview with Kerry Sachetta (Sachetta 2016), the high school principal at the 
time of the tornado, he expressed his surprise that enrollment dropped far less than the school 
district originally expected. This may be the result of the decisions made by the school system to 
provide transportation and support systems for the many victims of the ornado. All students and 
teachers were affected by this disaster in some way, and the school district played a critical role 
in their recovery. 
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8.5.5.2. Economic Effects 
Figure 8-12 shows that the total expenditures of the Joplin School District increased 
significantly in the years after the tornado. Before the tornado (2011) the schools total 
expenditures were about $63 million, and after the tornado (2012) their expenditures increased to 
about $112 million, a seventy-eight percent increase from the previous year. This increase in 
expenditures is likely due to many contributing factors including moving the high school to a 
temporary location, beginning the reconstruction process, access to federal funds, hiri g new 
mental health counselors, leasing new school buses, and hiring new bus drivers. Joplin School’s 
expenditures continued to increase for three years after the tornado before finally leveling off in 
2015 at $176 million (Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education 2016).  
 
Figure 8-12: Joplin Schools Total Expenditures Over Time 




































8.5.6. Physical, Social, and Economic Interconnectivity 
This section discusses how the physical, social, economic community domains of Joplin 
are interconnected, and how the decisions that were made by the school district affected these 
connectivities. The tornado caused devastating physical damage to school buildings, residences, 
and surrounding infrastructure leading to social and economic consequences. These 
consequences affected the daily commute of students, the routes that they took to school, and 
nearly every aspect of their lives. The school district’s decisions in the aftermath of the tornado 
helped to kept dislocated families engaged in the community and prevented students from 
missing school. Their decision to continue having the buses stop at the pre-tornado bus stops 
even though the nearby houses may have been completely destroyed helped to return a s nse of 
normalcy to the community, and it prevented confusion among parents about where to drop off 
their children and what routes the buses would be taking to school. Also, it is possible that the 
school district’s bus route decisions helped to keep the attendance rate high which prevented a 
significant drop in the graduation rate and test scores.  
After the tornado occurred parents were scrambling to take care of many responsibilities 
including clearing debris, working with insurance companies, taking care of children, and 
maintaining employment. This situation may have been overwhelming for many parents, and the 
destruction of several child care facilities created additional challenges. In order to alleviate part 
of the parents’ stress, the school district decided to open summer school within three weeks of 
the tornado, utilizing about forty buses to transport students to and from summer school. In the 
past the school district had only offered transportation to and from summer school for student  
with special needs, but in the summer of 2011 they offered transportation services to all students. 
The summer school enrollment at Joplin Schools increased dramatically during the summer of 
2011, and the free bus service was a significant contributing factor. Joplin Schools als held 
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classes during the winter break of 2011-2012 for the first time in order to help families in need of 
childcare. This additional childcare service through school during the summer and winter breaks 
may have prevented relational strain among children and between parents and children. 
Therefore, in the wake of the physical destruction of numerous family residences, the school 
district was able to provide parents with transportation to free childcare services, which allowed 
them to focus on other aspects of their individual recovery such as home repair and employment. 
The large summer school enrollment also gave students the opportunity to help each other 
recover by sharing their common experiences. This pro-social environment may have helped the 
students recover more quickly from this traumatic event. 
Figure 8-13 illustrates the interconnectivities influencing the school district’s decisions 
made after the tornado. One example of an interconnectivity that this figure illustrates is seen 
through damage to childcare facilities. Childcare facilities were damaged and closed after the 
tornado, which falls in the category of physical damage to buildings. This affected community 
members’ social lives because parents had to find alternative childcare or keep their children 
under their own supervision while they were trying to rebuild their homes, deal with job issues, 
etc. These social decisions also have economic costs such as the increased price of alternative 
childcare. The transportation decisions made by the school district changed the relationship of 
these interconnectivities by providing free transportation and childcare to parents over the 
summer after the tornado. This allowed the parents to focus on other aspects of their recovery 
and may have even improved social relationships between parents and children. This also sfted 
the financial burden off of the families and on to the school district. The families no longer had 
to pay for alternative childcare, but the school district had to pay for additional summer staff and 




Figure 8-13: Field Study Interconnectivity Diagram for Joplin School District Busing System 
 
169 
8.5.7. Summary and Conclusion 
Over a three day period from July 18th to 21st, 2016 a multidisciplinary team of engineers 
and sociologists went to Joplin, Missouri five years after it was devastated by a tornado in order 
to gain an understanding of how the physical, social, and economic domains of the community 
are interconnected. The team interviewed nine key stakeholders in the health care and education 
industries in order to understand their experiences in the five years after the o nado and how the 
damage to physical systems affected the social and economic aspects of schools and healthcare 
systems. This section focused specifically on school systems, the decisions that they made after 
the tornado, and how these d cisions affected students and their families socially, economically, 
and academically.  
One of the most interesting decisions that were made by the school district was to expand 
bus services to provide transportation f displaced students to their pre-tornado schools and to 
provide transportation to summer school for all students. This action allowed parents to have 
access to free and easy childcare so that they could focus on their personal and overll family 
recovery. It also provided a healthy, pro-s cial environment for students to recover mentally 
from their traumatic experiences. This decision affected the economic situation of theschool 
district because they had to lease ten new buses for two years, hire new drivers, and increase 
mileage on the buses. This is just one example of how damage to physical systems caused the 
school district to make decisions that affected the social and economic aspects of families that 
were affected by the tornado. Several additional examples were provided in this section, and an 




The conclusions that have been made about interconnectivities related to school bus 
routes are not certain because of the qualitative nature of the data that was collected. In future 
field studies it will be important to be able to quantify conclusions that stem from interviews 
with community members. For this example on school bus routes, a possible data collection 
strategy would be to give a survey to a sample of parents of students that were ffected by the 
tornado. This survey could ask questions related to how busing to and from school impacted their 
daily lives after the event. E.g. one question could be, “Was your home life less stressful, equally 
stressful, or more stressful as a result of the school district’s decision to provide free 
transportation to summer programs?” This would allow qualitative data to be quantified, and 
more certain conclusions could then be made about the interconnectivities. A similar data 
collection strategy can be applied to any form of qualitative data in future field studies.   
As researchers continue to expand their knowledge of community resilience, it is crucial for 
them to understand the complex interconnectivities that exist in every community. These 
interconnectivities are difficult to quantify and model because of the many unknown variables 
that exist within communities. However, if we are to be successful in our endeavor to quantify a 
community’s resilience, then these interconnectivities must be understood and modeled. The best 
way to begin this process is to conduct field studies that collect qualitative and quantitative data 
that is focused on interconnectivities.   
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9. Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendation 
This thesis focused on the connectivities between physical damage and socio-economic 
dimensions of a community following a disaster. The methodology discussed herein can be used 
in the aftermath of any natural disaster to collect data that can be used to help quantify 
community resilience. The two primary goals of this methodology were to collect data that allow 
researchers to study community resilience and interconnectivities and to create probabilistic 
models of crucial resilience metrics that can inform a software platform called IN-CORE. The 
material presented herein is expected to contribute to the body of work within the NIST Center 
for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning.  
In order to develop this protocol, an in-depth literature review was performed. The goal 
of this literature review was to learn lessons from previous field studies and to identify gaps that 
must be filled in order to conduct community resilience focused field studies. In addition, an 
overview of the dependencies and interdependencies that exist within communities’ physical 
systems was provided. Seven resilience metrics or performance indicators were identified from 
existing literature and expert opinion, and a method for collecting field study data that quantify 
these metrics was described. A diagram that illustrates the interco nectivities between the 
physical, social, and economic community domains was created and used to develop a sample 
field study questionnaire. An algorithm that has the capability of processing field study data to 
create resilience metric fragilities was derived and written as a MATLAB program, and a case 
study using population dislocation data from Hurricane Andrew was performed in order to cr ate 
population dislocation fragility functions. These fragility functions were then modified to 
account for different resident demographics and housing types. Finally, a community resilience 
field study was conducted in Joplin, MO, five years after the May 22, 2011 tornado that 
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devastated their community. During this field study, data was collected through quantitative and 
qualitative methods in order to validate models of the community before, immediately after, and 
five years after the vent. One of the primary focuses of this study was on the interconnectivities 
between physical damage to schools and healthcare facilities and socio-economic consequences, 
and how the decisions that were made by Joplin School District affected ach of these domains 
within the community.  
This thesis made the following five contributions to the discipline of community 
resilience research: 
1. A literature review of 35 field study reports related to engineering, sociology, 
epidemiology, and economics was conducted and the results of this review were 
submitted for publication. This literature review was unique because it focused on the 
protocols of past disaster field studies, and identified gaps that should be filled when 
conducting future community resilience-focused studies.  
2. This thesis is the first attempt that has been made to create a methodology for conducting 
post-disaster field studies that seek to quantify community resilience metrics. Thi  
methodology was informed by the aforementioned literature review.  
3. New progress was made in developing a method to link physical damage to social 
dimensions (including epidemiology) and economics using data collected uring a field 
study. This progress includes field study questions that were developed to find the links 
between these three community domains, and an algorithm that generates probabilistic 
models of social and epidemiology related metrics based on physical damage to 
infrastructure.  
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4. In order to create a new framework for conducting community resilience focused field 
studies, seven metrics were identified, and field data needs for quantifying these metrics 
were described. The selected metrics were meant to provide possible direction for field 
teams and may change as more is learned about community resilience but serve as 
examples for the work presented herein. 
5. A field study was conducted in Joplin, MO five years after a tornado took place, which 
provided an illustrative example of how one might develop the linkages between damage 
to physical systems and social and behavioral sciences. This particular study, while 
lacking the ability to collect large amounts of quantitative data, provided insight into the 
interconnectivities of physical damage done to school buildings, decisions made by 
school leaders, and social nd economic outcomes in the lives of students and parents. 
This field study was also unique because it was among only a few studies hat have been 
conducted that collect data that allow the modeling of a community’s recovery in the 
years after a disaster. 
Two conclusions that were made from the work described herein are listed below. There 
are many more specific conclusions that were made throug out this thesis, but the two listed 
below provide insight into the broader perspective of conducting community resilience field 
studies.  
1. Unlike the majority of past field studies, community resilience field studies focus on the 
recovery of a community over time. In order to collect the data that is required to model 
this recovery, field teams must return to the community at defined intervals in the years 
after the disaster occurs.  
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2. In the aftermath the tornado, Joplin School District’s decision to expand bus services in 
order to provide transportation for displaced students to their pre-tornado schools and to 
provide transportation to summer school for all students likely had a positive effect on the 
social and economic lives of parents as well as behavioral and academic effects on the 
students based on qualitative evidence.  
There are several issues that may result in inaccurate or insignificant data. The first 
concern is that samples for damage data collection cannot be selected based on the fact that they 
are damaged or of interest in some way. If data samples are selected based on a certain 
characteristic, then those data will be biased, and the fragility curves that are created with those 
data will be inaccurate (this is explained further in Section 6.2). The second concern is that 
damage states of infrastructure must be clearly defined and not subject to the judgment of the 
inspector. Two different people observing the same physical system should classify it under the 
same damage state every time. Team members may be engineers, sociologists, economists, or 
some other discipline; therefore, classifying damage states must be simple and reproducible.  
The work that has been done on this methodology has revealed the following 12 areas of 
study that need to be further developed. 
1. As research in the area of community resilience becomes more prevalent, several gaps in 
conducting community resilience field studies will need to be filled. Fewof the 35 field 
study protocol reports that were reviewed (see Figure 2-1) collected data related to all 
three community domains, and those few studies that were multi-disc plinary did not 
place an emphasis on the interconnectivity of each of thesedomains. This thesis provides 
guidance for field study teams that seek to collect data that help quantify the 
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interconnectivities between damage to physical infrastructure and social community 
resilience metrics, but it has not yet been tested in a full scale field study.  
2. Once this type of field study has been conducted, the methodology presented herein 
should be revised to account for new knowledge that is gained related to fieldwork and 
data analysis.  
3. Additional work is needed to create a protocol for collecting data that attempts to 
quantify interdependencies between physical infrastructure systems. This thesis provides 
a brief overview of these interdependencies and provides some guidance for data 
collection activities, but it must be further developed.  
4. This methodology only briefly mentions the role of economics in community resilience 
field studies. In order to create a more complete field study protocol, additional 
interconnectivities between the economic domain and the physical and social domains 
should be identified and related data collection activities should be described and tested 
in the field. 
5. The primary indicator of each of the seven community resilience metrics identified is 
damage to physical infrastructure. However, many other factors have been identified that 
significantly contribute to each of these metrics. The algorithm that was develop d in 
Chapter 6 allows community resilience fragility curves to be shifted based on secondary 
factors, but the sample size that is required to produce thesecurves with an acceptable 
error has not yet been defined. Error analysis needs to be conducted for field data sets to 
establish the data quantities that are needed to produce unbiased fragilities. 
6. Additional work should be done to determine how many data points need to be collected 
to obtain a representative random sample of a community.  
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7. Multivariate statistical methods should be developed that model empirical probability 
curves as a function of many different factors so that they better reflect reality.  
8.  Techniques that allow the modeling of resilience metrics using insufficient data should 
be developed.  
9. The real-time data processing system that was described in Section 6.3 is only possible if 
a large amount of data is being collected in the field. A system that communicates to field 
teams how much of each type of data must be collected should be developed for field 
teams with limited time and resources.  
10. The derivation that is described in Section 6.1 was intended to process data points that 
correspond to individual infrastructure systems (e.g., each data point corresponds to one 
home). In the future it will be important to be able to investigate groupings or clusters of 
infrastructure systems (e.g., each data point corresponds to a neighborhood) and their 
impact on the community. This idea has been well developed in the NIST Planning Guide 
(NIST 2016).  
11. Community resilience benchmarks should be developed that identify the threshold of 
acceptable probabilities of different resilience metrics (e.g., it is acceptable for a certain 
household within a community to have a 0.1% probability of being dislocated for more 
than one month after that community experiences a category 4 hurricane event). This will 
allow community leaders to identify their community’s vulnerabilities and make ris - 
informed decisions that best serve the future of their community.  
12. A standardized data ontology for field studies should be created. This will allow efficient 
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Appendix A: Interconnectivity Metrics  
This appendix contains a list of metrics that can be related back to the interconnectivity diagram 
shown in Figure 4-1. Many of these metrics can be grouped by demographics. If demographics 
information is available for any metric then it should be investigated (i. ., metrics can be grouped 
by geographical location within city, race/ethnicity, religion, income level, social class, gender, 
age, language, education level, disability, household size/type, etc.). 
Population Dislocation Metrics: 
General: 
a. Total/Percentage of population evacuated/not evacuated 
b. Total/Percentage of population returning over time 
c. Total/Percentage of population never returning 
d. Reason for dislocation 
1. Dislocation  Commercial Facilities 
a. Decrease in total business transactions within/outside the community 
b. Total/Percentage of employees dislocated 
c. Total/Percentage of commercial facilities damaged 
2. Dislocation  Residential Facilities 
a. Total/Percentage of residential facilities damaged 
b. Total/Percentage of population dislocated from residence 
i. Time until return to residence 
ii.  Total/Percentage of population never returning to residence 
c. Total/Percentage of population utilizing temporary public housing 
i. Hotel records of visitors over time 
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3. Dislocation  Healthcare Facilities 
a. Total/Percentage of people unable to receive care from local area 
b. Total/Percentage of people receiving healthcare from external sources 
4. Dislocation  Educational Facilities 
a. Number of students missing from school systems over time 
b. Number of students enrolled in school system pre and post disaster 
5. Dislocation  Religious Organizations 
a. Total/Percentage decrease/increase in attendance within/outside community 
b. Total/Percentage of religious employees dislocated 
6. Dislocation  Recreational Facilities 
a. Total/Percentage decrease/increase in attendance within/outside community 
b. Total/Percentage of recreational facility employees dislocated 
7. Dislocation  Child/Elderly Care 
a. Total/Percentage decrease/increase in elderly residency within/outside community 
b. Total/Percentage decrease/increase in children enrolled in childcare facilities 
c. Total/Percentage of child/elderly care employees dislocated 
8. Dislocation  Roadways 
a. Increase/Decrease in traffic flow on major highways headed in/out of community 
over time. 
9. Dislocation  Railroads 
a. Increase/Decrease in ticket sales on trains going into/out of the community 
b. Increase/Decrease in ticket sales on local/light rail 
c. Increase/Decrease in industrial train traffic 
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10. Dislocation  Airports 
a. Increase/Decrease in ticket sales on planes going into/out of the community 
b. Increase/Decrease in industrial airplane traffic 
11. Dislocation  Public Transportation 
a. Increase/Decrease in use of public transportation (i.e., buses, taxis, etc.) 
12. Dislocation  Improved Economy 
a. Number of jobs created by recovery 
i. Percentage of jobs that are permanent/temporary 
ii.  Increase in population of city 
1. Increase in tax base due to increase in population 
13. Dislocation  Diminished Economy 
a. Number of jobs lost due to disaster 
i. Decrease in population of city 
1. Loss of tax base due to decrease in population 
Morbidity Metrics: 
1. Morbidity  Commercial Facilities  
a. Number of injuries caused by starvation, thirst, extreme cold 
2. Morbidity  Healthcare Facilities 
a. Number of patients at hospitals 
b. Number of patients in critical condition 
c. Number of patients with specific injuries. I.e., head trauma, heart attack, etc. 
3. Morbidity  Emergency Services 
a. Number of emergency calls 
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b. Number of emergency response actions taken 
4. Morbidity  Child/Elderly Care 
a. Total/Percentage of elderly people injured (nursing home records) 
b. Total/Percentage decrease/increase in child care service participation 
5. Morbidity  Physical Infrastructure 
a. Total/Percentage of the population sustaining injuries 
i. Number of people injured in each category of infrastructure (i.e., 3 people 
injured while inside of residential facilities; 5 people injured while on 
bridges; 2 people killed while in public parks) 
ii.  Severity of injuries 
iii.  Specific cause of injury (i.e., Collapse of roof on top of person; Impact 
from debris from bridge, etc.) 
6. Morbidity  Economic Structure 
a. Insurance payment of medical bills 
b. Citizen payment of medical bills 
i. Percentage of injuries covered/not covered by demographics 
Mortality Metrics: 
1. Mortality  Commercial Facilities  
a. Number of deaths caused by starvation, thirst, extreme cold 
2. Mortality  Healthcare Facilities 
a. Number of patients deaths at hospitals 
c. Statistics of specific causes of deaths (i.e., h ad trauma, heart attack, etc.) 
3. Mortality  Emergency Services 
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a. Number of identified bodies 
b. Number of unidentified bodies 
c. Number of funerals held 
4. Mortality  Child/Elderly Care 
a. Total/Percentage of elderly deaths (nursing home records) 
5. Mortality  Physical Infrastructure 
a. Total/Percentage of population deaths 
i. Number of deaths in each category of infrastructure (i.e., 3 people killed 
while inside of residential facilities; 5 people killed while on bridges; 2 
people killed while in public parks) 
ii.  Specific cause of death (i.e., Collapse of roof on top of person; Impact 
from debris from bridge, etc.) 
6. Mortality  Economic Structure 
a. Insurance payment of life insurance 
i. Percent of deaths covered/not covered by demographics 
Physiological Needs Metrics: 
1. Physiological Needs  Commercial Facilities  
a. Total/Percentage of commercial buildings damaged/destroyed 
i. Level of damage (green, yellow, and red tags) 
ii.  Number of retail stores never repaired (demolished) 
b. Number of retail stores closed 
i. Average time until re-opened 
ii.  Number of retail stores never re-opened 
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c. Total/Percentage of population receiving free resources (i.e., Food stamps, 
donated clothes, etc.) 
2. Physiological Needs  Residential Buildings 
a. Total/Percentage of residential buildings damaged/destroyed 
i. Level of damage (green, yellow, and red tags)  
ii.  Number of residences never repaired (demolished) 
3. Physiological Needs  Healthcare Facilities 
a.  Total/Percentage of healthcare facilities damaged/destroyed 
i. Level of damage (green, yellow, and red tags)  
ii.  Number of healthcare facilities never repaired (demolished) 
b. Total/Percentage of capacity lost (beds lost) 
i. Total patients treated over time 
4. Physiological Needs  Child/Elderly Care 
a.  Total/Percentage of child/elderly care facilities damaged/destroyed 
i. Level of damage (green, yellow, and red tags)  
ii.  Number of child/elderly care facilities never repaired (demolished) 
b. Total/Percentage of capacity lost  
i. Total enrollment/residency over time 
5. Physiological Needs  Transportation 
a. Are the citizens able to get to work/stores? 
b. Length of roadway, sidewalk, railroads damaged/destroyed 
i. Damage level. I.e., usable or not usable 
ii.  Time until restored 
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c. Number of bridges, tunnels, airports damaged/destroyed 
i. Damage level (i.e., usable or not usable) 
ii.  Time until restored 
d. Total public transportation vehicles destroyed 
i. Time until return to original capacity 
6. Physiological Needs  Water Network 
a. Total/Percentage of end users without access to clean water 
b. Damage to WWTPs 
i. Level/location of damage 
1. Reason for damage 
ii.  Water quality over time 
iii.  Time until restored to full production levels 
c. Damage to water mains, sanitary sewers, and storm sewers 
i. Number of leaks 
ii.  Time until restored  
iii.  Number of pipelines abandoned/demolished 
d. Total/Percentage of wells damaged 
i. Damage Level 
ii.  Time until return to full production 
iii.  Number of wells abandoned/demolished 
e. Total/Percentage of storage tanks damaged 
i. Damage Level 
ii.  Time until return to full capacity 
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iii.  Number of storage tanks abandoned/demolished 
7. Physiological Needs  Economic Structure 
a. Insured vs. uninsured losses 
b. Total local, state, and federal aid granted 
Sense of Safety Metrics: 
General: 
a. Crime rates over time 
b. General sense of safety over time (Obtain through survey) 
c. Amount of debris in town 
i. Time until cleaned up 
1. Sense of Safety  Healthcare Facilities  
a. Total/Percentage of healthcare facilities damaged/destroyed 
i. Level of damage (green, yellow, and red tags)  
ii.  Number of healthcare facilities never repaired (demolished) 
b. Total/Percentage of capacity lost (beds lost) 
i. Total patients treated over time 
c. Equipment lost 
d. Number of patients turned away 
e. Average patient waiting time 
f. Number of local residents treated at outside healthcare facilities 
2. Sense of Safety  Emergency Services 
a. Total/Percentage of police/fire stations damaged/destroyed 
i. Level of damage (green, yellow, and red tags)  
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ii.  Number of police/fire stations facilities never repaired (demolished) 
b. Total/Percentage of police/fire fighter vehicles/equipment damaged/destroyed 
c. Time until return to full functionality 
3. Sense of Safety  Electrical Payments Network 
a. Total/Percentage of end users without power 
b. Damage to generation facilities 
i. Level/location of damage 
1. Reason for damage 
ii.  Electricity production over time 
iii.  Time until restored to full production levels 
c. Damage to EPN substations 
i. Time until restored  
ii.  Number of substations abandoned/demolished 
d. Damage to power lines/towers 
i. Number of towers damaged 
ii.  Time until restored  
iii.  Number of towers abandoned/demolished 
4. Sense of Safety Needs  Fuel Supply 
a.  Damage to fuel production/distribution facilities 
i. Level/location of damage 
1. Reason for damage 
ii.  Production over time 
iii.  Total amount stored over time 
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iv. Time until restored to full production levels 
b. Length of fuel pipes damaged 
5. Sense of Safety  Telecommunications 
a. Total/Percentage of end users without phone service/cell service 
b. Damage to telecommunication facilities 
i. Level/location of damage 
1. Reason for damage 
ii.  Time until restored to full production levels 
c. Damage to phone cables/towers 
i. Number of towers damaged 
ii.  Time until restored  
iii.  Number of towers abandoned/demolished 
6. Sense of Safety  Gas Supply 
a. Total/Percentage of end users without gas 
b. Damage to gas production facilities 
i. Level/location of damage 
1. Reason for damage 
ii.  Time until restored to full production levels 
c. Damage gas main 
i. Number of leaks 
ii.  Time until restored  
iii.  Length of gas main abandoned/demolished 
d. Damaged gas meters 
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i. Number of meters damaged 
ii.  Time until restored  
7. Sense of Safety  Other Built/Natural Infrastructure 
a. Total Dams/Levees/similar infrastructure damaged 
i. Time until restored 
ii.  Total/Percentage never repaired (demolished) 
b. Total contaminated soil 
i. Time until cleaned up 
8. Sense of Safety  Economic Structure 
a. Unemployment rate over time 
b. Number of people utilizing government benefits over time 
Additional Metrics: 
1. Community Response  Educational Facilities 
a. Survey of parent satisfaction with school system post disaster 
2. Sense of Esteem  Recreational Facilities 
a. Total/Percentage of recreational facilities damaged 
b. Capacity lost 
c. Total participants before and after 
i. Percentage decrease/increase  
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Appendix B: Institutional Review Board (IRB) Protocol 
PROTOCOL 
Social, Behavioral & Education Research 
Colorado State University 
Protocol # 15-6003H 
Date Printed: 10/06/2015 
Protocol Title: Center for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning: A NIST-Funded Center 
of Excellence 
Protocol Type: Social, Behavioral & Education Research 
Date Submitted: 09/14/2015 
Important Note: This Print View may not reflect all comments and contingencies for approval. 
Please check the comments section of the online protocol. 
Questions that appear to not have been answered may not have been required for this submission. 
Please see the system application for more details. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* * * Subject Population * * * 
Subject Population(s) Checklist 
Select All That Apply: 
X Adult Volunteers 
X Elderly 
X Employees 
X Other (i.e., non-English speaking or any population that is not specified above) 
It is possible that in some communities we will be interviewing people who speak other 
languages. In this case, we would be sure to translate all documents and make sure one of the 
interviewers speaks the same language as the participant. Also, although we are not seeking out 
pregnant women or students as part of our sample, we cannot guarantee that a woman we 
interview will not be pregnant, nor would it be ethical to ask. It is also possible that some of the 
adults in our sample might be in college (i.e. students) at the time of th  interview. Please let us 
know if you prefer we check those boxes as well. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* * * Study Location * * * 
Study Location(s) Checklist 
Select All That Apply - Note: Check "Other" and input text: 1. If your location is not listed, or 2) 
If you would like to list details of your already-checked location (e.g., specific school within a 
school district) 
Aims Community College 
Colorado Department of Public Health & Environment 
X Colorado State University 
X Other (In the box below, list your study location if not checked above. You may also list 
details of your already-checked location (e.g., specific school within a school district) 
This purpose of this protocol is to obtain a pre-approval for a 5-10 year research project that will 
include post- disaster field research with human subjects. Given that future disaster locations re 
unknown, the NIST Field Research Team will amend this IRB protocol as each research location 
is determined following an event and before any field research is conducted on any occasion. 
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With that said, generally speaking, our team is likely to conduct field investigations in 
communities affected by wind (e.g., tornado, hurricane), s ismic (e.g., earthquake), or flood 
events. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* * * General Checklist * * * 
General Checklist 
Select All That Apply: 
X Cooperating/Collaborating Institution(s) –Institution where recruitment will occur OR 
Institution where Collaborating PI will conduct associated research.  
Colorado State University (lead institution), Texas A&M University, Texas A&M Kingsville, 
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Louisiana State University, Rice University, Oregon 
State University, University of Washington, University of Oklahoma, Cal Poly Pomona, 
University of Kansas , National Institute of Standards andTechnology **Please see attachment 
for a full contact list of all research participants and their r spective institutions. Every person 
involved in the broader NIST project has been invited and strongly encouraged to complete the 
training now. 
X Federally Sponsored Project 
X Program Project Grant 
X Interview 
X Study of existing data 
X Survey/questionnaire 
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* * * Funding * * * 
Funding Checklist 
National Institute of Standards and Technology 
Principal Investigator Bruce Ellingwood, John van de Lindt 
Y For Federal projects, are contents of this protocol the same as described in Federal proposal 
application? 
Y Is this an Umbrella protocol? 
N Is this protocol under an Umbrella protocol? 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* * * Expedited Paragraphs * * * 
PLEASE READ: The criteria for expedited review are listed below. Please review these criteria 
to evaluate if your protocol meets the expedited-review criteria. For expedited review, a protocol 
must be no more than minimal risk (i.e., "not greater than those ordinarily encountered in daily 
life") AND must only involve human subjects in one or more of the following numbered 
paragraphs. If none of the expedited criteria are appropriate for your project, please move to the 
next screen without selecting any of these criteria; your protocol will be reviewed by the full 
IRB. Note: The IRB will make the final determination if your protocol is eligible for expedited 
review. 
Expedite Criteria: 
X 6. Collection of data from voice, video, digital, or image recordings made for research 
purposes. 
X 7. Research on individual or group characteristics or behavior (including, but not limited to, 
research on perception, cognition, motivation, identity, language, communication, cultural 
beliefs or practices, and social behavior) or research employing survey, interview, oral history, 
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focus group, program evaluation, human factors evaluation, or quality assurance methodologies. 
(NOTE: Some research in this category may be exempt from the HHS regulations for the 
protection of human subjects. 45 CFR 46.101(b)(2) and (b)(3). This listing refers only to 
research that is not exempt.) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* * * Purpose, Study Procedures, Background * * * 
Original Protocol Number (e.g., 07-226H) 
Title (Please indicate if the protocol title is different from the proposal title)
Center for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning: A NIST-Funded Center of Excellence 
Complete Sections 1 - 11. Specify N/A as appropriate. Do not leave any sections blank. 
1. Purpose of the study 
a) Provide a brief lay summary of the project in < 200 words. The lay summary should be readily 
understandable to the general public. 
The Center of Excellence for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning, funded by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology and led by researchers at Colorado State 
University with nearly a dozen partner institutions, is designed to accelerate the development of 
system-level models and databases that will provide the technology for enhancing community 
resilience. This is a five-year project that involves dozens of detailed research tasks to be carried 
out by experts at several universities from engineering, the social sciences, economics, and many 
other disciplines. One of those tasks involves a series of field studies in up to five locations to be 
carried out over the five-year duration of the project, in disaster-affected communities. In short, 
the goal of this task is to collect immediate post-event data, as well as data in the longer term 
aftermath of the event, in order to understand post-disaster recovery and community resilience. 
b) What does the Investigator(s) hope to learn from the study? 
In order to understand community resilience in the aftermath of disaster, it is critical that 
researchers gather post-event (or "baseline") data, as well as data over time so that recovery can 
be understood as it unfolds, and placed in proper context. To understand what makes a 
community "resilient" or what attributes facilitate "bouncing back" from disaster, researchers 
must track recovery across time. With this in mind, the goal of the field investigations portion of 
this much larger project is twofold. First, the investigators involved hope to learn as much as 
possible about impacts to and the post-di aster recovery of physical, social, and economic 
systems in the aftermath of an event. Second, the lessons learned will be quantified and added to 
a computer algorithm that will ultimately enable researchers and community leaders the ability to 
study resilience and optimize investments in community resilience. Put simply, the investigators 
need to learn about the complexity and processes of post-disaster recovery "on the ground" while 
then translating that information into quantifiable algorithms or "outputs" that can be 
incorporated to a computer model. 
2. Study Procedures 
a) Describe all study procedures here (please do not respond "See Attachment Sectio "). The box 
below is for text only. If you would like to add tables, charts, etc., attach those files in the 
Attachment section (#11). *Once we have identified disaster sites, one per year, that are 
appropriate for our study, we will submit amendments for final approval. 
** Our NIST research team wants to learn about community resilience in the aftermath of 
disaster. Our first step in moving forward with this particular task was to identify a group of 
potential field response researchers. These are researchers with varying backgrounds (e.g., 
engineering, sociology, planning) who c uld potentially participate in the research study. These 
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researchers have all completed the required CITIethics training. In addition, in the fall of 2015, 
the potential field researchers will participate in a quick response disaster research workshop, via 
webinar, to be led by Lori Peek and Jennifer Tobin-Gurley. This will help prepare the 
researchers for the realities of conducting post-di aster field investigations with uman subjects, 
the need for following IRB protocols and field research protocols, etc. Peek and Tobin- 
Gurley have participated in and led several such workshops in the past. Following IRB approval, 
and once an acceptable disaster setting (e.g., of appropriate hazard type, magnitude, etc.) has 
been selected, we will choose a final field study team to travel to the site of the disaster. The 
team will be chosen based on (1) pre-completion of the required CITI ethics training; (2) 
completion of the field research workshop; (3) proximity to the disaster site; (4) availability to 
travel to the disaster site with the team during a specified period of time so that everyone can b
in the field at one time; (5) area of expertise as related to disaster type (e.g., the wind engie rs 
on the project may be more likely to travel with the team to a tornado disaster as opposed to the 
seismic or geotechnical engineers); (6) interest in the disaster event; (7) cultural relevancy (e.g., 
a large population of non-English speaking residents would require a team member that is fluent 
in the dominant language. We will also make sure to have all consent and other informational 
forms translated and presented to the participant in their primary language); and (8) the principal 
investigators' (van de Lindt and Ellingwood) judgment regarding the size and best composition 
of the team. The timing of the study will likely vary depending on the magnitude of the event. If 
the event is a relatively “small scale” disaster, with few lives lost, relatively little transportation 
disruption, etc., the team may enter the field just days or even a week after the disaster onset. In 
the case of a larger scale catastrophe, the s udy team may not enter the field for several weeks 
after the disaster, especially if the study site is closed to outsiders for some period of time during 
the emergency response and rescue phase. The entire team will travel together to the study site. 
The principal investigators have determined that this is typically the most effective, and safest, 
way to carry out these large scale investigations, as all members of the team can be on the 
ground at one time and can share information with one another. Once the principal investigators 
and the IRB has agreed that the time is right to enter the field, field study data collection methods 
will include: (1) in-depth semi-structured interviews (see questions in attachment); (2) brief in-
person, closed ended survey questionnaires; and (3) photos of building and community damage 
for future documentation of recovery. More detail on each of the methods is included below: 
(1)Individual interviews will be conducted by two members of the team, working together (on  
lead, one assistant), to ensure the best data collection and also maximal safety of all team 
members. The interviews, which will last about 15-30 minutes each, will be audio recorded, 
transcribed, and analyzed using an iterative coding process supported by a qualitative software 
program (e.g., Atlas.ti). During the initial wave of data collection, when community disruption 
will be the highest, we will focus on community leaders / stakeholders and residents who are 
willing and available to speak with our team. We will use various methods to recruit participants, 
including flyers, message board posts on virtual forums, word of mouth, newspaper and internet 
searches to identify and then contact community leaders, etc. (See appendix attachment for 
example language that we would post to recruit participants.) One of our primary go ls of 
recruitment will be to minimize respondent burden (e.g., we will NOT ask a school principal for 
a letter of support so we can interview all of his/her teachers; instead we will ask to interview the 
principal to get a broader perspective). Upon each face-to-face meeting, we will explain the 
research project and gain signatures of informed consent. Once a participant has been identified 
and has agreed to be a part of the study, he/she will be presented with the university approved 
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IRB form (see attached). (2)The survey questions (see attachment) will be administered at the 
end of the open-ended interview. The survey will be administered via an electronic device (e.g., 
iPad), in person, and the questions will be asked out loud and recorded on the spot into the 
device. This will allow for easier quantification of some results. We are currently working to 
finalize the close- nded questions with the team and will upload as an amendment as soon as 
possible. (3)Participants will be asked to complete a demographic form (see attachment) so that 
the team can compile basic demographic information regarding respondents and contact them for 
possible follow-up interviews. Please see two attachments – one for respondents who are key 
stakeholders who are presenting their organizations; another for affected residents. 
(4)Photographs of building and community damage will be taken in order to track rebuilding, 
reconstruction, and recovery processes over time. This is a method that has been used by many 
of the engineers on the NIST team. They follow various protocols regarding the taking of phot s, 
including only taking publically viewable/available photos when permission is not attained. 
Meaning, the engineers frequently take photos of damaged buildings and infrastructure as part of 
the quick response portion of the research. These photos typically have no human subjects and 
therefore no permissions attached to them as the damage is “viewable from the street” and 
building owners or occupants are typically not available at the time the photos are taken. For 
example, in a typical engineering project not involving human subjects, the protocol is that for a 
commercial building they cannot go onto the property without permission. If it is a school or 
public building, the researchers can usually (~50%+) get access from the police at a barricde 
with proper identification. For residential structures, they can take photos from the lot line or 
walk closer to the perimeters when they are not occupied. It is usually not possible to obtain 
permission for residential buildings, but sometimes they knock on the door, present a business 
card (while wearing a hard hat with the university on it), and explain what they are doing. They 
are sometimes invited in, but they only document the damage to the structure, not the personal 
stories of residents. These structural photos are important to gather b seline data to understand 
building impacts and to capture recovery over time. In the rare event that individuals are vi ible 
in any of the damage photos that the team takes, their faces will be blurred out to protect Page 9 
of 18 identities or permission will be attained to use their photos. In this study, we are interested 
in both the documentation of structural damage and the personal stories of disaster survivors. 
Therefore, a similar protocol will be followed for any public spaces in terms of photographing 
buildings. However, when we photograph private spaces and human subjects, a permission form 
will be acquired from all individuals or organizational representatives (see attached permission 
form). 
b) State if audio or video taping will occur. Describe how the tapes will be maintained during 
and upon completion of the project. Describe what will become of the tapes after use (e.g., 
shown at scientific meetings, erased, etc.). Original data access is limited to project investigators 
and will be maintained for the three-year archive period following the conclusion of the study. 
All investigators on the larger project have been notified that only those who have completed the 
required ethics training and who are listed as part of the potential field study team will have 
access to this data. All physical data will be stored in a locked file cabinet and all electronic 
media will be saved in locked offices on the password protected computers of the principal 
investigators. A linked-list will be created where all identifiable information will be replaced 
with code numbers. The same code will be used for the audio recording, field notes, and 
photographs from each site. No names will be attached to this documentation. 
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Audio recordings that contain identifiable information will only be seen/heard by team members. 
Photos produced through the field work that contain identifiable information will only be 
seen/viewed by team members unless express written permission is provided by anyone 
identifiable in those images. c) State if deception will be used. If so, provide a rationale and 
describe debriefing procedures. Submit a debriefing script in the Attachment section (#11). 
No deception will be used under any circumstance. 3. Background/Rationale a) Briefly describe 
past findings leading to the formulation of the study, if applicable. Community infrastructure 
systems that are essential to the economic security and social well-being of any 
nation/state/community are susceptible to damage due to extrem environmental and geophysical 
hazards, such as hurricane wind storms and floods, tornadoes, earthquakes, tsunamis, and 
wildfires, as well as anthropogenic hazards such as industrial accidents. The human and 
economic losses and social disruption caused by failure of infrastructure systems is often 
disproportionately high in relation to the physical damage to such systems. The potential exists 
for even larger losses, given the shifts of population and economic development to hazard-prone 
coastal areas of the United States and global climate change. The aftermath of recent disasters, 
such as Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, earthquakes in Haiti, Chile, New Zealand and Japan, and 
Cyclone Haiyan in the Philippines have revealed the importance of disaster mitigation policies 
that focus on the resilience of the community as a whole, rather than those that simply address 
safety and functionality of individual infrastructure facilities and broader engineered and social 
and economic systems. Herein, the resilience of a community is defined by the ability of its 
physical and non-physical infrastructure (core built environment, social institutions, and its 
people) to return to a level of normalcy within a reasonable time following the occurrence of an 
event. Resilience reflects the community’s preparedness and ability to respond to and recover 
from a disaster. Enhancing community resilience is a national mperative (see Presidential Policy 
Directive 21). Despite significant progress in disaster-related science and technology, natural and 
human-caused disasters in the United States are responsible for over $55 billion in average 
annual costs in terms of injuries and lives lost, disruption of commerce and economic networks, 
property damaged or destroyed, the cost of mobilizing emergency response personnel and 
equipment, and recovery of essential services (NIST, 2010, NAE, 2012). The state of the art 
regarding the performance of individual constructed facilities (e.g., bridges, buried piping, 
electrical substations) and the integrity of individual infrast ucture systems (electrical, gas, and 
water distribution systems) during extreme events is reasonably mature. Most research on 
community resilience has focused on the response of civil infrastructure systems to specific 
extreme natural hazards, such as erthquakes (e.g., Bruneau, et al., 2003). Such systems are 
interconnected, however, and their functioning is dependent on the availability and functioning 
of other connected systems (Rinaldi, et al., 2001). 
Furthermore, the distinctive features of each hazard (e.g., advance warning time, area affected, 
type and severity of damage, populations displaced) have caused hazard mitigation 
methodologies to be strongly hazard-dependent. Multiple hazards, and the differences in 
community response to them, or synergis that might be achieved in policies to mitigate risk or 
enhance community resilience under multiple hazards, have received only limited attention. 
Similarly, while each facility and infrastructure system has its own characteristic response to a 
natural hazard, the performance of these systems during and following a disaster are positively 
correlated due to the extended spatial scale of the hazard and the interconnected ature of their 
successful (or unsuccessful) operations within the community. These positive spatiotemporal 
correlations are an essential ingredient of resilience assessment, but are not reflected in current 
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loss estimation platforms. The numerous sources of uncertainties associated with the life cycle 
performance of infrastructure systems make a risk-informed decision-making approach to assess 
facility and community risks and to identify cost-effective strategies to enhance ommunity 
resilience absolutely essential. Finally, the reality of climate change may require modifications o 
existing decision methods based on life-cycle metrics for mitigating competing hazards and 
enhancing community resilience with time horizons extending over the next century and for 
allocating risks equitably between the current and future g nerations. 
The past three decades have seen significant advances in the science of reducing the impacts of 
extreme natural hazards on individual physical facilities and infrastructure networks. Much of 
this research has been incorporated into design and construction practice through our system of 
codes and standards, which is the primary vehicle in the United States (US) for managing risks to 
the built environment. In the current 
US regulatory system, codes and standards apply to individual facilities and focus on 
preservation of life safety under severe events. Resilience, however, is a concept best applied to 
communities rather than to individual infrastructure facilities and individual networks because 
community resilience goals are based on social needs and objectives (such as post-disaster 
recovery) which are not reflected in codes, standards n  other regulatory documents. Of the four 
attributes of resilience suggest d by Bruneau, et al. (2003) – robustness, rapidity, redundancy, 
and resourcefulness – only one – robustness – is affected by provisions in codes and standards. 
Functionality and time to recovery following the occurrence of an event are equally important 
but are not reflected in building regulation.(Footnote: The SPUR Program in San 
Francisco (Poland 2011) is attempting to establish a set of performance objectives for critical 
buildings in different performance categories exposed to different earthquake intensit es and with 
different functionality needs. While the SPUR Program provides an example of community 
resilience planning for one type of infrastructure system (critical facilities) and one hazard 
(earthquake), more general metrics, criteria and guidelines based on measurement science are 
required for communities with different hazard exposures, social needs and resources.) Science-
based measurement tools to evaluate performance and resilience at community scales, fully 
integrated supporting databases and risk-informed decision frameworks to support optimal life-
cycle technical and social policies aimed at enhancing ommunity resilience do not exist. 
Furthermore, there is a lack of consensus on appropriate metrics for community resilience and 
how they might be incorporated into design criteria for the built environment. 
Fundamental Research Issues 
A review of the literature [e.g., McAllister (2013); United Nations Office for Disaster Risk 
Reduction 
(UNISDR (www.unisdr.org)]] has identified a number of critical challenges confronting the 
development of a resilient built environment, among them: 1) Quantitative metrics and tools for 
assessing community resilience are required to improve resilience in the built and modified 
natural environment. Community resilience objectives and policies should be developed for 
regional hazards, include goals and performance criteria based on the role of each facility or 
infrastructure system in the community, should be consistent and fully incorporated in the design 
standards and codes for new buildings and infrastructure systems, and should be tailored to the 
needs of each community. 2) Community resilience plans and guidance are needed to help 
communities plan for hazard-specific performance, and for restoring community infrastructure 
systems in a cost effective and timely manner. Such planning needs to consider infrastructure 
interdependencies, resources available for planning, mitigation, recovery, and special 
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performance goals and measures for critical/essential systems. 3) Existing building and 
infrastructure systems must be considered in community resilience planning as well as new 
construction, recognizing that existing buildings (a) may not meet current codes an  standards; 
(b) in many cases cannot be modified economically to meet modern design and construction 
practices; and (c) may have deteriorated due to structural aging. 4) Codes and standards with 
consistent performance goals for all buildings and infrastructure systems are a key component 
for achieving a resilient comunity, but such consistency is seldom achieved. Transportation 
systems are designed and maintained by cities or states, which may not adopt current model 
codes and standards, or may exempt significant requirements; electric power, communication, 
and water systems rely on industry standards, focusing on reliability of service rather than 
system performance during or after hazard events. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* * * Subject Population * * * 
4. Subject Population - In the space below, please describe the participants tha you are 
requesting to recruit (include requested participant number and description of each group 
requested). 
a) Requested Participant Description (Include number that you plan to study and description of 
each group requested, if applicable). 
The research will involve up to 200 adults in each post-disaster community over the course five 
years. 
1. Approximate # of participants in each community (will include specific number in each 
amendment) 
2. Description of groups to study: Community leaders / stakeholders including: local business 
owners and business managers, local government officials including elected lead rs, emergency 
managers, first responders, city planners, leaders of non-profits and other service organizations 
such as religious leaders, health care administrators, school administrators, and residents (e.g., 
renters, home owners, mobile home residents). 
3. All adults, including employees, elderly, pregnant women, non-english speakers, could 
potentially be included in the study. However, it is important to note that the s udy team will 
seek out individuals who are knowledgeable about the community and about disaster impacts on 
the community. The team will also be particularly sensitive to not include individuals who have 
experienced the most devastating losses (e.g., if someone has lost a family member or friend in 
the disaster, they likely would be excluded from the study out of respect for their privacy and the 
grieving process). 
b) What is the rationale for studying the requested group(s) of participants? 
Community resilience depends on the performance of the built environment and on supporting 
social, economic, and public institutions that, individually and collectively, are essential for 
immediate response and long-term recovery within the community following a disaster. The 
resilience goals of a community are based on social needs and objectives that are specific to its 
character –its prior experience with natural hazards, the vulnerability/resilience of the 
population, economic and financial drivers and resources, and local building regulations and 
construction practices. The performance of the built environment in the US, which is a key factor 
in community resilience, is largely determined by codes and standards, which are applicable to 
individual facilities and have the primary objective of prese ving life safety under severe events. 
Current codes do not address facility performance in the period of recovery following an event. 
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Moreover, design of inter-dependent transportation systems, utilities, and communication 
systems currently is based on different criteria. In the present environment, there is no assurance 
that all systems required for community resilience will perform at a consistent lev l during and 
following a hazard. 
Furthermore, science-based measurement tools to evaluate performance and resilience at the 
community scales, fully integrated supporting databases, and risk-informed decision frameworks 
to support optimal life-cycle technical and social policies aimed at enhancing community 
resilience do not exist. In light of the importance of understanding community resilience and in 
order to build robust models that can be used to increase the resilience of a community, it is 
necessary that we speak to participants in a post-disaster context to learn how the disaster has 
impacted them, what influences their resulting behavior and what determines their recovery 
trajectory. Specifically, we need to learn from leaders and residents about decisions that they 
made before, during, and after a disaster event so that we can better map out and quantify 
recovery and resiliency trajectories. 
c) If applicable, state the rationale for involvement of potentially vulnerable subjects to be 
entered into the study, including minors, pregnant women, economically and educationally 
disadvantaged, and decisionally impaired people. Specify the measures being tak n to minimize 
the risks and the chance of harm to the potentially vulnerable subjects. 
Our team plans to only interview adult participants in this study. We understand that this 
population may contain persons such as women, minorities, non-E glish speakers, and 
economically and educationally disadvantaged. 
Moreover, during the immediate disaster period, even those not considered traditionally 
"vulnerable" may have had their lives minimally to significantly disrupted. Our team is aware of 
this dynamic and is very sensitive to it. This is one of the primary reasons we plan to initially 
focus (immediate post-disaster phase) on community leaders and stakeholders, as they tend to be 
the leaders who are used to serving as spokespersons for their organizations and institutions. O r 
team also plans to observe various residence types (e.g., mobile homes, apartments, single family 
homes, etc.) to understand the different disaster impacts on the physical infrastructure and on the 
individuals living in those structures. Again, we will be careful to invite residents to participate, 
never coercing them, and encouraging them to share their stories on their own terms. 
To date, the research team has conducted multiple research projects in the U.S. and 
internationally with adults and children who were directly affected by a disaster. None of those 
individuals became distraught during the interviews. At the end of the interviews, almost 
everyone expressed appreciation for having had the opportunity to tell their story. 
Based on our experiences with post-disaster social science research, we believe that a negative 
psychological response to these interviews is unlikely. However, we recognize that some persons 
may be reminded of unpleasant experiences related to the disaster. Thus, participation is 
completely voluntary, and the person can end the interview at any point. We will also share 
mental health referral resources with e participants. If at any point the interviewer notices that 
the participant is experiencing emotional pain or trauma, the recording will be stopped and the 
participant will be reminded that they have the right to permanently end the interview with zero 
negative consequences at any time. 
d) If women, minorities, or minors are not included, a clear compelling rationale must be 
provided. Examples for not including minors: participant must be a registered voter; the d ug or 
device being studied would interfere with normal growth and development; etc. 
N/A 
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e) State if any of the subjects are students, employees, or laboratory personnel. They should be 
presented with the same written informed consent. If compensation is allowed, they should also 
receive it. N/A 
f) Describe how potential subjects will be identified for recruitment. Examples include: class 
rosters, group membership, individuals answering an advertisement, organization position titles 
(i.e., Presidents, web designers, etc.). How will potential participants learn about the research and 
how will they be recruited 
(e.g., flyer, email, web posting, telephone, etc.)? Attach recruitment materials in the Attachment 
section (#11). Important to remember: subjects cannot be contacted before IRB approval. 
We will recruit participants through multiple channels. Because these will be quick response 
field studies in the immediate aftermath of disaster, we will need to simultaneously be attentive 
to and respectful of the post-disaster context. Several of the field study leads, including Peek, 
Tobin-Gurley, Peacock, Van Zandt, and others have extensive experience with conducting quick 
response research involving human subjects in disaster-affected areas. Similarly, all of the 
engineers on the team have b en involved in rapid response tudies where they have collected 
highly perishable data on damaged or destroyed buildings and infrastructure. 
Over the years the social scientists have honed and refined their approaches t  recruitment, and 
often find participants through multiple channels including: word-of-mouth (friends, colleagues, 
responders in affected areas often help to find target populations); flyers posted in strategic reas 
(business districts, emergency response centers, etc.) (see attached recruitment flyer); newspap r 
stories and social media posts calling for participants, etc. We will pursue similar channels with 
this project, and as noted above, at all times will work to minimize respondent burden. 
In addition, because this is a study of resilience and thus requires that we study the community 
over time, we have added a portion to our IRB consent form, asking respondents if they are 
willing to be contacted for follow up interviews. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* * * Subject Population * * * 
4. Subject Population (continued) 
g) Identify the inclusion and exclusion criteria. 
1. Exclusion: We will not actively recruit individuals who have lost family memb rs or friends in 
the disaster, out of respect for their situation. With that said, if individuals with those experiences 
reach out to us (for example, in response to a recruitment flyer) they will not be automatically 
excluded from the study. 
Again, we just will attempt to be sensitive to this dynamic, should it arise. 
2. Inclusion: We will focus primarily on decision makers, leaders, and others, at least initially, 
who can give us a big picture perspective regarding the impacts of the disaster. We will also 
select some homeowners, renters, business owners and others who have exp ri nced various 
degrees of damage to their proerty or surrounding infrastructure so we can better understand 
resilience in context. Persons who will be invited to participate will be able to speak to broader 
social trends that can be quantified and used to improve the modeling of community resiliency 
modeling of community resiliency. 
h) Compensation. Explain the amount and schedule of compensation, if any, that will be paid for 
participation in the study. Include provisions for prorating payment. 
N/A 
i) Estimate the probable duration of the entire study. This estimate should include the total time 
each subject is to be involved and the duration the data about the subject is to be collected (e.g., 
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This is a 2-year study. Participants will be interviewed 3 times per year; each interview will last 
approximately 
2 hours. Total approximate time commitment for participants is 12 hours.) 
•There will be a minimum of three interviews for approximately 15-30 minutes each spread over 
a one to three year duration (approximate). 
•The initial timing, the number of interviews, and the duration of those interviews will be 
determined, in part, by the scale of the disaster. For instance, in a smaller scale disaster, our team 
might be able to mobilize and move into the field within a matter of days; in a larger scale event, 
like Katrina, weeks may pass before we begin the investigation due to logistical complications 
with entering a badly damaged region. A study of a smaller scale disaster (like the Windsor 
tornado) might be completed in a year. A study of a larger scale disaster, like Sandy or Katrina, 
could go on for many ears. Resilience is a difficult concept to measure as it must be measured 
over time, and the time scale of recovery varies based on the initial disaster impact. 
•Three to five communities will be studied in years 1-5 of the grant. If additional funding is 
received for years 6-10, additional communities would eventually likely be included. For now, 
though, the 
Center is only funded for the first five years. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* * * Risks * * * 
5. Risks (Input N/A if not applicable) 
US Department of Health & Human Services (HHS) Regulations define a subject at risk s 
follows: "...any individual who may be exposed to the possibility of injury, including physical, 
psychological, or social injury, as a consequence of participation as a subject in any research, 
development, or related activity which departs from the application of those accepted methods 
necessary to meet his needs, or which increases the ordinary risks of daily life, including the 
recognized risks inherent in a chosen occupation or field of service." 
a) For the following categories, include an estimate of the potential risk. Input N/A if not 
applicable.  
There is a minimal possibility of psychological risk in this study because 1) Particip n s have 
already experienced an upsetting event, i.e., the disaster and 2) We will be asking them questions 
about their own experiences with or their communities’ disaster impacts and longer term 
recovery. That being said, we do not expect there to be any serious harm associated with 
participating in this study, however, there are no immediate benefits either. Over the longer term, 
the study itself is designed to inform policy and practice to improve the resilience of people 
living in disaster-affected communities. 
b) In case of overseas research, describe qualifications/preparations that enable you to evaluate 
cultural appropriateness and estimate/minimize risks to subjects. 
International studies are possible, but highly unlikely given time and budget constraints. It would 
have to be in a developed country that has similar buildings and infrastructure systems, political
structures, etc. (for instance, in the highly unlikely event that an international location were 
selected, it would be a place, like New Zealand, where the physical, social, and economic 
environments are such that results can be applicable to communities in the U.S. However, if we
are in a community that has a high non-E glish speaking population, we will make sure a team 
member that is fluent in the dominant language conducts the interview. We will also make sure 
to have all consent and other informational forms translated and presented to the participant in 
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their primary language. Again, this is a highly unlikely scenario and we realize any such change 
to this base IRB protocol would require a detailed and extensive amendment. 
c) Discuss plans for ensuring necessary medical or professional intervention in the event of a 
distressed subject. 
We will include information regarding local mental health specialists on the consent form and 
will recommend that participants seek additional help or withdraw from the study if the  appear 
distressed at any point. We have created such flyers and forms for other disasters that we have 
studied, and have members of the team who are quite skilled at assembling these types of 
documents. We take providing this information seriously, and will create this type of flyer as 
soon as we have agreed that we will move into a study community. 
d) If audio/video taping will be used, state if it could increase potential risk to subject's 
confidentiality. 
We cannot promise anonymity to informants in this research, but we can offer confidentiality in 
that no names will be used in any written reports or publications that are issued from the study. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* * * Benefits,Procedures to Maintain Confidentiality * * * 
6. Benefits 
a) Describe the potential benefit(s) to be gained by the subjects or how the results of the study 
may benefit future subjects. Indicate if there is no direct benefit to the participants. 
Potential Benefits to Participants: 
There are no direct benefits to participants as they will not be compensated for their time. 
However, as described above, the entire project is designed to provide longer term benefits. 
Potential Benefits to Society: 
The primary contributions of this research to society include the eventual development of a 
computational environment that can be used by decision makers to help them optimize 
investments in community resilience. 
We plan to actively promote our research and the products generated well beyond scholarly 
audiences to ensure that the general public, disaster recovery practitioners and organizations, nd 
others in hazard-prone communities have access to the information generated. This project is 
poised to influence both scholarly and broader social domains through contributions to graduate 
student training, enhanced public discourse, and increased community resilience. 
The applicants (Van de Lindt and Ellingwood) and collabortor (Peek) along with the many 
other investigators on this study have a demonstrated track record in basic research, applied and 
evaluation activities, and policy translation. 
7. Procedures to Maintain Confidentiality 
a) Describe the procedures in place that will protect the privacy of the subjects and maintain the 
confidentiality of the data. If a linked list is used, explain when the linked list will be destroyed. 
Provide a sample of the code that will be used, if applicable. 
All physical data will be stored in a locked file cabinet and all electronic media will be saved on 
a password-protected computer in locked offices. A linked-list will be created where all 
identifiable information will be replaced with code numbers. The same code will be used for the 
audio recording, field notes, and photographs from each participnt. No names will be attached 
to this documentation. We cannot promise anonymity to informants in this research, but we can
offer confidentiality in that no names will be used in any written reports or publications are 
issued from the study. The use of any images (still or video) that compromise anonymity and 
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confidentiality as above will only be done with the written permission of all individuals 
identifiable in the image. 
b) If information derived from the study will be provided to the subject's per onal physician, a 
government agency, or any other person or group, describe to whom the information will be 
given and the nature of the information. 
c) Specify where and under what conditions study data will be kept, how samples will be labeled, 
who has access to the data, and what will be available and to whom. Federal Regulations require 
that study data and consent documents be kept for a minimum of three (3) years after the 
completion of the study by the PI. For longitudinal projects, the PI may be required to keep the 
data and documents for a longer time period. 
Data access is limited to project team investigators who have completed the required ethics 
training and will be maintained for the three-year archive period following conclusions of the 
study. No facial images will be used in any outlet without express written permission. 
Audio recordings that contain identifiable information will only be seen/h ard by team members 
who have completed the required ethics training. Photos produced through the research that 
contain identifiable information will only be seen/viewed by team members unless express 
written permission is provided by anyone identifiable in those images (see attached consent 
form). All raw data will be stored on password protected computers in locked offices and a 
linked-list will be created where all identifiable information will be replaced with code numbers. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* * * Potential Conflict of Interest * * * 
8. Potential Conflict of Interest 
Although you have already submitted CSU's official Conflict of Interest form (COI/COC) to the 
University, it is the IRB's responsibility to ensure that conflicting interests related to submitted 
protocols do not adversely affect the protection of participants or the credibility of the human 
research protection program at CSU. 
Please answer questions a-d below. Please note that if you indicate that you have a potential 
conflict of interest in relation to this protocol, your CSU COI/COC Reporting Form must reflect 
this potential conflict. 
Link to CSU's Conflict of Interest policy: http://www.provost.colostate.edu/print coirev.pdf. 
a) N In connection with this protocol, do you or any of the protocol investigators or their 
immediate family members (i.e., spouse and legal dependents, as determined by the IRS) have a 
potential conflict of interest? 
b) N/A If you do have a potential conflict of interest, is this reported in your current COI/COC? 
c) N/A If you do have a potential conflict of interest, is there a management plan in place to 
manage this potential conflict? 
d) N/A If you do have a potential conflict of interest, is this potential conflict of interest included 
in your consent document (as required in the Management Plan)? 
If you have reported a possible conflict of interest, the IRB will forward the ti le of this protocol 
to your Research Associate Dean to complete your COI file. 
For more information on CSU's policy on Conflict of Interest, please see the Colorado State 
University 
Academic Faculty and Administrative Professional Manual Sections D.7.6 & D.7.7: 
http://www.facultycouncil.colostate.edu/files/manual/sectiond.htm#D.7.6. 
Link to CSU's Conflict of Interest policy: http://www.provost.colostate.edu/print coirev.pdf . 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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* * * Informed Consent * * * 
9. Informed Consent See sample consent forms at 
http://web.research.colostate.edu/ricro/hrc/forms.aspx 
NOTE: In order to complete this protocol, you must upload either a Consent Form or an 
Alteration of 
Consent Form (i.e., Cover Letter or Verbal Script) OR (if neither of those apply to your project) 
you must complete the Waiver of consent information. 
In the space below, provide consent process background information, for each Consent Form, 
Alteration of 
Consent Form (i.e., Cover Letter or Verbal Script), or Waiver of consent. You will not be able to 
submit this protocol without completing this information. 
Informed Consent 
Title NIST Consent Form 
Consent Information Type Consent 
Consent Form Template X Attachment NIST Consent Form FINAL 
Who is obtaining consent? The person obtaining consent must be knowledgeable about the study 
and authorized by the PI to consent human subjects. 
NIST Researchers 
How is consent being obtained? 
In person, in writing 
What steps are you taking to determine that potential subjects are competent to participate in the 
decision making process? 
We will discuss the consent form with each participant and make sure they understand its 
contents prior to the interview. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* * * Assent Background * * * 
10. Assent Background 
All minors must provide an affirmative consent to participate by signing a simplified assent 
form, unless the 
Investigator(s) provides evidence to the IRB that the minor subjects are not capable of assenting 
because of age, maturity, psychological state, or other factors. 
See sample assent/consent forms at http://web.research.colostate.edu/ricro/hrc/forms.aspx 
If applicable, provide assent process background information for each Assent Form, Alte ation of 
Assent Form (i.e., Cover Letter or Verbal Script), or Waiver. 
Assent Background 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* * * Attachments * * * 
11. Attachments 
Attach relevant documents here. These could include: Collaborating Investigator's IRB approval 
and approved documents; Conflict of Interest information; Debriefing Script; Grant/Sub-
contract; HIPAA 
Authorization or Waiver Form from HIPAA-covered entity; Interview/Focus Group Questions; 
Investigator's 
Brochure; Letters of Agreement/Cooperation from organizations who will help with recruitment; 
Methodology section of associated Thesis or Dissertation project; Questionnaires; Radiation 
Control Office approval material; Recruitment Material (e.g., flyers, email text, verbal scripts); 
219 
Sponsor 's Protocol; Surveys; Other files associated with protocol (can upload most standard file 
formats: xls, pdf, jpg, tif, etc.) Please be sure to attach all documents associated with your 
protocol. Failure to attach the files associated with the protocol may result in this protocol being 
returned to you for completion prior to being reviewed. Students: Be sure to attach the Methods 
Section of your thesis or dissertation proposal. All PIs: If this protocol is associ ted with a grant 
proposal, please remember to attach your grant. To update or revise any attachments, please 
delete the existing attachment and upload the revised document to replace it. 
Document Type Other Protocol Material 
Attachment MASTER Contact List 
Document Name MASTER Contact List 
Document Type Interview/Focus Group Questions 
Attachment NIST Interview Guide FINAL 
Document Name NIST Interview Guide FINAL 
Document Type Other Protocol Material 
Attachment DemographicInfoOrganizationsFINAL 
Document Name DemographicInfoOrganizationsFINAL 
Document Type Other Protocol Material 
Attachment DemographicInfoResidentsFINAL 
Document Name DemographicInfoResidentsFINAL 
Document Type Recruitment Material (e.g., flyers, email text, verbal scripts) 
Attachment Field Studies Recruitment Flyer 
Document Name Field Studies Recruitment Flyer 
Document Type Grant/Sub-Contract 
Attachment NIST Award_70NANB15H044 
Document Name NIST Award_70NANB15H044 
Document Type Other Protocol Material 
Attachment Photo Release Form 
Page 18 of 18 
Document Name Photo Release Form 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* * * Obligations * * * 
Obligations (Researcher's Responsibilities) 
The Principal Investigator is ultimately responsible for the conduct of the proj ct. Obligations of 
the Principal Investigator are: 
Conduct the research involving human subjects as presented in the protocol, including 
modifications, as approved by the Department and Institutional Review Board. Changes in any 
aspect of the study (for example project design, procedures, consent forms, advertising materials, 
additional key personnel or subject population) will be submitted to the IRB for approval before 
instituting the changes (PI will submit the "Amendment/Revision" f rm); 
Provide all subjects a copy of the signed consent form, if applicable. Investigators are required to 
retain signed consent documents for three (3) years after close of the study; 
Maintain an approved status for Human Subjects Protection training. Training must be pdated 
every three (3) years (Contact RICRO to check your current approval/renewal dates). For more 
information: Human Subjects 
Training Completed? 
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Submit either the "Protocol Deviation Form" or the "Report Form" to report ro ocol 
Deviations/Violations, Unanticipated Problems and Adverse Events that occur in the course of 
the protocol. Any of these events must be reported to the IRB as soon as possible, but not later 
than five (5) working days; 
Submit the "Continuing Review" Form in order to maintain active status of the approved 
protocol. The form must be submitted annually at least four (4) weeks prior to expiration, five (5) 
weeks for protocols that require full review. If the protocol is not renewed before expiration, all 
activities must cease until the protocol has been rereviewed; 
Notify the IRB that the study is complete by submitting the "Final Report" form. 
X The Principal Investigator has read and agrees to abide by the above obligations. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
